dissenting.
This is an unusual case in many respects. The record demonstrates that Milton Couch was convicted of first degree murder — a *1345crime he did not commit. Couch was sentenced to life imprisonment for killing a complete stranger in a bar in St. Louis on May 2, 1975. The evidence is undisputed that on the day in question Couch mixed drugs with alcohol and experienced complete amnesia regarding the events in question. Medical records show three extensive hospitalizations for acute intoxication, the last of which occurred just five days after the alleged offense. The facts indicate no motive or provocation for the crime. Although the prosecution presented many witnesses to prove Couch did the shooting, the undisputed evidence of Couch’s excessive drinking and irrational actions was not revealed to the jury. The record is completely devoid of any evidence of the essential element of first degree murder: premeditation.
Petitioner has an eighth grade education. At sentencing he told the trial court that he had no memory of the events in question. In a panic he told his counsel that he could not have committed the crime because he was at the hospital visiting his sick wife. Counsel, a state public defender, blindly accepted his client’s story. Without any investigation whatsoever he placed Couch on the stand to assert an alibi defense. In my judgment it borders on the incredible to find that counsel’s decision not to investigate was based on a strategic choice. A strategic choice is a decision between reasonably investigated alternatives, not an uninformed decision to push ahead blindly with a defense of unknown merit. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).1 Our holding in Eldridge v. Atkins, 665 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1760, 72 L.Ed.2d 168 (1982), establishes that an attorney’s decision not to interview the prosecution’s witnesses, justified by no reasonable excuse, amounts to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. In Eldridge, investigating witnesses would have uncovered important facts relevant to asserting a defense of mistaken identity. We adopted the following ABA standard to review counsel’s failure to investigate:
“It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty.” (emphasis added)
Id. at 232 (quoting American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1971)).
Counsel’s preparation here fell grossly short of this standard and materially prejudiced the defendant. Counsel’s failure to investigate prevented him from realizing the extreme weakness of Couch’s claimed alibi. Counsel did not corroborate the purported alibi with Couch’s wife, nor did he make any effort to investigate the state’s witnesses. Such investigation would have revealed that eight witnesses were prepared to verify Couch’s presence in the bar and his intoxicated and irrational state. One of the eight was an eyewitness who would confirm that Couch pulled out a gun, *1346put it to the head of a complete stranger, and fired without provocation. Had counsel discovered these facts, he could have confronted Couch with the state’s overwhelming evidence, and he would have perceived that the alibi was merely a story inspired by the panic of a poor, uneducated and scared individual. If the defendant had insisted on perjuring himself with this defense, the public defender had a duty to withdraw from the case. Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173-74, 106 S.Ct. 988, 997-98, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (counsel’s threat to withdraw or divulge perjury to court did not violate duty of confidence to client; counsel’s duty was to the truth).
Had counsel made any reasonable effort to investigate, and discovered the utter weakness of the alibi defense, he would have recognized the urgent need to further pursue the issue of Couch’s state of mind to commit the crime charged. The majority holds that counsel did not need to further press the issue of mental incompetence because the available medical reports showed Couch did not suffer psychosis. Under existing state law, it is claimed, alcoholism without psychosis could not be used to prove a mental disease or defect in mitigation of criminal responsibility. See Maj.Op. at 1342 (quoting Mo.Rev.Stat. § 552.020 (1969)). While indeed such a law would prevent counsel from asserting mental incapacity as a complete defense to the crime, that statute did not remove the state’s duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had sufficient premeditation to sustain a conviction for first degree murder. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (“the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).2 If counsel had properly investigated the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime, he would have uncovered a wealth of evidence and law to suggest premeditation was impossible in the circumstances of the case.
No doubt the state would have objected to the admission of evidence relating to Couch’s intoxication at the time of the crime. Decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court at that time purported to bar admission of evidence of intoxication for the purpose of undermining premeditation. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 495 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Mo.1973) (“[Missouri] does not even allow a jury to consider * * * intoxication on the issue of specific intent”). That rule, however, was of questionable constitutional validity, and no one had yet challenged it.3
*1347Due process requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072. It is difficult to see how a rule that prevents the jury from hearing all the evidence necessary to determine the element of premeditation can survive due process scrutiny. Although the Supreme Court allows the states to shift the burden to the defendant to prove certain affirmative defenses, the Court still requires that the jury be instructed to consider all the evidence, including the evidence that relates to the affirmative defense, when deciding whether the prosecution has proven its case in chief. In Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987), the Court found no violation of due process in a state law that, upon proof of aggravated murder, shifted to the defendant the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court emphasized, however, that in evaluating the prosecution’s case in chief, the jury must be instructed to consider all the evidence, including evidence brought forth to prove self-defense, even if the jury did not find that self-defense was proven by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court wrote:
It would be quite different if the jury had been instructed that self-defense evidence could not be considered in determining whether there was a reasonable doubt about the state’s case, i.e., that self-defense evidence must be put aside for all purposes unless it satisfied the preponderance standard. Such instruction would relieve the state of its burden and plainly run afoul of Wins hip’s mandate.
Id. at 233-34, 107 S.Ct. at 1102. Martin therefore clearly counsels that the jury in the present case should have heard the evidence of Couch’s intoxication, even if it could not suffice to prove the affirmative defense of mental incapacity, because it related to the state’s burden to prove premeditation.4
*1348Counsel’s inexcusable failure to investigate the prosecution witnesses and realize the weakness of the alibi defense, therefore, prejudiced the defendant. While a jury would not likely believe that Couch was not at the scene when eight witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, placed him there, the jury might have been persuaded that Couch did not premeditate the unprovoked killing of a total stranger, especially considering Couch’s drunken state. Moreover, to prove that counsel’s performance was prejudicial, the Supreme Court does not require proof that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s deficiencies. Rather, only a reasonable probability of a different outcome is required. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Here a reasonable probability exists that a challenge to Couch’s premeditation, or to the law that would prevent the jury from hearing of his intoxication, would have led to a different outcome.
So there is no misunderstanding, my disagreement with the majority is not that counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to challenge the constitutionality of Missouri law. Rather, I consider counsel’s performance totally derelict and deficient because he utterly failed to investigate prosecution witnesses and realize the absurdity and falsity of the defense he chose. That deficiency was prejudicial to the defendant because if counsel had recognized the gravity of his situation he could have explored other avenues and given a tenacious fight on the premeditation issue. It is reasonably probable he could have achieved a different result with this defense. Because counsel’s decision to pursue an absurd alibi defense was not an informed choice, it cannot be considered strategic. Cf. Eldridge, 665 F.2d at 232-36 (counsel had duty to investigate; failure to do so was constitutionally ineffective assistance).
The wanton killing of the victim is not to be excused. Couch’s intoxication and irrational behavior do not justify his criminal conduct. But the state recognizes different degrees of homicide, and it is just as unlawful as the crime itself to subject a defendant to a punishment not warranted by the undisputed facts of the crime. Our criminal law system operates unfairly if the state-furnished counsel makes little effort to investigate or defend the indigent accused. Public defenders in Missouri are burdened with a large caseload and little funds with which to operate. But the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of trial counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution has little meaning if we justify in the name of “strategy” the conduct of counsel here.
. In Strickland, the Court held that counsel’s decision not to investigate potential character witnesses and psychiatric experts for the defendant was a valid strategic choice because counsel had a reasonably well-thought-out alternative plan. Counsel would rely on the defendant’s bare statements in the record of the plea colloquy to suggest that defendant was experiencing acute emotional distress at the time of his killing spree. By limiting testimony to that already in the plea colloquy and not calling character witnesses or psychiatric experts, counsel would prevent the state from introducing contrary and potentially damaging evidence. This strategic choice, according to the court, "was well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. In the present case, by contrast, counsel’s decision not to investigate witnesses was not based on a strategically sound decision to pursue a different course. Rather, he simply neglected to prepare the one defense he had chosen.
. See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (Maine law violated due process by presuming malice aforethought upon a showing of intentional murder — rather than requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt — and placing burden on defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion, thereby reducing offense to manslaughter).
. Although in 1975 no one had raised a due process attack against the Missouri statute, the Missouri Court of Appeals later heard argument challenging the rule’s constitutionality, but the court decided the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. State v. Hegwood, 558 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Mo.Ct.App.1977). Proper preservation of the issue would have allowed it to be raised in this case. Even if the Missouri Supreme Court ruled against Couch on the constitutional claim, his counsel would have had a basis to petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, or bring the constitutional issue into federal court on a habeas petition. Even if ultimately unsuccessful, a clearly spelled-out threat of a prolonged constitutional battle could have provided ammunition to plea bargain for a lesser charge such as second degree murder or manslaughter.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri considered the constitutionality of the rule in a 1982 case. Hindman v. Wyrick, 531 F.Supp. 1103, 1112 (W.D.Mo.1982), aff’d on other grounds, 702 F.2d 148 (8th Cir.1983). Although the court declared the rule not unconstitutional, the court offered only a one sentence pronouncement with no analysis, and in any case this questionable opinion did not yet exist at the time of Couch’s trial.
Besides the potential constitutional infirmity of the Missouri rule barring evidence of intoxication to address premeditation, research by counsel would have revealed substantial criticism of the rule in contemporary legal literature. One scholar wrote in the Missouri Law Review in 1963:
If one of the elements of a crime is that the defendant have as his purpose, the achievement of a certain result, or that he have *1347knowledge of certain facts, then he should have a "defense” if he does not in fact have the necessary purpose or knowledge, no matter what the cause of his lack of purpose or knowledge may be, whether from mental disease, ignorance, mistake, or intoxication.
This approach is not going to be of much assistance to drunks. * * * [M]urder can be committed without an intent to kill or to injure, for murder can sometimes be committed recklessly, and if not murder, the recklessness would be sufficient for manslaughter.
Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri — The Need for Revision, 28 Mo.L.Rev. 521, 530-31 (1963) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Although the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Richardson declined an invitation to overturn the longstanding rule, the court said that it reached its decision "particularly in view of the record in this case.” 495 S.W.2d at 440. The defendant had asked a medical expert whether the defendant’s intoxication made it impossible for him to premeditate the crime. The state’s objection to the question was sustained, but the defendant made no offer to prove how the witness would have answered. The court therefore decided that the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. In the present case counsel could have made a proper record for appeal and provided the court the opportunity to pass on the questionable constitutionality of the Missouri rule.
. The Supreme Court’s decision in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), which allows states to place on the defendant the burden of proving mental incapacity, does not conflict with our analysis of Martin. Leland plainly suggests that juries should consider all the evidence when deciding the prosecution's case in chief, even the evidence going to the affirmative defense. The Leland court wrote:
It is contended that the instructions may have confused the jury as to the distinction between the State’s burden of proving premeditation and the other elements of the charge and appellant’s burden of proving insanity. * * * Juries have for centuries made the basic decisions between guilt and innocence and between criminal responsibility and legal insanity upon the basis of the facts, as revealed by all the evidence, and the law, as explained by instructions * * *. We think that to condemn the operation of this system here would be to condemn the system generally.
Leland, 343 U.S. at 800, 72 S.Ct. at 1008 (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit wrote a very thorough and convincing opinion supporting the conclusion that the court may not bar admission of evidence of a defendant’s mental state relevant to premeditation. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 710, 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988). The court wrote:
[T]he mere fact that a defendant has the right to introduce psychiatric evidence in support of the affirmative defense of insanity does not *1348justify barring the evidence from negating the government’s case in chief. The Supreme Court has indicated that although a state may constitutionally shift the burden of proving insanity to the defendant, it did not sanction, and probably would not sanction, a jury charge that prevented a jury from considering evidence of mental abnormality in determining whether the state had proven premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 901 (citation omitted).