dissenting.
While I agree with the majority that the district court stated in its findings that “the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing that he is an ‘otherwise qualified handicapped individual,’” that is not the way this case proceeded and the cases cited by the district court do not directly address that question.
The Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), case cited by the district court discusses what the term “otherwise qualified” person means, but it says nothing about who has the burden of proof to show that the employee is an “otherwise qualified individual” in the trial of a case under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir.1985), case cited by the district court likewise says nothing about who has the burden of proof to establish whether a plaintiff is an “otherwise qualified individual” in the trial of a case under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Gardner case states as the majority states that the plaintiff is required to produce sufficient evidence to make at least a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible. Then the burden shifts to the defendant to show that reasonable accommodation is not possible.
Both the Southeastern case and the Gardner case appear to proceéd by assuming the plaintiff is an otherwise qualified individual and, when the plaintiff makes thé facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible, then shift the burden to defendant. The defendant must then show that the accommodations are not possible at all or are not economically possible, or that the individual is not “otherwise qualified” to participate in the program or to do the job the plaintiff is being denied.
This procedure was followed in this case. Arneson presented his evidence showing he could do the work as a claims representative if he had (1) a telephone headset to free his hands; (2) a quiet work space to diminish distractibility; and (3) clerical assistance to check his work. SSA then presented its witnesses to demonstrate what accommodations had been tried and why the accommodations Ameson claims he needs would not enable him to do the work of a claims representative, even if they were supplied. In other words SSA proved that, even with accommodations, Ameson was not an “otherwise qualified individual” to perform the duties of a claims representative. SSA assumed and met its burden of proof, as the district court found in its ruling. The district court was correct.
A review of the trial transcript reveals that the district court never ordered Ame-son to present evidence to prove he was an “otherwise qualified individual” during the presentation of his evidence. At no time before, during, or after the trial did Ame-son raise the issue or object to the evidence he was presenting as improperly shifting the burden of proof to him.
*399Arneson raises it now for the first time on appeal. He should not be permitted to do so because he has waived it. Browzin v. Catholic University of America, 527 F.2d 843 (C.A.D.C.1975). Further, even if Arneson were permitted to do so it should be considered harmless error because this was a court-tried case and the witnesses called by Arneson could have been called just as easily by the SSA.
I find there was more than sufficient evidence presented at the two-day trial to allow the district court to reach its decision. The majority opinion to remand the case for further development of whether SSA attempted all the accommodation suggested by Arneson is unnecessary. The evidence heard and presented by the exhibits was more than sufficient to allow the district court to render its opinion.
As to Ameson’s claim that a telephone headset is needed, he testified that SSA supplied him a telephone headset but he seldom used it and the majority of the time it was kept by him on a shelf in a storage room. As to his contention that he needs a proofreader to check his work, a reading of the transcript shows that suggestion came from witness Vincent Stalk, a vocational counselor for the Missouri Department of Education at the time who identified himself as an advocate for Mr. Arneson (Tr. 93). There is no indication in the transcript that Stalk has a clear understanding of the duties of a claims representative, and his opinion was further made suspect when he testified that another type of work Arneson could do would be a position as a security guard similar to those “we are familiar with in the Federal Courthouse.” (Tr. 96). The Court can only assume that Mr. Stalk is also not familiar with the fact that security guards in federal courthouses are armed with loaded weapons and must know when and how to use them. Mr. Stalk cannot seriously believe that an individual with impairments described by the two neurologists who testified should be placed in a position with the possibility of deciding, under pressure, when to draw and use his weapon.
The district court correctly discounted Mr. Stalks’ testimony and relied on the finding of the neurologists. Ameson’s neurologist, Simon Homstein, M.D., testified that appellant suffers from a “genetically determined disorder of language perceptual and motor functions * * * impaired comprehension of spoken and read [sic] language, poor special [sic] and memory, and impaired ability to. predict and regulate the power output necessary for the completion of acts.” (Tr. 22). Dr. Homstein further testified this affects Ameson’s ability to perform his tasks as a claims representative, in acquiring, arranging and processing data, and would have a considerable effect if he is expected to do it as everyone else does it. Dr. Homstein stated he believes that Arneson could perform his work with the following accommodations: (1) distraction-free environment, (2) opportunity to extend his work hours on his own, and (3) use of an assistant to read and make sure he understands clearly difficult written passages.
Dr. William M. Landau, Chief of Neurology at Washington University/Bames Hospital, testified that the term “apraxia” means a combination of disabilities. “Further stated, this is regarding a congeries or collection of symptoms which can be described in non-medical language in terms of difficulty in bringing ideas together, difficulties in writing, distractibility, motor awkwardness.” (Landau Depo. p. 8).
It is apparent that Arneson cannot perform his duties as a claims representative without a person assisting him to do all those acts required of a claims representative. The description of the duties and responsibilities of the claims representative is spelled out in four single-spaced pages entered into evidence as Arneson exhibit No. 80. It is described as the keystone position in the SSA.
The claims representative must interview the claimant and take down all the relevant information to determine if the claimant is entitled to benefits, then determine the amount of benefits the claimant shall receive. A mere proofreader to check and see if Arneson had filled out the application *400forms correctly is and will be totally inade- . quate, unless the proofreader sits in on the interview with the claimant to make sure that Arneson gets the information correctly and enters it directly in the computer he must now use. (Testimony at the trial from witness Barbara Foster, an operations supervisor at SSA). (Tr. 217). Thus, there must be another employee with Ame-son all the time who is knowledgeable about the qualifications for benefits, and knows how to enter them correctly in the computer — in other words, a claims representative. This is an accommodation not anticipated or allowed under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 “... the Act does not contemplate that a federal employer will launch major restructuring of projects and facilities disregarding expense of accommodation.” Gardner, supra.
As to the suggestion that SSA consider moving Arneson back to the Clayton office, the transcript reveals that the move of Arneson to the Maryland Heights Office was in response to Dr. Bane's recommendation because it was a quieter office with fewer distractions than the Clayton office. (Tr. 272). As to Arneson’s claim that he should be allowed to take files home or be allowed to work longer hours at the office, the transcript shows that Arneson indicated he would do it, “[b]ut if there was scheduled overtime. I want to be paid for it like everyone else if other people were being paid for it.” (Tr. 143, Ins 13-15). This belies Ameson’s contention that he is willing to do anything on his own to be as productive as the other claims representatives.
The remand to the district court is not necessary, but it will enable the district court to direct the SSA to elicit from its witnesses and exhibits more thoroughly when, why and how each recommendation was tried, or why it did not work or was not feasible. Further, the record should be expanded from the witnesses regarding the duties and responsibilities of a claims representative, and what it will cost the SSA in dollars to have a claims representative on the payroll who is not productive and who, without substantial assistance in performing his job, can cause the SSA to pay out large amounts of money to claimants who are approved by Arneson when they should not have been approved.
If there is any weakness in the present record it is the evidence as to why it is not possible for Arneson to take files home to work on and why he can or cannot work on his own time at the office to keep his production up. It should also be made clearer that the way to rate employees’ performances was changed in 1982 “where traits were no longer the item to be rated, it was actual job performance tied in directly with the job,” (Tr. 320) to give supervisors a more accurate idea of the employees’ abilities to actually perform their job by explaining in detail the differences.
I agree with the Court that the Government should bend over backwards to accommodate the handicapped. However, this does not mean the Government should be a floor mat to be walked on by individuals intent on taking advantage of the Government’s perceived inability to discharge non-productive or unqualified employees because most Government supervisors will not be persistent in pursuing all the hearings and appeals an employee can pursue to stay on the payroll. The Court’s ruling in this case perpetuates that reputation.