dissenting.
We should affirm the district court. The sentence imposed by the district court is consistent with the broad purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines. It fully protects society and fulfills the stated goals of the Sentencing Commission. Furthermore, it shows a sensitivity on the part of the district judge which is entirely appropriate and should be encouraged. The government never should have appealed this case, and we certainly ought not to reverse it. If the majority opinion in this case is permitted to stand, this court will be sending a message to every district court judge in the circuit that when it comes to sentencing, you are to leave common sense at the door and apply the Guidelines in a totally mechanical way. Neither the Congress nor the Sentencing Commission intended that this should be the case.
Under the district court’s application of the guidelines to this case, Lange had an offense level of 7 with a guideline range of 1-7 months imprisonment, for which the district court properly could substitute a sentence of probation and intermittent or community confinement. See U.S.S.G. *711§ 5B1.1(a)(2). The majority’s interpretation of the guidelines increases Lange’s offense level to 11, with a sentencing range of 8-14 months, for which the district court must impose at least four months confinement in prison and a term of supervised release to include an additional four months of intermittent or community confinement. See id. § 502.1(d). Under the circumstances of this case, the district court acted within its discretion in sentencing Lange as it did. The net result of remanding this case for resentencing will be to expend finite prison resources on a nonviolent, first-time offender when both society and the offender would be better served by execution of the sentence imposed by the district court.
I. Obstruction of Justice
Neither the government nor the United States Probation Office believed Lange’s stipulation during plea negotiations that he had stolen only $90 from express or certified mail. The government steadfastly maintained that the actual amount of Lange’s thefts was $645, and agreed with the presentence investigation report’s recommendation that Lange’s offense level be increased one level based on a total loss to victims in this amount. The government and the probation office also agreed that Lange owed restitution of $645, despite Lange’s assertion to the contrary. The government thus challenged the veracity of Lange’s stipulation regarding the amount of his thefts throughout the plea agreement and presentence investigation process.
The government never suggested that Lange’s apparent lies constituted an attempt to obstruct justice or merited a two-level enhancement, however, until Lange recanted them before sentencing. The government thus sought an enhancement for obstruction of justice only when, and because, Lange ceased the allegedly obstructive activity. Lange, in turn, will have his sentence enhanced from one of probation to one which must include imprisonment not because he misrepresented the amount of his thefts, a fact which the government recognized all along, but because he came forward with the truth before sentencing rather than adhering to his earlier story. Surely neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission intended the enhancement for obstruction of justice to have such an effect.
The majority opinion demonstrates that Lange’s misrepresentations technically fall within the definition of “wilfully obstructing or impeding proceedings” in guideline section 3C1.1. Application of the obstruction enhancement under the circumstances of this case, however, elevates form over substance.
Lange, a forty-one year old veteran with no prior criminal record, voluntarily admitted lying about the extent of his thefts and that he had done so in hope of receiving a shorter sentence. Moreover, he made this admission prior to sentencing, insuring that his lies would not have the effect he originally desired. It was only at this point in the proceedings, a point at which Lange’s lies could no longer have any possible obstructive effect, that the government sought an increase in Lange’s offense level for obstruction of justice.
The district court carefully considered these circumstances in determining that Lange’s actions did not warrant the obstruction enhancement. The sentence imposed, which included a one-level increase to reflect the $645 theft, four years probation with two months of community confinement, fifty hours of community service, and payment of $645 in restitution, adequately reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, affords deterrence to criminal conduct, and protects the public from further crimes by Lange. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988). Accordingly, the district court’s application of the guidelines represents careful consideration of the appropriate sentencing factors and constitutes “a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the Sentencing Reform Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
As noted earlier, the majority’s insistence on mechanical adherence to the letter of *712the guidelines despite the district court’s finding that the obstruction enhancement was not warranted will force the district court to send Lange to prison for at least four months. Lange, as a first offender, belongs to the group of criminal defendants that historically has performed most successfully on probation, showing the lowest rates of both probation violations or revocation and recidivism. See, e.g., U.S. Probation Office, Eastern District of Arkansas, A Statistical Study of Supervision and Violations 1980-1985 at 92 (Nov. 1986); P. Texter & D. Huie, A Statistical Review of the United States Probation Office, Eastern District of Arkansas 1970-1979: A Study of Recidivism, Supervision and Violations 15, 19, 22 (Aug. 1981). Congress recognized this fact in establishing and defining the duties of the Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (1988) (“The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense ...”).
Given these considerations, we should not lightly vacate the district court’s reasoned and reasonable sentence. We should be especially reluctant to do so where, as here, a remand for resentencing will result in the incarceration of an individual with no prior criminal record primarily because he finally chose to admit the truth about his offense.
II. Abuse of Position of Public Trust
The district court also properly declined to enhance Lange’s offense level for breach of a position of public trust. The majority correctly notes that neither the base offense level nor specific offense characteristic for theft take into account abuse of public trust. The majority errs, however, in concluding that Lange’s status as a mail handler “contributed in some substantial way to facilitating” his thefts rather than merely providing him with “an opportunity that could as easily have been afforded to other persons.” See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 Application Note 1.
Application Note 1 to section 3B1.3 illustrates the distinction between a position of trust which substantially facilitates a crime and one that merely provides an opportunity for crime with the example of “embezzlement by an ordinary bank teller,” to which the adjustment does not apply. The majority attempts to distinguish Lange’s position from that of a bank teller by describing how his enhanced opportunity to steal from express and certified mail substantially facilitated his crime. A comparison of Lange’s opportunities for theft with those available to the average bank teller, however, reveals no meaningful difference between the two positions.
A bank teller’s position provides certain access to large amounts of cash on a daily basis. Monitoring of cash transactions by the bank and its customers limit somewhat the teller’s opportunities for undetected theft. Lange’s position as an express and certified mail handler provided him with occasional access to uncertain quantities of cash and valuables one day each week. Monitoring of the valuable contents of the mail by its senders and recipients limited Lange's opportunities for undetected theft. Thus, Lange’s job as a mail handler merely provided an opportunity for crime that was also afforded to every other handler of express and certified mail, much as a bank teller’s job provides an opportunity for crime that is also afforded to every other bank teller. Lange’s access to express and certified mail no more “substantially facilitated” his thefts therefrom than a bank teller’s access to bank deposits would substantially facilitate his embezzlement of those funds.
Lange’s thefts from the mail differ in no meaningful way from embezzlement by an ordinary bank teller, and do not merit the enhancement for abuse of a position of public trust. Accordingly, I dissent.