dissenting.
I concur in the majority decision to vacate that portion of the district court’s order certifying a class action and requiring appellants to submit a remedial plan for the training of Disciplinary Board members and prison inmate advisors. I write to set forth my understanding of the First Amendment issue argued and ruled upon by the district court and briefed and presented to this court. I dissent from the majority decision to address appellees’ claim as a free speech issue. The magistrate and the district court based their opinions on a probable violation of the First Amendment right of access to the courts. Appellees’ brief filed with this court does not set forth a free speech issue. Finding that the right of access to the courts is not implicated in this case, I would also vacate the district court’s grant of injunctive relief.
I. Right of Access to the Courts
The First Amendment guarantees that all persons shall have access to the courts. In a prison context, the right of access to the courts is the right to prepare and file pleadings with a court which fairly represents the inmate’s claim. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72, 83 (1977). In the absence of any meaningful alternative, inmates must be permitted to receive from other inmates assistance in preparing their court documents. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969).
In this case, the district court found ap-pellees had a constitutional right to provide legal advice. This concept has been soundly rejected by other jurisdictions. In Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir.1986), the Eleventh Circuit held that although a prisoner has a right to receive from other inmates assistance and advice on legal matters, trained inmate “law clerks” have no constitutional right to provide legal assistance to prisoners. Similarly in Smith v. Halford, 570 F.Supp. 1187, 1194 (D.Kan.1983), the court noted that no authority existed for the creation of “a [constitutional] right, vested in jailhouse lawyers, to provide legal assistance to others.” But see Gometz v. Henman, 807 F.2d 113, 115 (7th Cir.1986) (leaving unanswered the question of whether a jailhouse lawyer has standing to assert the constitutional rights of the prisoner he desires to assist).
I find appellees have no constitutional right to provide legal assistance to other prisoners. A litigant may present only his *383own rights as the bases of relief. In order for a third party to assert another’s constitutional rights, there must be some impediment to first party litigation. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-116, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2874-2875, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). No impediment to first party litigation is alleged by appellees; the inmates to whom appellees provided assistance are capable of pursuing their own claims.
Assuming arguendo appellees had standing to assert the claims of their inmate clients, the right of access to the courts is not implicated in this case. No inmate has ever been denied access to an inmate advis- or as a result of the decision not to reappoint the appellees to their positions. New inmate advisors were appointed to serve in the positions previously held by the appel-lees. Just as an indigent defendant to a criminal trial does not have a constitutional right to a lawyer of his choice, the prison inmates whom appellees represented are not entitled to the assistance of a particular legal advisor. Cf. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 108 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (finding indigent criminal defendant merely entitled to adequate representation).
Moreover, the right of access to the courts guarantees an inmate access to a court of law for the primary purpose of filing habeas corpus petitions and civil rights complaints. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). By allowing inmates access to the courts to pursue these types of legal proceedings, inmates are provided an avenue for the protection of their constitutional rights. Id. The right of access to the courts does not guarantee an inmate a right to counsel in internal prison administrative proceedings. The assistance provided inmates by appellees was limited to matters involving internal prison disciplinary action before the prison disciplinary board. Appellees did not assist in the preparation of legal memoranda for filing with the courts. Therefore, appellees’ assistance is not guaranteed by the First Amendment right of access to the courts.
II. Right to Free Speech
The majority state:
the appellees commenced the instant action ... [asserting] First Amendment free speech infringements alleging that appellants had conspired to and had deprived them of their constitutional rights to continue to serve as inmate advisors ... in retaliation for complaints filed with the Warden concerning the performance of David Hindman as Chairman of the Disciplinary Board.
Review of appellees’ complaint reveals no express claim of an abridgement of free speech by appellants.1 Reviewing the ap-pellees’ pro se complaint with a measure of leniency, appellees’ complaint may, arguably, be broad enough to encompass a free speech claim. The district court, however, did not grant injunctive relief on such a theory. I believe it is inappropriate to rule on such a theory without the matter being presented to the district court.
A similar issue was encountered by the Eleventh Circuit in Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir.1986). In Adams, inmates who were terminated from law clerk positions instituted a lawsuit to be reinstated. The inmate-law clerks alleged their termination violated their inmate-clients’ First Amendment right of access to the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison administration. On appeal, the inmate-law clerks argued that they raised before the district court claims implicating their own First Amendment rights rather than the rights of their inmate-clients. The inmate-law clerks argued that the district court misunderstood their position and, as a consequence, they were denied relief. The Elev*384enth Circuit only addressed the claim ruled upon by the district court, stating:
[i]t is important that we review the case presented to the district court rather than a better case fashioned after the district court’s order.
784 F.2d at 1080. Likewise, in the instant case, I would review only those matters ruled upon by the district court.
Because the majority discuss the free speech issue, I must express my view that injunctive relief is nonetheless inappropriate because there is no showing of irreparable harm.
The majority relies upon Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2690, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), to support the proposition that any First Amendment infringement, no matter how minimal, constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify in-junctive relief. In Elrod, Justice Brennan, who authored the plurality opinion, stated:
It is clear therefore that First Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was sought. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.... Since such injury was both threatened and occurring at the time of respondents’ motion and since respondents sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, the Court of Appeals might properly have held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief. (Citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Clearly, the Elrod Court contemplated that the First Amendment infringement would either be threatened or occurring at the time relief is sought before the injury could be considered irreparable. Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir.1988) (finding chilling of speech stems not from discharge but from threat of discharge); American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 766 F.2d 715, 722 (2d Cir.1985) (holding employee’s right to free speech not threatened subsequent to discharge), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046, 106 S.Ct. 1262, 89 L.Ed.2d 572 (1986); Kendzierski v. Corey, 615 F.Supp. 550, 552 (N.D.Ind.1985); Savage v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 475 F.Supp. 524, 532 (E.D.Pa.1979), aff'd. 620 F.2d 289 (3rd Cir.1980).
In this case, the First Amendment violation is a past act which is no longer a threat to appellees’ right to free speech. Appellees may now lodge as many complaints as they wish against disciplinary board members.
Since reinstatement and money damages would make appellees whole subsequent to a trial on the merits, I would find appellees failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.2 Accordingly, to the extent that this case is *385addressed as a free speech claim, I would nonetheless deny injunctive relief.
III. Conclusion
Finding no violation of appellees’ right of access to the courts, and further finding it inappropriate to address matters not properly presented in the district court, I would vacate the district court’s order in its entirety.
. The First Amendment right of free speech is not mentioned anywhere in appellees’ complaint. Moreover, the complaint alleges in no uncertain terms that appellees were terminated because they were effective legal advocates, not because they registered complaints about Disciplinary Board Chairman Hindman. See Complaint § 5, para. 24-27; § 6, para. 4; Joint Appendix pp. 16-18.
. It is the very nature of prisons to deprive persons of their liberty. Incarcerated persons retain minimal liberty interests. Prison authorities may threaten the loss of those liberty interests retained by inmates to ensure conformity with prison rules, regulations and policies. The threat of additional deprivations of liberty, however, often has little deterrent effect since many inmates perceive they have nothing left to lose. This situation creates security risks in prisons which are unparalleled when compared to any other facet of society. Because of the nature of prisons and recognizing the grave risks associated with the day-to-day operation of prisons, the Supreme Court has granted prison administrators great deference in the execution of their duties. See e.g., Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908-1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (finding that absent state regulation containing explicitly mandatory language to limit discretion, prison administrators should be afforded vast discretion in the implementation of prison regulations and policies); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251, 260-261 (1986) (holding courts must consider nature of prison setting to prevent prison official’s conduct from being subject to unreasonable post hoc judicial second guessing); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1989) (stating that "Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-range deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (finding policies and goals of correction system may justify restrictions on prisoner’s First Amendment rights).
I believe it is inappropriate to grant injunctive relief in a prison when the injury to the plaintiff is reparable. To hold otherwise unduly restricts the discretion of prison officials and subjects prison officials to premature judicial oversight.