concurring in part and concurring in judgment:
I write separately only to note my disagreement with the court’s holding that we are unable to review Mr. Hazel’s claim that the district court misapplied section 4A1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) in fashioning his sentence. According to Hazel, § 4A1.3 sets forth an adjustment methodology for downward departures when a criminal history is overstated, and the district court should have applied it as well to the career offender provision (§ 4B1.1). My colleagues decide that we cannot review this aspect of the sentence, characterizing Hazel’s claim as *426only quibbling with the degree of departure and challenging the reasonableness of the district court’s decision not to depart downward even further. I think there was more to it than that.
This court’s power to review sentencing decisions is spelled out in 18 U.S.C. § 3742. It is clear that “we have no jurisdiction to review the extent of a downward departure merely because the affected defendant is dissatisfied with the quantification of the district court’s generosity.” United States v. Pighetti, 898 F.2d 3, 4 (1st Cir.1990). But if the district court erred in construing the scope of its discretion to depart downward, that question would be reviewable. “[Wjhile decisions not to depart from the sentence range prescribed by the Guidelines may be within the discretion of the trial judge, and therefore not subject to change by an appellate court, decisions apparently based upon a mistake of law or fact are reviewable under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) (1988).” United States v. Zine, 906 F.2d 776, 777 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam).
The majority decides that we cannot review Hazel’s challenge in this case because of the limitation in § 3742(a)(3). There is no doubt that, once a threshold decision to depart has been made, a defendant is only allowed to challenge the reasonableness of a sentence in cases of upward departures under § 3742(a)(3). See United States v. Wright, 895 F.2d 718, 721 (11th Cir.1990) (observing that to allow review of reasonableness under subsection (a)(2) would nullify (a)(3)); United States v. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 978-79 (7th Cir.1989) (holding that one could not automatically read every departure-related decision as an incorrect application of the guidelines without rendering § 3742(a)(3) redundant). But this feared redundancy would only exist if every challenge to a downward departure (including challenges to the reasonableness of the departure) were characterized as misapplications of the guidelines. No such redundancy appears if a limited subset of downward departures are reviewable as misapplications of the guidelines when a defendant contends that the trial judge failed to calculate the extent of the departure as required by the guidelines. In most instances, of course, the guidelines only provide guidance for when a departure is appropriate without adding guidance for the scope of departure (the so-called “policy-based” departures of U.S. S.G. Chapter 5 at issue in every decision cited by the majority). But, as explained below, § 4A1.3 also governs the method by which the scope of a departure is calculated, and a failure to abide by its terms would constitute a misapplication of the guidelines subject to appellate review.
While § 3742(a)(3) refers to a defendant’s right to challenge the reasonableness of a departure, § 3742(a)(2) allows review for any misapplication of the guidelines. In Wright, “no allegation was made that the sentence was imposed in violation of law ... [and] there was no incorrect application of the guidelines.” 895 F.2d at 722. Here we are not reviewing the downward departure for reasonableness but for an allegedly improper application of the guidelines. We could surely entertain a challenge by a defendant who was found to have accepted responsibility as defined in § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines but was then only given a one-level reduction when the guidelines require a two-level reduction. Although such adjustments appear to be “departure-related,” Maj. Op. at 423, the defendant’s challenge on appeal would allege a misapplication of the guidelines reviewable under § 3742(a)(2). The majority cannot mean that, once a district court has given a defendant some benefit in sentencing, the defendant is never able to challenge the sentence because of § 3742(a)(3).
Hazel has argued all along that his sentence was imposed through an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, specifically § 4A1.3, a claim that we can clearly review under § 3742(a)(2). Section 4A1.3 governs not only when but also how a departure should be calculated:
In considering a departure under this provision, the Commission intends that the court use, as a reference, the guideline range for a defendant with a higher or lower criminal history category, as applicable. For example, if the court *427concludes that the defendant’s criminal history category of III significantly un-derrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history, and that ... [it] most closely resembles that of most defendants with a Category IV criminal history, the court should look to the guideline range specified for a defendant with a Category IV criminal history to guide its departure.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Although only a Policy Statement, this court has held that § 4A1.3 mandates that a trial judge “should ascertain whether adjustment within the Guidelines is adequate.” United States v. Allen, 898 F.2d 203, 204 (D.C.Cir.1990) (emphasis added). Section 4A1.3, by dictating how a district court should calculate the scope of a departure, is fundamentally unlike the other departure sections in the Guidelines which leave the degree of a departure entirely to the district court’s discretion. See U.S.S.G. §§ 5K1.1 (substantial assistance), 5K2.0 (other factors not considered by the Commission). Indeed, § 4A1.3 is more akin to the adjustments specified in Chapter 3 of the Guidelines which provide for automatic departures in certain circumstances.
Although I think we can review Hazel’s claim, I conclude that it too lacks merit. Notwithstanding Hazel’s contention that the district court “threw away the guidelines” in sentencing, the trial judge appears to have been quite precise in his decision. Both the Criminal History Category and the Offense Level were enhanced by the finding that Hazel technically qualified as a career offender, but the district court decided to eliminate the enhancement in Category. By asking that the Offense Level be reduced as well, Hazel wants the departure counted twice. But there is no general requirement for symmetry in departures along both axes of the Sentencing Table. For instance, the Tenth Circuit recently held that the guidelines must be consulted “to arrive at the most appropriate offense level or criminal history category, as applicable.” United States v. St. Julian, 922 F.2d 563, 569 (10th Cir.1990) (emphasis added).
Hazel also contends that the district court failed to explain why the reasons justifying departure from Category VI to Category IV did not also apply to a reduction of Offense Level from 34 to 30. We have held that a “court should state definitively its reasons for [a § 4A1.3] determination.” Allen, 898 F.2d at 204-05 (citing decisions from other circuits that had remanded sentences when the trial judge inexplicably “skipped” over possible other Categories in departing from the Guidelines). Here, the district court recognized that the FYCA conviction had “already [been] taken into account” in the career offender classification, but evidently felt that Hazel should not suffer the double-whammy that results when both Category and Level are enhanced by that classification and chose to depart downward on the Criminal History Category alone. Cf. United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1438 (10th Cir.) (observing that district courts may “articulate the objective criteria used as a basis for” the sentence imposed via “an extension of or extrapolation from other guideline levels or principles”), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 202, 112 L.Ed.2d 163 (1990). The trial judge adequately explained why he thought a § 4A1.3 departure was appropriate here and decided to reduce the Category by two levels but not alter the Offense Level.
Therefore, although I disagree with the majority’s belief that we are unable to review the merits of Hazel’s § 4A1.3 claim, I would nonetheless affirm the sentence.