dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the alleged appropriation of United Nuclear Corporation’s mining rights (1) is not the responsibility of the United States, and (2) does not constitute a regulatory “taking” under the standard of Connolly v. Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986).
I
United’s Dispute Is With The Navajos
Stripped of irrelevancies, the facts are that United Nuclear Corporation entered into leases with the Navajo Tribe which entitled United to enter on certain tribal lands and to mine uranium. United’s “rights” in such leases vis-a-vis the Navajos, are enforceable, according to United’s counsel, only in Navijo Tribal Courts. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1680-81, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978) and cases cited therein. (“Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.”) United first attempted to litigate this dispute in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States and the Navajo Tribe seeking an extension of the lease term and damages. The tribe asserted sovereign immunity. The court concluded, inter alia, that United could not “defeat the Navajo’s sovereign immunity,” particularly with respect to “control of its natural resources,” by “reliance on a commercial exception, due process or compensation principles.” United Nuclear Corp. v. Clark, 584 F.Supp. 107, 110-11 (D.D.C.1984). Accordingly, the case was dismissed. No appeal was taken.
United totally ignores tribal laws although such law is the fundamental basis for United’s asserted property rights. As the Supreme Court has said, “Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2872, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) Cf. Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1572-73 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824, 106 S.Ct. 78, 88 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (“It is our view that one who owns land in a foreign country looks to the laws of that country to determine his incidents of ownership including his rights in the event of expropriation.”) Here, United’s leasehold rights are dependent on tribal law. United has not established what is the scope of leasehold rights that the Navajos recognize in a private non-Indi*1439an party as against the sovereign Tribe. If United’s rights were defeasible, for example by reason of legitimate Tribal concerns for the environment, United may have no property rights that could be taken.1
Unlike the majority, I do not know the reasons the Navajos did not approve the mining plan. It could have been because the Tribe wanted more money, as the majority finds, or its concern for its water supply and fear of the hazards of uranium mining, as the Claims Court suggested (United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. at 768, 771 n. 10 (1989)), or simply a desire to preserve its patrimony. The leases, for example, were renewable in perpetuity.2 The reason is immaterial to a taking claim against the United States, and in any event, the tribe’s motive is beyond judicial inquiry. As stated in Langeneg-ger:
Consideration of El Salvador’s motives for expropriation is not the central focus of a claim alleging a taking by our country. To the extent that such motivation may be pertinent, we find that the relevant facts reside in what that government “purported” to do. If the “purported” reasons for action are not the real reasons, we think the matter is not one the judicial bench can correct; a subjective determination of a government’s motive is beyond judicial inquiry.
756 F.2d at 1569-70.
What is material here is that any claim that United may have is against the Navajos in accordance with the law recognized in their tribal courts.3 United has not pursued that avenue. Its excuse for not doing so is that it does not wish to sue the Navajos in tribal courts. United prefers to sue the United States in its “tribal court,” the U.S. Claims Court, on a strained theory that the United States has “taken” its leasehold interest by “giving” the Navajos a “veto” power over mining plans proposed for the Navajo’s sovereign lands.
At most, the Secretary facilitated the Navajo’s exercise of inherent sovereignty. Because of the Secretary’s deference, the Navajos, simply by doing nothing, effectively prevented United from obtaining approval of its mining plan from the Secretary. However, there is no evidence that “but for” the Secretary’s deference to the Tribe, mining would have proceeded. Ap*1440proval of the mining plan was required before mining, but whether a tribal court would have held United was entitled to mine once it obtained the Secretary’s approval, we have no idea.
In any event, after securing mining plan approval, United had to obtain approval from, the Navajos to build roads, put in power lines, and construct other necessary production facilities. It is difficult to rationalize in a real world setting that the Secretary “destroyed” the leasehold and caused United’s loss of profit by not approving United’s mining plan. If the Navajos wanted to stop mining or make it unprofitable (e.g., by taxing United), they had the power to do so, regardless of what the Secretary did with respect to the mining plan. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 2080, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980) (power to tax is “fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain.”)
The point of this analysis is that exploitation of United’s leasehold interest was dependent on the cooperation and law of the Navajos. That the consent of the Secretary was necessary to obtain the lease and to proceed at various stages does not change the fact that United’s lease is with the Navajos and concerns tribal lands. Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 372, 88 S.Ct. 982, 985, 19 L.Ed.2d 1238 (1968) (although approval of Secretary is required, “he is not the lessor” of Indian lands). United’s dispute, like its lease, is with the Navajos. The acts, or more precisely inaction, which directly caused United’s leasehold interests to become valueless were those of the Navajo Tribe.
I recognize that precedent does support the proposition that the United States may be held responsible for a taking even where its acts are not the final direct cause of the property loss. Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1570; Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 190 Ct.Cl. 367, 372, 420 F.2d 1386, 1391 (1970), Turney v. United States, 126 Ct.Cl. 202, 115 F.Supp. 457 (1953). However, in a comparable situation, the Supreme Court has said, “[A] determination must be made whether the [federal] government involvement in the deprivation of private property is sufficiently direct and substantial to require compensation under the Fifth Amendment,” National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 93, 89 S.Ct. 1511, 1516, 23 L.Ed.2d 117 (1969). In this case, there is no justification for attributing the acts of the Tribe to the United States. The record is wholly devoid of evidence that the United States encouraged or even suggested, much less required, that the Navajo Tribe should withhold approval of the mining plan. Cf. Fern v. United States, 908 F.2d 955 (Fed.Cir.1990) (United States not liable for action taken by states following enactment of statute removing preemption).
In Langenegger, no taking by the United States was found upon expropriation of property of U.S. citizens by El Salvador despite the active encouragement of such action by the United States. There, this court held that its determination of whether the United States’ involvement was “sufficiently direct and substantial” to warrant fixing responsibility on the United States must be “premised upon the sum of two factors: (1) the nature of the United States’ activity, and (2) the level of the benefits the United States has derived.” Langenegger, 756 F.2d at 1572. The “activity” of the United States in Langenegger was a change in our foreign policy towards El Salvador which encouraged land reform; here, it was a change in our policy towards Indian tribes which encouraged their self-determination. In both eases, the United States derived no actual benefit from the “taken” property itself. Rather, it merely enjoyed a nebulous improvement in relations with another sovereign.
Judged by the Langenegger two-part standard, the nature of the acts of the United States and the level of benefits it accrued do not rise to the level of a “substantial and direct” involvement in the appropriation of United’s lease by the Navajos. Under these circumstances, the United States is not responsible for the acts of the Tribe, and thus, there is no taking of United’s property by the United States. Accord Erosion Victims of Lake Superior Regulation v. United States, 833 F.2d 297 *1441(Fed.Cir.1987) (no “direct or substantial involvement” under Langenegger test by United States where international organization exercised own discretion in action which injured landowners).
II
No Regulatory Taking
If one adopts the view of the majority that the United States is the responsible party for causing United’s loss here, I would nevertheless hold that United has failed to meet the legal standard set forth by the Supreme Court for determining that a governmental action has transgressed the boundaries of an uncompensable “regulation” and, therefore, must be viewed as a compensable “taking.” As set forth by the majority, the factors to be weighed in determining a taking are the character of the governmental action, its economic impact and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224-25, 106 S.Ct. at 1025-26; PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2041, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); United States v. (1) 1979 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 833 F.2d 994, 1000 (Fed.Cir.1987). It is to the last of these three factors that I principally direct this part of my opinion because the weight of this factor is so overwhelming here that it controls the taking issue. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1005, 104 S.Ct. at 2874; United States v. (1) 1979 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 833 F.2d at 1000. In contrast to the majority, I agree with the Claims Court that the Secretary’s failure to approve the mining plan unless the Tribe also approved did not interfere with any reasonable investment-backed expectation of United.
The majority holds that United had distinct investment-backed expectations in that “[pjrior to the April 1978 meeting with Departmental officials, United had no indication or even suggestion that tribal approval of the mining plan would be required before the Secretary would approve it.” Even assuming United had no prior indication or suggestion, the inquiry does not end there. The circumstances surrounding this case provide no basis for United to have had reasonable investment-backed expectations that it would be able to mine uranium under its leases with the Navajo Tribe merely because its mining plan was technically adequate under applicable regulations. The regulation with respect to mining plan approval, 25 C.F.R. § 177.7 (1978), did not guarantee mining. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1008, 104 S.Ct. at 2875 (no investment-backed expectation that data submitted to EPA would remain confidential absent explicit assurance). Any expectation under the circumstances was precatory at best.
Nor did the United States guarantee or give assurance of the Tribe’s performance under the leases. In Monsanto, the Court held that a governmental action does not interfere with a reasonable investment-backed expectation if the party claiming the taking was aware of and subject to a statutory scheme that did not provide any assurance that such expectations were reasonable. 467 U.S. at 1007, 104 S.Ct. at 2875. The majority does not address what in the record here establishes that the United States accepted the burden of the uncertainty which United assumed by contracting with another entity. Cf. Allied-General Nuclear Servs. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1573-74 (Fed.Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 819, 109 S.Ct. 61, 102 L.Ed.2d 39 (1988) (“[W]e note an entire absence of any evidence that the government in any manner, express or implied, contracted to share whatever risks there might be in the venture, to warrant that it would succeed, or otherwise shield it against vicissitudes.”)
Moreover, the regulations on which United relies as the basis for its investment-backed expectation were subject to change. Specifically, the express language of paragraph XVII of the leases required United to abide by and conform to “all regulations of the Secretary of the Interior now or hereafter in force and relative to such leases.” As the Claims Court pointed out, “[t]he express language of paragraph XVII makes it clear that the Secretary as trustee for the lessor expressly reserved the right *1442to make changes, additions or modifications to the existing regulations which could affect the leases.” United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. at 775-76. The Secretary did not adopt the change in policy here by formal rulemaking procedures. That was deemed not necessary because the regulations at all times required the Secretary “to consult” with the Tribe. See 25 C.F.R. § 177.12 (1978). The Secretary merely expanded that consultation.4 The point is, however, that these regulations provide a shaky foundation for United’s assertion of a reasonable investment-backed expectation.
Further militating against the existence of a reasonable investment-backed expectation is the longstanding statutory, regulatory, and jurisprudential backdrop concerning Indian affairs within which United placed itself by leasing rights on tribal lands. Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g, Congress entrusted the Secretary of the Interior with the responsibility of considering the best interests of the Indians when making any decision involving leases on tribal lands. See United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. at 776; see also, 43 U.S.C. § 1457(10) (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1988); 25 C.F.R. §§ 171-77. In effectuating the trust responsibilities, the Secretary has broad discretion in choosing the manner in which to protect the best interests of Indian lessors. See Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Department of the Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir.1982). Also having potential effect on Indian mining activity was the government’s policy of fostering Indian self-determination which predated United’s signing of the leases. That policy began with an announcement by President Nixon and was effectuated in the passage of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub.L. No. 93-638, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq.
I find the present complaint of a taking much less persuasive than that made in Allied-General Nuclear Servs. Allied-General had invested $200 million in building a reprocessing plant for processing spent fuel from nuclear power facilities under a construction license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. President Carter concluded that the foreign policy position of the United States against nuclear proliferation was undermined if the United States built such plants which produced plutonium, a component of nuclear weapons. Thus, the United States denied Allied-General an operating license and made its plant worthless. This court found that no taking of property occurred, inter alia, because Allied-General accepted the regulatory scheme under which the licensing agency was “required to take into account the common defense and security of the nation.” Allied-General Nuclear Servs., 839 F.2d at 1577.
The majority distinguishes Allied-General on the basis that the governmental action there was tied to concern over “national safety” whereas here the Secretary’s action was “an attempt to enable the Tribe to exact additional money from a company with whom it had a valid contract.” Not only is this original factfinding by the majority based on snippets of testimony that the Tribe had this motive, but also there is no evidence that the Secretary’s intent was so sinister. In any event, the particular purpose of the governmental action is not of legal import. In both cases the governmental action was permissible, being rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and in both cases a reasonable investment-backed expectation was lacking because of the regulatory scheme. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. at 1007, 104 S.Ct. at 2875. Moreover, Allied-General makes clear that United’s ability to foresee the specific approval requirement is not dispositive. Allied-General Nuclear Servs., 839 F.2d at 1577.
The majority presumes that United has suffered a severe economic impact which is not otherwise compensable. Again, we *1443simply do not know. United failed to pursue a breach of contract or unjust enrichment claim against the Navajo Tribe. United counsel’s assumption that suit in a Navajo Tribal Court would have been a futile gesture is untenable. As held by the district court in prior proceedings between these parties, due process is not violated by this being the sole remedy. United Nuclear Corp. v. Clark, 584 F.Supp. at 110. Moreover, the exhaustion of United’s Tribal Court remedy is required before a claim that it has suffered a loss has any credibility. Cf. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). It is worth noting that other lessees who entered into uranium mining leases with the Navajos were able to work out settlements of similar problems with the Tribe.
Ill
Conclusion
The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Connolly that the purpose of forbidding uncompensated takings of private property for public use is to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 475 U.S. at 227, 106 S.Ct. at 1027. I am unpersuaded that United has shown any reason to receive compensation from the people of the United States because the Navajos frustrated United’s desire to secure permanent mining leases on Navajo lands.
For all the above reasons, I would affirm.
. The fact that United submitted an environmental impact statement which the Secretary approved does not restrict the Tribe from imposing stricter environmental standards than federal standards. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, p. 538 (1982 ed.).
. The terms of the lease provided a fixed rate schedule for royalties and for renewal so long as the lessee produced “the minerals specified in paying quantities." The record also indicates that United did not attempt to work matters out with the Tribe and that the Tribe took offense at United "going to Washington” rather than dealing directly with the Tribe.
. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981):
Indian Tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Williams v. Lee, supra, [358 U.S. 217] at 223 [79 S.Ct. 269, 272, 3 L.Ed.2d 251]; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 [24 S.Ct. 712, 48 L.Ed. 1030]; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8); see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-154 [100 S.Ct. 2069, 2080-2082, 65 L.Ed.2d 10]. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 [96 S.Ct. 943, 946, 47 L.Ed.2d 106]; Williams v. Lee, supra [358 U.S.], at 220 [79 S.Ct. at 270]; Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128-129 [26 S.Ct. 197, 200-201, 50 L.Ed. 398]; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 [18 S.Ct. 340, 343, 42 L.Ed. 740], Id. 450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1258-59.
No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case. Non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow Tribe so as to subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction.
Id. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1258-59 (footnote omitted). Montana was recently reaffirmed and cited in Duro v. Reina, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990).
. Moreover, United does not, as it cannot in a taking case seeking compensation, challenge the action of the Secretary as substantively or procedurally improper. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899, 905 (Fed.Cir.1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053, 107 S.Ct. 926, 93 L.Ed.2d 978 (1987).