dissenting.
In Erebia II, the district court declined to order reinstatement. Instead, it awarded front pay, compensating Erebia for future nonemployment by Chrysler due to its discriminatory treatment of him.
This court reversed on the issue of reinstatement. However, the award of front pay was specifically affirmed.1 The sufficiency of the award is therefore not in issue.
Erebia has thus fully litigated his claim of compensation for not having post-judgment employment at Chrysler. He has received a judgment on that claim with the imprimatur of this court. He should not be permitted to continue to litigate entitlement to employment after having been compensated for lack of same by the award of front pay. As the district court below aptly noted, “[s]uch a theory would cause Title VII and § 1981 cases to go on ad infini-tum.”
In my view, Erebia is precluded, in this action, from again seeking compensation for not being employed by Chrysler.
The majority focuses on the non-finality of the reinstatement issue in reversing the district court, but I perceive the finality of the front pay award as being determinative. Had front pay not been awarded or had its award been reversed by this court in Erebia II, I would join the majority opinion.
For these reasons, I would affirm the district court and must respectfully dissent.
. "We accordingly affirm the district court’s action here as to front end pay because the remedy reflects both the misconduct of the employer and employee in this case.” Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corporation, Nos. 87-3297/3298, (Table), 863 F.2d 47 (6th Cir.1988). Erebia’s misconduct consisted of making unwanted sexual advances toward three female subordinates, and pressing them for sexual favors and money.