dissenting.
The district court in this case held that the plaintiffs who had retired had no vested welfare benefits under the applicable ERISA plan and that defendants were entitled to terminate those benefits. The court reached this decision after studying the plan and the evidence in the case, including all the extrinsic evidence. I find that the district court’s decision that the retirees welfare benefits were terminable corresponds with the plan documents, the history of handling benefits under the plan and the actions of the parties, and I therefore would affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants on the issues raised in this case. Judge Keith acknowledges that the definitions section of the plan would exclude retirees such as plaintiffs as covered persons entitled to vested benefits because, plainly, it provides that one must be a full-time employee to be eligible or “covered” for the benefits plaintiffs seek. Because of other inconsistencies retired persons were even considered eligible.
The district court found that the plan “clearly states” that benefits terminate on the date the plan terminates and thus “plan benefits for covered persons are not vested and may be terminated.” It further found the plan to be part of the labor agreement between defendants and their employees, and that the agreement and the plan may be reconciled to provide the intended meaning “that even if the plan or agreement is terminated, benefits will continue ... except that if the fund would not have enough money to pay all the benefits, none of the benefits will be paid.” The district court then concluded “if ABS terminates the plan, and has funded it properly, its liability ceases.” 1 I would find no error in this interpretation. I do not find the cited language from United Auto. Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 1002, 79 L.Ed.2d 234 (1984), to indicate otherwise. See In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.1986); Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1745, 104 L.Ed.2d 182 (1989); Ryan v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 877 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1989), all of which I find to support the district court’s decision.
I therefore DISSENT from the opinion reversing the district court judgment.
. The district court noted that this would follow "once ERISA allowed it to do so.”