The survivors of Eugene G. Bach, Jr. appeal the summary judgment dismissal of their claims made under the Jones Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and the general maritime law. 708 F.Supp. 776 (E.D.La.1989). We affirm.
I. FACTS
On December 26, 1986, Eugene G. Bach, Jr. came aboard the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT to serve as its compulsory river pilot between New Orleans and Pilottown, near the mouth of the Mississippi River. Bach arrived alongside the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT in a small pilot boat and ascended a pilot ladder to the ship’s deck. Although Bach arrived safely on the bridge, he collapsed from a heart attack a few minutes later. The crew summoned medical help from shore, but no one attempted to aid *324Bach although several had been trained in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation techniques.
Bach’s survivors brought suit under the Jones Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and the general maritime law. All of their theories centered upon the adequacy of the pilot ladder and the failure of the crew of the vessel to render medical aid to Bach. The trial judge dismissed their claims, and this appeal followed.
II. JONES ACT
Only a “seaman” may assert a negligence action under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C.App. § 688.1 An injured worker attains seaman status by proving: (i) permanent attachment to or substantial work on a vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels; and (ii) contribution to the function or mission of the vessel or an identifiable fleet of vessels. Barrett v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067, 1072-74 (5th Cir.1986) (en banc); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir.1959).
Bach’s survivors do not seriously argue that he was permanently attached to or did substantial work on board the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT. The record clearly reveals that he fulfilled neither requirement. His transitory work aboard the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT, which lacked any degree of regularity and continuity, does not constitute either permanent attachment to or substantial work aboard that vessel. See Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1073-74.
Bach’s survivors argue that he is not required to establish a connection to the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT because he can prove the requisite connection to a “fleet” of vessels that includes the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT. See Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1074; Braniff v. Jackson Ave.—Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.1960). In Barrett, we defined “fleet” for these purposes as an “identifiable group of vessels acting together or under one control.” Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1074. The only apparent connection between the vessels Bach piloted was that they traversed a stretch of the Mississippi River between New Orleans and Pilottown. Ordinarily, this would hardly constitute a fleet. But Bach’s survivors contend that because each vessel he worked aboard was under his control when he piloted it, the aggregation of the vessels he worked aboard constitutes a fleet.
We made it clear in Barrett that “fleet” means more than simply “any group of vessels an employee happens to work aboard.” 781 F.2d at 1074. Bach’s “control” argument is no more than an attempt to make a “fleet” out of all the vessels he worked aboard. Barrett’s definition and explanation of “fleet” forecloses this argument. This group of vessels is not a “fleet.”
While Bach fails the vessel connection prong of the Robison-Barrett test, we have specifically reserved decision on whether an exception to that test might be made in a case such as Bach’s:
We do not decide whether the same principle governs the crewmember status of the maritime worker who spends virtually all of his time performing traditional seaman’s duties — work closely related to the movement of vessels — but does his work on short voyages aboard a large number of vessels.
Barrett, 781 F.2d at 1075 n. 13. The question we reserved in Barrett faces us today. In particular, we must decide whether to exempt workers who perform traditional seaman’s work on a large number of unconnected vessels from the vessel connection prong of our test for seaman status.
Bach’s case for seaman status has corn siderable intuitive appeal for two reasons: (i) his entire job was to perform an archetypical seaman function, the steering of an oceangoing vessel through navigable waters; and (ii) in performing his job, Bach regularly faced many of the hazards of life on the sea and the risks created by moving vessels through navigable waters. To use a metaphor frequently employed in describ*325ing the stuff that makes a seaman, Bach’s occupation was quite “salty” indeed.
Although some of our seaman status cases discuss the perils of the sea that the worker faces, we have never held that seaman status is coextensive with exposure to seaman’s risks. We have frequently refused to extend seaman’s protections to workers exposed to a seaman’s perils but who lacked the requisite connection to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. See Ardleigh v. Schlumberger Ltd., 832 F.2d 933, 934 (5th Cir.1987) (employee who worked offshore on thirty unconnected vessels denied seaman status); Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc., 831 F.2d 554, 555-56 (5th Cir.1987) (worker who spent seventy-five to eighty percent of his working time aboard unconnected moveable drilling rigs not a seaman); Langston v. Schlumberger Offshore Services, Inc., 809 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir.1987) (worker who performed work on fifteen vessels belonging to ten different owners not a seaman). We have also refused to extend seaman status to a variety of workers who undeniably faced the perils of the sea but who worked on a structure that did not qualify as a “vessel.” See Reynolds v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton, 788 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 278, 93 L.Ed.2d 253 (1986) (ship on sea trials not a vessel “in navigation,” and therefore those working aboard ship during sea trials not seamen); Reeves v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 720 F.2d 835, 836-37 (5th Cir.1983) (helicopter not a vessel and therefore offshore helicopter pilot not a seaman).
Similarly, we have not granted seaman status to workers who performed the work usually or traditionally done by seamen but who lacked connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels. To the contrary, we have always required those workers performing traditional maritime functions to satisfy the vessel connection test. In Fazio v. Lykes S.S. Co., Inc., 567 F.2d 301 (5th Cir.1978), we denied seaman status to a shoregang worker who performed traditional seaman’s work but who lacked the requisite vessel connection. Similarly, in White v. Valley Line Co., 736 F.2d 304 (5th Cir.1984), we refused to grant seaman status to an injured fleetman at a barge fleeting facility who spent almost all of his time aboard various barges doing seaman-type work — handling tow lines, and cleaning and repairing barges — but who could not show connection to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. Thus, to grant Bach an exemption from establishing connection to a particular vessel or fleet of vessels would be inconsistent with a long list of cases from this court.
Granting Bach an exception to the vessel connection requirement would also draw us farther away from other circuits. Although Robison and Barrett only require the worker to establish that he aided in the accomplishment of the mission of the vessel, several other circuits adhere to the narrower “aid in navigation” test or a similarly stringent requirement. See Stanfield v. Shellmaker, Inc., 869 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.1989); Johnson v. John F. Beasley Const. Co., 742 F.2d 1054, 1062-63 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S.Ct. 1180, 84 L.Ed.2d 328 (1985); Simko v. C & C Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960, 964-65 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 64, 62 L.Ed.2d 42 (1979); Whittington v. Sewer Const. Co., 541 F.2d 427, 436 (4th Cir.1976). To further weaken our test by excusing workers engaged in traditional maritime work from establishing vessel connection would only widen the gap between this court and most other circuits in the proof required to establish seaman status.2
Further, such an exception for workers engaged in traditional maritime work would be difficult to apply and would unnecessarily inject uncertainty and ambiguity in our circuit’s test for seaman status. For example, would harborworkers, particularly those engaged in occupations *326not enumerated in the Act3 who perform essential vessel functions traditionally performed by the crew and who sometimes face seaman-type risks, be entitled to have a jury ponder whether they are seamen? For over thirty years, this circuit has struggled to provide a workable test for distinguishing seamen from other maritime workers in maritime injury cases. A large-body of law, developed through a case-by-case application of the Robison test, provides the means for deciding which workers are entitled to the benefits of the Jones Act. Dozens (perhaps hundreds) of seaman status cases have come before us, but we have never made an exception to the core requirement that the injured worker show attachment to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels. We decline the invitation now to make a wholesale exception to a test that has served us for so long.
In short, to create an exception for a worker such as Bach who has the duties and faces the risks of a traditional seaman but who lacks requisite vessel connection would include all sorts of workers we have previously excluded, would widen the divergence of views between our circuit and others, and would make our seaman test unnecessarily uncertain and ambiguous. We therefore decline to make such a radical change in this circuit’s test for Jones Act coverage. The district court correctly determined that no genuine issue of fact remained and that Bach was not a seaman as a matter of law.
III. OTHER MARITIME REMEDIES
A. Section 905(b) of the LHWCA
Bach’s survivors also assert a negligence action against Trident Steamship under section 905(b) of the LWHCA. They make two arguments: (i) that the crew and owners of the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT negligently provided a substandard boarding ladder; and (ii) that the crew of the TRIDENT were negligent in failing to administer cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to him after his heart attack.
1. Adequacy of the Boarding Ladder
Bach’s survivors assert that the crew was negligent because it failed to provide him with an appropriate means of boarding the ship. They rely on two regulations concerning pilot ladders. The two regulations — one a part of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) and a nearly identical Coast Guard regulation— require that when the distance from the water to the ship’s deck exceeds thirty feet, “access from a pilot ladder to the [vessel or ship] must be by way of an accommodation ladder” or by an “equally safe and convenient means.” Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 1974, Multilateral, Ch. 5, Regulation 17(a)(ii), 32 U.S.T. 47, 243, TIAS No. 9700, reprinted at 6B Benedict on Admiralty, doc. 14-8, at 14-400; 46 C.F.R. 96.40-1(g). The SOLAS regulation also requires a pilot ladder to be secured so that “the pilot can gain safe and convenient access to the ship after climbing ... not more than 9 metres (30 feet).”
Bach’s survivors point out that the free-board of the M/V JAYMAT TRIDENT was approximately thirty-two feet and that no accommodation ladder or similar device was provided for Bach’s ascent. Therefore, they contend, both the SOLAS regulation and the Coast Guard regulation were violated.
We conclude that these regulations were not violated. The regulations do not prohibit pilot ladders more than thirty feet in length; nor do they prevent the use of a pilot ladder when the vessel’s freeboard exceeds thirty feet. The obvious intention of these regulations is to limit to thirty feet the distance a pilot can be required to climb a pilot ladder. It is only after the pilot has climbed thirty feet of pilot ladder that an accommodation ladder or other similar device is required.
It is undisputed that Bach began his ascent of the pilot ladder at least eleven feet above the water level. Bach therefore *327climbed considerably less than thirty feet on that ladder. Because Bach was required to climb less than thirty feet on the pilot ladder, no accommodation ladder or other device was required. Hence, Bach’s section 905(b) claim based on violation of these regulations fails.
2. Failure of the crew to administer CPR
Bach’s survivors also asserts a negligence claim based on the failure of the crew to administer CPR to him. Undisputed medical testimony indicates that Bach had no more than a fifteen percent chance of surviving even if the crew had rendered CPR and electrical defibrillation had been available. From this uncontradicted evidence, no rational factfinder could conclude that the crew’s failure to administer CPR more likely than not caused Bach’s death. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts section 41, at 269 (5th Ed.1984) (“plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result”); Restatement (Second) by Torts sections 431, 433 comment b (1965).
Bach’s survivors seek to avoid this factual weakness by urging this court to adopt a special rule of causation, the “loss of a chance of survival” doctrine. Under this doctrine, which as far as we can tell, has been confined to medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs who cannot meet the ordinary standards of causation are allowed to recover for negligent conduct that decreases their chances of survival. See generally Annotation, Medical Malpractice: “Loss of Chance Causality”, 54 ALR 4th 10 (1987).4
We decline the invitation to apply this doctrine in this section 905(b) case, well beyond the context in which it has been developed.
Bach’s survivors have therefore failed to prove causation and failed to persuade us to adopt the loss of a chance of survival doctrine. They therefore may not recover in negligence for the failure of the crew to administer CPR.
B. Unseaworthiness
Bach’s survivors contend that they may bring an unseaworthiness action based on the “Sieracki” seaman doctrine. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872, 90 L.Ed. 1099 (1946). The Sieracki doctrine survives only in favor of maritime workers who are not covered by the LHWCA. See Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1118 (5th Cir.1981). However, the record before us does not clearly reveal whether Bach was an LHWCA-cov-ered worker.5 We therefore address their claim on the merits.
Unfortunately for Bach’s survivors, this claim is nothing more than their negligence claim recast in terms of the warranty of seaworthiness. They assert that the vessel was unseaworthy because it did not have the type of ladder prescribed by SOLAS and Coast Guard regulations. As we have already noted, undisputed summary judgment evidence shows there was no violation. Hence, the unseaworthiness claim must fail as well.
AFFIRMED.
. Because we decide that Bach is not a seaman, we need not consider whether Trident Steamship was his employer for purposes of the Jones Act.
. We note that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one of our Jones Act seaman cases, apparently to resolve this conflict among the circuits. See Wilander v. McDermott Intern., Inc., 887 F.2d 88 (5th Cir.1989), cert. granted in part, _ U.S. _, 110 S.Ct. 3212, 110 L.Ed.2d 660 (1990).
. See Pizzitolo v. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp., 812 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059, 108 S.Ct. 1013, 98 L.Ed.2d 978 (1988).
. Bach’s survivors also rely on Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 728, 9 L.Ed.2d 721 (1963), in which the Fourth Circuit discussed the duty to attempt rescue of an overboard Jones Act seaman. We read Gardner as enforcing a special duty imposed by the Jones Act. Because Bach is not a Jones Act seaman, that special duty has no relevance.
. The LHWCA covers those "engaged in maritime employment.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3), 903. The record does not clearly show that Bach was the employee of anyone. It is, therefore, unclear whether the LHWCA covered him.