dissenting in part, concurring in part:
I disagree with the panel majority’s determination that the three litigants who did not sign the notice of appeal invoked the jurisdiction of this court. The Supreme Court made it clear in Torres v. Oakland *838Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988), that failure to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) by identifying with certitude the identification of the appellants, is a jurisdictional defect. Rule 3(c) requires that “[t]he notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal.” The question, as I see it, is whether Mikes-ka, Crecelius, and Williams, who neither personally signed the notice of appeal nor had it signed by a qualified representative, have specified their intention to take an appeal.
At least two other circuits have held that a notice of appeal not signed by the appellant or someone qualified to represent the appellant does not satisfy Rule 3(c). See Carter v. CIR, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.1986); Covington v. Allsbrook, 636 F.2d 63 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914, 101 S.Ct. 1990, 68 L.Ed.2d 305 (1981). See qlso Scarella v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan, 536 F.2d 1207, 1209 (8th Cir.1976). More importantly, this circuit took that position in Smith v. White, 857 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.1988).
In that case, Smith, a non-attorney, filed a notice of appeal that named several parties as appellants, but only he signed the notice. The court dismissed the appeals of the non-signing parties:
Of course, as to the other defendants, no timely notice of appeal was filed. “[U]nless'xa party is represented by an attorney, he must sign [the notice of appeal] himself, and ... a notice of appeal naming several appellants and signed by one of them, who is not an attorney, is ineffective to initiate an appeal on behalf of the nonsigners [citing cases].”
Id. at 1043, citing 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice § 203.17 at 3-73 (2d ed. 1980) (brackets in original). The Smith court relied on Covington v. Allsbrook, which in turn held that a notice of appeal not signed by some of the pro se litigants seeking to appeal did not comply with Rule 3(c). The Smith court did note that the dismissal of the appeal worked no prejudice because it had become clear that the non-signmg parties were not attempting to appeal; but this does not detract from its independent holding that the parties who had not signed the notice of appeal, or had it signed by a qualified representative, had failed to appeal.
Had the notice of appeal been signed by an attorney representing the multiple appellants, Rule 3(c) would be satisfied because such a notice would specify the intent of all appellants to appeal. But the law does not permit Diez to assume the responsibility of representing his fellow inmates. Smith, 857 F.2d at 1043; Covington, 636 F.2d at 64.
Thus, I conclude that the litigants who did not sign the notice of appeal failed to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Rule 3(c); accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to Mikes-ka, Crecelius and Williams.
I fully concur in the majority’s disposition of Diez’s appeal.