concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that Paroline has raised a triable issue of a hostile sexual environment at the company which made working conditions for her a source of considerable apprehension. I thus concur in part III of the majority opinion. I do not think, however, that there is any evidence that Unisys attempted to discharge Paro-line, “constructively” or otherwise. I thus dissent from part IV. The issue is of more than theoretical import; a finding of constructive discharge carries an award of back pay.1
A constructive discharge is not an actual discharge; like a claim of “constructive *114notice” or “constructive possession” it will always have its fictional elements.. In this, as in other claims of constructive discharge, no one was actually terminated; instead the employee quit. Because the claim of constructive discharge is so open to abuse by those who leave employment of their own accord, this circuit has insisted that it be carefully cabined.
A plaintiff alleging constructive discharge must thus prove two elements: “deliberateness of the employer’s action, and intolerability of the working conditions.... Deliberateness exists only if the actions complained of ‘were intended by the employer as an effort to force the employee to quit.’ ” Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.1985), quoting EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir.1983), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 867, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984).2 Although a failure to act in the face of known intolerable conditions may create an inference that the employer was attempting to force the plaintiff to resign, Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir.1984), such an inference depends upon some evidence that the inaction of the employer was directed at the plaintiff. The fact that all employees were treated identically rebuts any inference that the treat ment of the plaintiff was done “with the intention of forcing him to resign. Certainly ... [the employer] did not wish to force all of its employees to resign.” Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.1981).
In this case, there is no evidence that Unisys engaged in any adverse action or inaction directed at the plaintiff Paroline. To the contrary, Unisys took remedial action when presented with Paroline’s complaint. The company told Moore that if there were any more such incidents he would be fired. There were, in fact, no 1 more such incidents. A written memorah-dum, setting forth the conditions of his continued employment, was placed in Moore’s personnel file. Moore was required to seek counseling; his planned promotion and salary increase were delayed; and his contact with female employees was limited to official company business. Moreover, Unisys asked Paroline not to quit. The company also gave Paroline two weeks off in which to recuperate. Finally, Unisys offered to pay for counseling for Paroline. How this course of conduct amounts to a constructive discharge of Pa-roline on the part of Unisys is beyond me. Paroline did not, however, give these remedies the opportunity to work. See Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, 807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir.1987).
The majority bases its argument that there was a genuine issue as to Unisys’ intent upon one fact: that Unisys’ remedial action of withdrawing Moore’s access to its Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility actually “increased the risk of contact between Moore and Paroline, precisely at a time when Paroline wanted to avoid Moore altogether.” The majority speculates this might conceivably be evidence of a ploy by a “clever or sophisticated” employer from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that Unisys intended to provoke Paroline to resign. The majority, however, overlooks the fact that Paroline herself, in an interview during Unisys’ investigation of her complaint, requested that Unisys withdraw Moore’s SCIF access. Unisys was in the process of getting Paroline a transfer so that she would be able to work in the section of the building that Moore could not enter. The fact that issuance of a SCIF clearance for Paroline rests with the Department of Defense does nothing to meet the point that Unisys was acting in accordance with Paroline’s wishes in the matter.
The majority contends that, while the response of Unisys to Paroline’s complaint may well have been*satisfactory, the claim *115of constructive discharge in this case must nonetheless be submitted to the fact-finder. If, however, a claim this thin is one for the trier of fact, it is hard to imagine any claim of constructive discharge on which summary judgment would be appropriate. The implications of the majority’s holding are most troubling. To protect itself as a matter of law against a claim of constructive discharge an employer may now be prompted to immediately dismiss any employee against whom a complaint of harassment is lodged. Whether this rule comports with any basic sense of personal fairness or due process, the majority neglects to ask. The workplace is to become the world of the accuser, where the slightest hesitancy in discharging the target of an accusation may lead the accuser to quit and later hold the company liable for constructive discharge.
One may take quite seriously the problems of sexual harassment in the workplace without subscribing to part IV of the • majority opinion. Title VII suits for sexual harassment implicate several interests. The victim has an interest in not having to run a daily gauntlet of unwelcome pressures and advances at work. The accused also has an interest, however, in not losing a job or reputation on the basis of an accusation which turns out to be mistaken or downright false. The rule of law must reflect some equation of interests in a controversy. With all respect for the majority, it has left companies little incentive to inquire. Under the majority’s view, the safe legal course is to act upon accusation, and not risk a claim of constructive discharge by waiting for the facts.
Instead of indicating an intent to force Paroline to leave, the company’s actions here reflect the opposite; Unisys actively took action to improve Paroline’s conditions of employment. Because there was no evidence presented of any intent to force Pa-roline to leave, and in fact substantial evidence of an intent to persuade her to stay, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Unisys on the claim of constructive discharge.
. I would also hold that upon remand, Paro-line’s claim against Unisys for negligent failure to warn and reckless endangerment must be considered in light of the Virginia Supreme Court’s failure to recognize a tort of negligent supervision of employees in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 365 S.E.2d 751 (1988). I do not understand the majority’s discussion of J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391 (1988), to foreclose the district court’s consideration of the applicability of the Dowdy decision as well. With that understanding, I concur in all of the majority opinion with the exception of part IV.
. While other courts have adopted an objective test, dependent upon the reasonableness of the employer’s action and the reasonableness of the employee’s perception of the intolerable conditions, the result under either standard is the same. Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, 860 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.1988); Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corporation, 798 F.2d 559 (1st Cir.1986); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 796 F.2d 340 (10th Cir.1986); Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.1983).