(concurring).
I do not agree with the dissent for two reasons. First, in my view, the law is clear. Morin signed a document called “Conditions of Probation.” Condition 4 said “You shall not leave the Judicial district [i.e., Maine] without the permission of the probation officer.” After an evidentia-ry hearing, the district court found that Morin had left “without the proper authorization” and thus had violated Probation Condition 4. The district court had the legal power to revoke probation for such a violation. See Majority Opinion at 331-332 (citing cases).
The cases chiefly relied upon by the dissent involve different circumstances. In United States v. Reed, 573 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir.1978), United States v. Hamilton, 708 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir.1983), and United States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.1987), the court of appeals remanded a case in which the district court revoked probation. In Reed, however, the court found that the revocation was based partly on a probation violation that had not been charged and had not occurred. See Reed, 573 F.2d at 1023. Here, in contrast, Morin admitted having violated his probation. Similarly, in both Hamilton and Simmons, the Ninth Circuit found, among other things, that the *334probationer did not receive adequate notice of the true nature of his conditions of parole. See Hamilton, 708 F.2d at 1415; Simmons, 812 F.2d 561. Here, the district court found that Morin had received an “elaborate explanation of what was expected of him ... in respect to travel.” Morin received this explanation on the day he was sentenced and again shortly before his trip. Thus, the legal precedents seem to me to support the district court’s decision. See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir.1982) (“In addition to the bare words of the probation condition, the probationer may be guided by the further definition, explanations, or instructions of the ... probation officer.”)
Second, this is not a case that warrants the creation of some new legal principle. The record, as I read it, does not show the imposition of a severe punishment on a sick man for a technical violation so much as it shows a district court eventually concluding that sickness is not a license to violate the law with impunity. It suggests that Morin has made very clear to the court system several times that he is ill; and the system has responded with probation. Morin’s violation is not “technical.” It amounts to a violation of probation’s rather slight restriction on his freedom of action, namely that he cannot leave the state without the requisite permission; and its circumstances suggest both that he does not take the restriction very seriously and that he cannot be trusted to report accurately on his movements. The district court found that Morin “attempted] to withhold ... information” about his trip to New York City, revealing it “only on very specific and detailed inquiry from the probation officer” and only “after he understood that] the probation officer [had] been investigating him.” The district court could conclude that probationer is a person who will violate restrictions on movement when he thinks he can get away with it, and who, when caught, will cite his own bad health as an excuse. The record supports such a characterization. The court’s incarceration order amounts to a determination that Morin should not be trusted to make his own arrangements for treatment; instead, prison officials will make and supervise such arrangements. Given these facts, the court’s decision to revoke probation was within its legal powers.