Digital Equipment Corporation v. The United States

BISSELL, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent because the majority has mischaracterized the issue. The issue is not the factual question of whether these particular imports fit within the classification term “rectifying apparatus.” The issue instead is the legal question of whether the judge properly defined the term “rectifying apparatus.” .

First, Digital Equipment Corporation does not dispute that its imported items are computer power supplies, albeit more sophisticated and complex than those available in 1962 when the pertinent TSUS provisions were enacted. Second, based on a review of the 1955 Brussels Nomenclature, technical lexicons and dictionaries, and testimony from both the government’s and importer’s experts, the trial judge determined that the term “rectifying apparatus” in Item 682.60 allows for functions in addition to rectification. Additionally, it is my view that, at the time Congress enacted the 1962 TSUS, it intended the term to encompass “power supplies,” including power supplies for computers. Accordingly, the trial judge erred as a matter of law by defining “rectifying apparatus” to exclude *270certain modern computer power supplies solely on the basis of complexity. Tariff schedules are not frequently revised and of necessity are drafted to accommodate technological advancements. There is nothing in the 1962 TSUS or its legislative history that warrants limiting the definition of “rectifying apparatus” to power supplies of a particular complexity or era. Therefore, I would reverse.