This is an appeal from the August 3, 1988, decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, ASBCA No. 36628 and 36632, 88-3 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 21,103, 1988 WL 97169, dismissing certain of appellant’s claims involving two roofing contracts with the United States Army, and the September 26, 1989, decision of the Board, ASBCA No. 36628, 36632 and 37026, 90-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 22,719, 1989 WL 222697, denying appellant’s claims for compensation under the contracts. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 16, 1985, the United States Army awarded Contract No. DACA83-85-C-0131, entitled “Reroofing of a Hokulani Housing Area, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii,” to Emerald Maintenance, Inc. with a contract price of $474,322.02. On September 23, the Army also awarded to Emerald Contract No. DACA83-85-C-0143, entitled “Reroofing of Catlin Park Housing Areas, Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii,” with a contract price of $913,949.10. These contracts required Emerald to, inter alia, remove, replace, and repair existing roofs on military housing.
Each of these contracts contained a provision that incorporated the Davis-Bacon Act wage rate clause, codified as 40 U.S.C. § 276a(a) (1988), which stated that:
[a]ll laborers and mechanics ... will be paid unconditionally ... the full amount of wages and bona fide fringe benefits (or cash equivalent) thereof due at time of payment computed at rates not less than those contained in the wage determination of the Secretary of Labor which is attached hereto and made a part [of the contract]....
*1427(Emphasis added). The above-mentioned Wage Determination, i.e., schedule of job titles, job descriptions, wages, and fringe benefits, was prepared by the Department of Labor and was part of the contract. It stated hourly rates and fringe benefits for ninety separate categories of workers including, inter alia, the following:
Basic Hourly Rates Fringe Benefits
ROOFERS $16.95 $ 5.05
LABORERS
Group 13.75 4.50
Group 12.75 4.50
Group 14.75 4.50
Group 14.25 4.50
Group 13.25 4.50
Group 7.00 2.75
The Wage Determination did not describe the job responsibilities of roofers, but classified laborers according to their responsibilities. At the time these contracts were executed, an area practice governing the performance of the contracts required that all employees who worked on roofs as part of a roofing contract be classified as Roofers. See Building & Construction Trades’ Dept., AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 712 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C.Cir.1983) (in order to comply with the Davis-Bacon provisions of a contract, workers must be classified according to the classifications used in the locality in which the contract is performed). Both parties have stipulated that neither was aware of this area practice at the time the contracts were executed.
Prior to the time of contracting, Emerald’s project manager, Billie J. Noles, had estimated the labor and materials for the bids. In doing so, Noles referred to the 1984 Means Repair and Remodeling Guide. The “Forward” of this text described local union restrictions as factors which affect cost. However, Noles did not consult any area unions with regard to their practices.
On May 19,1986, Labor began an investigation of alleged Davis-Bacon Act violations by an Emerald subcontractor under an unrelated contract. Labor also began an investigation for similar violations under the subject contracts. By a letter dated September 10, 1986, the contracting officer notified Emerald of the area practice of classifying and paying all employees who worked on roofs as Roofers and requested that it make restitution payments for underpaid employees within thirty days, provide evidence of such payments, and properly classify each employee for the remainder of the contracts. The requested corrective action was never taken. Subsequently, the contracting officer withheld a total of $110,104 under the “Withholding of Funds” provision of the contracts,1 and paid this money directly to workers who had been incorrectly paid according to the various rates for laborers.
Emerald then submitted a claim to the contracting officer for payment of the withheld money. The contracting officer denied the claim. Emerald appealed to the Board, its complaint containing four claims (or counts). Count I alleged that the Wage Determination amounted to a defective specification; count II, that the government had misrepresented the rate at which “laborers” performing roofing work could be paid; count III, that the government had superior knowledge as to the proper classification of workers; and count IV, that a mutual mistake was made with regard to the existence of the area practice.
On motion by the government, the Board, on August 3, 1988, dismissed counts I and II for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It denied that part of the government’s motion to dismiss counts III and IV because it concluded that they focused on the contracting officer’s role in the contracts and pleaded matters which went to the rights and obligations of the parties. In its later decision of September 26, 1989, it determined that the superior knowledge count (III) had been abandoned because both parties had stipulated that neither of them was aware of the area practice at the *1428time of contract. The Board then concluded, reviewing count IV, that a mutual mistake as to a basic assumption underlying the contracts did not exist. Emerald appealed.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Board erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over appellant’s defective specification and misrepresentation claims.
2. Whether the Board erred in concluding that appellant’s contracts with the government should not be reformed on the ground of mutual mistake.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, our standard of review is set forth in 41 U.S.C. § 609(b) (1988), as follows:
the decision of the [Board] on any question of law shall not be final or conclusive, but the decision on any question of fact shall be final and conclusive and shall not be set aside unless the decision is fraudulent, or arbitrary, or capricious or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or if such decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
Since both issues before us are questions of law, we are not limited in our review of the Board’s decision.
Appellant argues that the Board erred in its decision concerning counts I, II, and IV, but does not argue error regarding count III. We thus consider count III to have been abandoned, as did the Board.
A. Counts I and II — Defective Specification and Misrepresentation
In its treatment of counts I and II, dealing with defective specification and misrepresentation, respectively, the Board determined that, in these counts, Emerald was contesting the adequacy of the job descriptions, which is an attack on the contents of the Wage Determination. It concluded that, since the Wage Determination was prepared by Labor, and the Disputes Concerning Labor Standards provision of the contracts2 limited the resolution of labor disputes to Labor, the contracting agency was not responsible for the determination’s content and the Board did not have jurisdiction over these counts.
Appellant argues, inter alia, that the Disputes provision does not create an exception to the Contract Disputes Act, which, it says, gives the Board jurisdiction to decide the present dispute, and that the Board’s interpretation of the Disputes provision is contrary to that act. We do not agree.
The Disputes provision of the contracts clearly provides that disputes arising out of the labor standards provisions of the contracts are not to be subject to the Contract Disputes Act, but are to be resolved “in accordance with the procedures of the Department of Labor” (which clearly means by the department). The question then arises whether the particular problem before us “aris[es] out of” the labor standards provisions.
The facts in this case closely parallel those in Collins Intern. Service Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 812 (Fed.Cir.1984). In Collins, the wage disputes clause in the contract between the government and the contractor “require[d] the contracting officer, in the case of a dispute over [the] classification [of workers], to ‘submit the question together with his recommendation, to the * * * Department of Labor * * * for final determination.’ ” The court stated that “[t]he contract ... [wa]s clear *1429that Labor has final authority to settle wage disputes_” Id. at 815.
The dispute here also concerns the contracts’ wage determinations and their application. However Emerald chooses to style its complaint, whether as a defective specification or a misrepresentation, the essence of its complaint relates to the wage rate it had to pay all workers doing roofing work, and the listing of job categories and wage rates in the contracts is surely one of the labor standards provisions. The dispute here thus “aris[es] out of” the labor standards provisions of the contracts, and the Disputes provisions require that it be resolved by Labor.
The Contract Disputes Act is not to the contrary. This act “applies to any express or implied contract [other than a Maritime Contract] ... entered into by an executive agency for — [inter alia] the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of real property.” 41 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3) (1988). Section 8(d) of the Act, 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1988), gives the agency boards of contract appeals jurisdiction “to decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting officer (1) relative to a contract made by its agency....” However, in the specific Disputes provision of the contracts, appellant agreed that disputes over labor standards are not to be subject to the general disputes clause. While Emerald may have had little choice in the matter due to the Davis-Bacon Act, there is little doubt that an objective reading of the contracts indicates that the parties intended that the specific Disputes provision, stating that disputes arising out of labor standards are not to be subject to the general disputes clause, but are to be resolved in accordance with the procedures of the Department of Labor, predominates over the general provision that the Board has jurisdiction to decide any appeal from a contracting officer. It is well established that the specific governs over the general, and the language of these provisions compels the result.
We therefore conclude that the Board did not err in deciding that counts I and II arose out of the labor standards provisions of the contracts and as such were not subject to the Board's jurisdiction.
B. Count IV — Mutual Mistake
Appellant asserted to the Board that the mutual lack of awareness of the local area practice of classifying the subject workers as Roofers was a mistake that was made by both parties. The Board determined that appellant did not consider the area practice to be relevant to the contracts because it was a non-union company and that appellant’s knowledge of it would not have affected its bid price. The Board concluded that the mistake on the part of the contractor was more a mistake of law than of fact, and decided that there was no mutual mistake as to a basic assumption necessary for granting reformation.
Appellant argues to this court that it is entitled to relief for mutual mistake. Specifically, it asserts that both parties mistakenly believed that Emerald could pay laborer wages to some workers under the contract, that that mistake was a basic assumption underlying the contract, and that the mistake materially affected the contract price.
Appellant also asserts that the contracts do not expressly allocate the risk of mistake and that Emerald did not assume it. Its position is that both parties were unaware of the area practice and believed they knew the facts regarding the correct wage rates. Allocation of the risk of mistake to Emerald would give the government a windfall it neither sought, expected, nor is entitled to, according to Emerald.
We do not agree. The purpose of reforming a contract on the basis of mutual mistake is to make a defective writing conform to the agreement of the parties upon which there was a meeting of the minds. American President Dines, Ltd. v. United States, 821 F.2d 1571, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1987). “[A] mutual mistake as to a fact or factor, even a material one, will not support relief if the contract puts the risk of such a mistake on the party asking reforma-tion_” Flippin Materials Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 408, 415 (Ct.Cl.1963).
*1430Provision 45(a) of the contract states that:
[t]he Contractor acknowledges that it has taken steps reasonably necessary to ascertain the nature and location of the work, and that it has investigated and satisfied itself as to the general and local conditions which can affect the work or its cost ... [a]ny failure of the Contractor to take the actions described and acknowledged in this paragraph will not relieve the Contractor from responsibility for estimating properly the difficulty and cost of successfully performing the work, or for proceeding to successfully perform the work without additional expense to the Government.
(Emphasis added).
The contractor, by the above provision, expressly contracted to inform itself and work on the basis of the Wage Determination as set forth by the Department of Labor. It acknowledged that it investigated and satisfied itself as to the local conditions, which include area practice in classifying workers, and which could affect the cost of performing under the contract. The language of Provision 45(a) of the contracts is very clear in providing that any failure of the contractor to take the actions described and acknowledged would not relieve it from responsibility for performing the work without additional expense to the government. The risk of loss was thus on Emerald and it should not be compensated for incurring added expenses resulting from assuming that risk. The government is not responsible for Emerald’s inadequate investigation.3
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Board did not err in dismissing counts I and II of appellant’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and in concluding that there was no mutual mistake on the part of the parties that justifies reformation of the contracts.
AFFIRMED.
. This provision allows the contracting officer to withhold "so much of the accrued payments or advances as may be considered necessary to pay laborers and mechanics ... the full amount of wages required by the contract.”
. The "Disputes Concerning Labor Standards” provision states that:
[disputes arising out of the labor standards provisions of this contract shall not be subject to the general Disputes Clause of this contract [i.e., the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (1988), as provided for in Provision 43 of the contract]. Such disputes shall be resolved in accordance with the procedures of the Department of Labor set forth in 29 CFR Parts 5, 6, and 7. Disputes within the meaning of this clause include disputes between the Contractor (or any of its subcontractors) and the contracting agency, the U.S. Department of Labor, or the employees or their representatives.
(Emphasis added).
. The dissent states that there is no dispute as to the applicability of the local wage rates, and that the issue is which party is to bear the responsibility for the increased cost. It then cites cases and regulations assigning that risk to the government. There are two answers to that assertion. The first is that, as to counts I and II, the dispute still relates to the Wage Determination, and that dispute should have been raised with the Department of Labor. It was not. Moreover, Emerald contracted away any right not to be responsible for added costs when it agreed that any failure on its part to investigate the local conditions that affect the cost of the work would not relieve it of the obligation to perform the work without additional expense to the government. That waiver, which Emerald freely made, controls.