concurring in the judgment.
Although on the peculiar facts before us, the majority may have reached a technically correct result under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), I must note that I am troubled by this case. I have been similarly disturbed in the past year by a series of other cases where the Batson issue has been raised and where superficial or almost frivolous excuses for peremptory challenges with racial overtones have been proffered and accepted. I fear that Bat-son is fast coming to offer a theoretical right without an effective remedy.
I am particularly troubled here because the Assistant United States Attorney’s “justification” for the peremptory challenge may reflect an inappropriate hostility to an American1 who was called to an American court to perform one of the most important duties of citizenship. When the Assistant United States Attorney was asked by the trial judge why he used a peremptory challenge against Das, the following colloquy ensued:
PROSECUTOR: For the record, I believe that this juror No. 2 is not, I *1160think — my impression is that he is ... East Indian. He is not a black man, so — at least, not by heritage, I believe. My impression is blacks come from Africa, whereas Mr. Das, Juror No. 2, is clearly, to me, an Indian. And my reasoning in striking him was that I feel that he is probably Hindu in religion, and Hindus tend, in my experience and in talking it over with my counsel, to have feelings a good bit different than ours about all sorts of things, and I am just not certain he would — I am not certain of all those things, and I can be more certain with an American juror, and that was my primary reason for striking him. He may have religious beliefs that may affect his thinking.2
THE COURT: Well, let the record show that, according to the Court’s own observation, Mr. Das is not of the black race. However, we will not question him about his race. We will not question him about his religion. I think that he probably is Indian or some other race. There is one man of the black race, according to my observation, on the jury panel, and only one, and, of course, he is not in controversy here, so I think [the prosecutor’s] explanation is sufficient, so we need not make any other inquiry.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I would, for the record, however, say that the other black man is an alternate and therefore may not serve on the jury, and the other—
THE COURT: Well, he is not in controversy.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: —and the other matter is that Baldhadra Das is a member of the colored race, and I am sure he considers himself as a member of the colored race.
THE COURT: I doubt if he would agree with that.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: But, in any event, I think the explanation given by [the prosecutor] with respect to his guess that this man’s religion is [insufficient 3—
THE COURT: [The prosecutor’s] explanation is that he is just uncertain.
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Um-hum.
THE COURT: He is just uncertain about the man’s background, beliefs. We will accept that, in view of the fact that I don’t think he is of the black race and, generally, we would accept it.
App. at 57-58 (emphases added).
The prosecutor’s comments signify a bias against a venireman solely because that individual is from a cultural or religious tradition that is out of the American mainstream. The Assistant U.S. Attorney explained that because Das was “probably Hindu,” because “Hindus tend ... to have feelings a good bit different than ours about all sorts of things,” and because Das may thus “have religious beliefs that may affect his thinking”, the prosecutor would prefer an “American juror”.
There is no support in the record for the prosecutor’s implicit conclusion that Das is not an American citizen.4 The more disturbing aspect of the prosecutor’s comments, however, is his apparent suspicion that because members of a particular ethnic group look different or have different beliefs, they are not real “Americans,” and thus cannot be trusted to serve as jurors or to perform other duties of citizenship.5
*1161It is sad that in the late twentieth century, educated public officials still fall victim to racial or religious biases that preclude them from making an independent evaluation on the basis of an individual’s character. However, since the religious issue was not raised at the trial court, the majority correctly holds that it cannot be considered here.6 Thus, I must view the case solely in a racial context on appeal.
In this regard, I note that nearly all Hindus are of Indian origin.7 I can also take judicial notice of the fact that many Indians do not look exactly like American whites, and are generally of a darker corn-plexion. It is impossible to discern the prosecutor’s racial views from his brief comments on this issue, and I do not mean to suggest that his peremptory challenge was motivated by overt or conscious racial bias. However, the proceedings in the district court leave unanswered the issue of whether the gravamen of the prosecutor’s objection to Das was the latter’s non-whiteness, or whether it was his supposed Hinduism without any consideration of the matter of color,8 or whether there was some confounding of the two in his mind. I find it more difficult to dissect as neatly as the majority the intertwining cords of race and religion in this case.
*1162I have recently seen other cases involving the Batson issue in which the prosecuting attorneys have offered nonracial justifications for peremptory challenges that strain credulity. In one case involving three black defendants, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against the only two black persons in the venire panel. In the first instance, the prosecutor asserted that he exercised a peremptory challenge because the black panel member was a young, single, former Peace Corps volunteer who might sympathize with the defendant. In the other instance, the prosecutor explained that the black panel member was stricken because she was a social worker who also might be partial to the defendant. The prosecutor further explained that he made his challenges in order to eliminate young people and Philadel-phians from the jury. However, one white panel member who was a young Philadelphia resident did not meet the same fate. United States v. Selby, 872 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1989) (judgment order); United States v. Green, 875 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.1989) (judgment order).9 In United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 97, 102 L.Ed.2d 73 (1988), the prosecutor, who used peremptory challenges to strike the only two blacks on the venire panel, explained that his objective was to exclude from the petit jury all young, single individuals — although a white young, single venireperson was not subjected to a peremptory challenge by the prosecutor. In these and other cases involving the Batson issue, prosecutors have asserted that it was only the sheerest coincidence that all or most of the black jurors were excluded and that, of course, the exclusion of blacks was not racially motivated.
On any individual case on appeal, even a flimsy explanation may appear marginally adequate and be sustained. However, this cumulative record causes me to pause and wonder whether the principles enunciated in Batson are being undermined by excuses that have all form and no substance.
Justice Marshall predicted in his Batson concurrence that the decision would allow courts to remedy only the most flagrant instances of racial discrimination in jury selection. 476 U.S. at 105, 106 S.Ct. at 1727 (Marshall, J., concurring). Time and experience have proved him correct. Recent commentators note that Batson has left prosecutors free to strike jurors based on what amounts to patent stereotypes. See, e.g., Serr and Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges and the Democratic Jury, 79 J.Crim.Law & Criminology 1, 43-47 (1988); Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1365, 1420 (1987) (prosecutor may seek to justify strike on arbitrary grounds such as speech, hair style, demeanor). Indeed, the Batson standard, as it has been interpreted, appears now to allow prosecutors to strike non-white jurors for reasons that are clearly, but subtly, racial in nature:
[Ujnder the Batson formula, the prosecutor can easily articulate a non-race based reason for her peremptory challenge.... Moreover, in part because the prosecutor’s prejudice may be subtle, unconscious, and shared by the judge, the prosecutor may be able to articulate non-racial explanations that the judge would find reasonable.
Developments — Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1472, 1581 (1988) (footnote omitted). In the case at bar and in many others, the prosecution’s peremptory challenges may betray underlying prejudices of precisely this nature.10
*1163Both prosecutors and the courts must act affirmatively to counter this trend. Prosecutors should be forever mindful that selecting jurors in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner is far more important than winning a case with highly suspect or questionable tactics. However, because the fifth and fourteenth amendments’ guarantee of racial neutrality in jury selection is so vital to the integrity of our criminal justice system, the courts, when faced with a properly supported prima facie case under Batson, cannot rely solely or principally on the prosecutors’ asserted good faith justification for the exclusion of minorities from the jury. Rather, the courts must take seriously our responsibility to determine whether the justification is “clear and reasonably specific”, and that it is “related to the particular case to be tried.” 476 U.S. at 98 & n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 & n. 20. At a minimum, this inquiry requires us to consider whether the prosecutor’s rationale makes sense in light of the facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination.
Under the particular circumstances of this case — which include the uncertainty about Das’s race, the selection of a black person as an alternate juror, and the absence of any other significant indicia of discrimination in the voir dire or at trial — I agree with the majority that the district court did not commit clear error in overruling the defendant’s objection to the peremptory challenge. In my view, however, the holding in this case should not be taken to imply that an explanation for the peremptory challenge such as that proffered here would typically suffice to overcome a properly supported prima facie case under Batson.
. Although the record is silent on Das’s citizenship status, I note that only U.S. citizens are eligible to serve on federal juries. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(1).
. I find the prosecutor’s assertion fascinating. One wonders whether the Assistant U.S. Attorney has been equally suspicious of Catholics, Jews, Protestants, Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses or evangelical Christian sects because some of “them” may have different beliefs from some of "us”?
. There is a handwritten correction, of undetermined origin, in the transcript, changing “sufficient” to "insufficient.” App. at 58.
. See infra note 1.
.Racial discrimination in jury selection has tainted the American legal system since the colonial period.
Before the Civil War, nearly all states, through statute or custom, prohibited blacks from serving on juries. L. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States 1790-1860 94 (1961). Although the statutory exclusion of blacks from jury duty was struck down by the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880), legislatures, prosecutors, and jury commissioners have since developed an imaginative array of devices to bar blacks and other minorities from the jury *1161box. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) (blacks excluded through peremptory challenges); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953) (jurors selected by means of racially coded tickets); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct. 1159, 86 L.Ed. 1559 (1942) (jury commissioners selected jurors from among their personal acquaintances); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1881) (selection of jurors from list of "sober and judicious” citizens); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir.1966) (exclusion of hourly wage earners), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.1966) (blacks excluded through "key man” system of panel selection, in which "respectable" citizens were asked to recommend other “good citizens” for jury duty); U.S. ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.) (jury lists drawn from voter registration lists, from which blacks were excluded), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 838, 80 S.Ct. 58, 4 L.Ed.2d 78 (1959); L. Rice, The Negro in Texas: 1874 — 1900 255-57 (1971) (blacks excluded through subjective eligibility criteria for jury duty, jury commissioner discretion, literacy qualifications). See generally J. Bass, Unlikely Heroes 278-285 (1981) (race discrimination in jury selection in the Fifth Circuit during the 1950s and 1960s); D. Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 235-77 (2d ed. 1980).
Today, over one hundred years after Strauder, the integrity of the jury system is still threatened by sometimes blatant race discrimination on the part of government attorneys. As Justice Marshall noted in his Batson concurrence, an instruction handbook used by the Dallas, Texas prosecutor’s office in the 1970s "explicitly advised prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate 'any member of a minority group.’ ” An earlier jury-selection guide used by those same prosecutors phrased this advice more bluntly: "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or well educated.” 476 U.S. at 104 & n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 1727 & n. 3 (citations omitted). The government attorney in a recent § 1983 case, Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F.Supp. 890 (D.Conn.1986), candidly admitted that he struck eight out of eight black venirepersons on purely racial grounds. When asked to justify his peremptory challenges, he stated:
[I]f I had a choice between a white juror and a black juror under the facts of these cases, I’m going to take a white juror. That’s what I'm saying.... [W]hy should I put my city and my defendants at the mercy of the people in my opinion who make the most civil rights claims, at least in my experience!?] ■ • •
Id. at 894.
Clearly, we are still some distance from our constitutional objective of colorblind jury selection.
. In any event, it is unclear whether, on the facts of this case, Clemmons could have properly raised the religious issue, since he (presumably) is not Hindu.
. The overwhelming majority of the world’s Hindus live on the Indian subcontinent. According to the Handbook of the Nations (8th ed. 1988), Hindus make up 82.6% of India’s population of over 800,000,000, 16% of Bangladesh’s 110,000,000 inhabitants, and 15% of Sri Lanka’s 16,600,000 citizens.
. The prosecutor asserted that he was troubled by Das’s possible religious beliefs, rather than his racial or ethnic background. However, in common usage the word "Hindu,” in addition to identifying the religious faith, has often served as a shorthand reference to Asian Indians. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1070 (1961) (defining Hindu as "a native or inhabitant of India”); Webster’s Second International Dictionary 1180 (1948) (noting that in Continental and American usage, a "Hindu” may be "a member of one of the native races of India.”)
. I was on the panel that entered the judgment orders in Selby and Green. I do not mean to question the propriety of the summary affirmance of the convictions in that case. However, I see the peremptory challenges at issue in those related appeals as part of a disturbing trend in jury selection appeals. As this court cautioned, prosecutors must be particularly cautious during jury selection to avoid "creating a circumstance which would be perceived as insensitive to the rationale of Batson v. Kentucky." United States v. Selby, (3d Cir.1989) [872 F.2d 414 (table)].
. So long as peremptory challenges are permitted, trial and appellate judges will continue to have difficulty in ascertaining whether the prosecutor's motives in exercising peremptory challenges are good or bad.
*1163Nevertheless, allegations of race discrimination in jury selection, and in other areas involving prosecutorial discretion, must be reviewed carefully. As Professor Steven Alan Reiss has observed:
Few officials can so affect the lives of others as can prosecutors. Yet few people operate in a vacuum so devoid of externally enforceable constraints. Indeed, contemporary efforts to constrain the discretion of actors in the criminal justice system have not only bypassed the prosecutor, they have tended to expand her power by squeezing the system’s seemingly insoluble bubble of discretion her way.
Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1365 (1987) (footnotes omitted).