dissenting:
After conceding that none of the four factors relevant to a speedy trial claim favor the government, and two of the factors are in Doggett’s favor, the majority denies his sixth amendment speedy trial claim because he cannot show prejudice. Because I think that the majority’s approach is inconsistent with the requirements of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), I dissent.
After setting out the four factors applied by the majority, the Barker Court explained how a court should consider these factors:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right....
We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused’s interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.
407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The majority ignores this directive and denies the claim because Doggett cannot show prejudice. The majority abdicates its responsibility to “engage in [the] difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Id. The four factors in this case “should be considered together with [the] other circumstances [that are] relevant” to Doggett’s claim. When this balancing is done fairly and equitably, Dog-gett is entitled to relief.
As noted above, there are two Barker factors favoring the defendant. The first is the length of the delay. As the majority notes, the five-year delay in Barker was characterized as “extraordinary.” At 578. The delay in this case was eight and one-half years. In Bell v. Lynaugh, 828 F.2d 1085, 1094 (5th Cir.1987), the court characterized an eight-year delay as “unwarranted and presumptively prejudicial.” Similarly, in Garcia Montalvo v. United States, 862 F.2d 425, 426 (2d Cir.1988), the court noted that “eight years is an inordinate amount of time in which to bring an indicted person to trial.” I would place great weight on this factor in conducting the Barker balancing.
As the majority concedes, the government’s only justification for this inordinate delay is that it was not guilty of “bad faith or a dilatory purpose.” At 578. According to the majority, the government was merely “negligent.” The majority correctly recounts the government’s “attempts” to capture Doggett. It is evident on its face that the government did not capture Dog-gett because he was not worth the effort. He was a small fish in the ocean of those involved in the drug trade. Given that the government missed many opportunities to apprehend Doggett, I would consider its conduct in this case grossly negligent and would weigh this factor heavily against the government.1
*583I agree with the majority that Doggett cannot show any concrete examples of how he was prejudiced. Nevertheless, as Barker clearly holds, this showing is not “necessary” to make out a speedy trial clause violation. 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. The defendant cannot always show all of the prejudice he faces when the government waits over eight years to bring him to trial. As Justice Powell noted in Barker:
There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the faded past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.
Id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. This unprovable prejudice is one of the reasons why the majority’s mechanistic approach is inconsistent with the sixth amendment guarantee.
There are other circumstances in this ease which should be taken into account in determining Doggett’s entitlement to relief. Because Doggett did not know he was indicted until he was arrested in 1988, he could not assert his right to a speedy trial earlier. In this case, Doggett has been leading “a normal, productive, and law-abiding life” since his return to the United States. At 577. It is reasonable to expect that after a certain point in time one will not have to answer for actions taken in the past. Generally, this protection is provided by the five-year statute of limitations in which “Congress has codified the policy that a person need not remain indefinitely in jeopardy for allegedly illegal acts.” See Mitchell, 769 F.2d at 1547 (applying 18 U.S.C. § 3282). While the fact that the defendant does not learn about the charges until after the limitations period has expired does not automatically amount to a speedy trial violation, it is “another factor” that should be taken into account. Id. at 1547, 1548.
After balancing these factors, even after taking into account the Supreme Court’s caution against an “overzealous application” of the “extreme remedy of dismissal,” Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 & n. 16, 92 S.Ct. at 2188 & n. 16, Doggett was entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him. That society’s interest in trying Doggett is insignificant is evident by the government’s weak attempts to apprehend him. I would reverse.
. I do not mean to suggest that the government has to leave no stone unturned when attempting *583to apprehend those accused of relatively minor crimes. I realize that the government must deploy its law enforcement resources where they will be the most effective. Nevertheless, because criminal defendants are entitled by the constitution to a speedy trial, the government should not be allowed to use negligence to justify an eight-year delay when it has missed several opportunities to apprehend a criminal defendant.