dissenting.
In setting aside a jury verdict the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the jury. Mathewson v. National Automatic Tool Co., 807 F.2d 87, 90 (7th Cir.1986). It seems to me the majority opinion places great weight on the testimony of Frank Frederick, who apparently selected Aungst for elimination, and no weight at all on the testimony of Aungst, which is characterized as “self-serving.” The jury may well have exactly reversed the order of reliance and hence reached a different conclusion. Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir.1987) (“nor can we disregard the verdict merely because almost all of the evidence favorable to Isak-sen came from his own mouth”), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1728, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (1988). It also may have believed, consistent with the district court’s instructions, that the decision regarding Aungst’s termination was influenced by executives outside the capacitor department: thus the jury may have deemed critical the EEO officer’s confession to feeling a "moral obligation” to the company’s younger employees, or the fact that out of the seven engineers terminated in the Bloomington plant’s RIF, six were within ADEA’s protection.
The heavy reliance placed on “versatility” by Westinghouse’s argument and by the majority here seems to me misplaced. “Versatile” may be virtually a synonym for “young.” It is not infrequently the case that long-term employees tend to become specialized, doing primarily the things that they do best and doing them with the encouragement of their employer. Indeed in this case Aungst worked in capacitor unit design (the discipline one of his younger successors was learning) for fourteen years before the company began limiting his assignments to autotrol design. New *1227employees, on the other hand, have been exposed to many facets of the work. They may be uniformly capable of undertaking a wide array of tasks — all perhaps with an equal degree of inexperience. Aungst received substantial increases in pay and excellent ratings on his work — right up to the time he was let go. Pl.Exs. P, S; Order on Summary Judgment at 8 (June 6, 1989). “Versatility” apparently became an issue only when the RIF arrived or perhaps when litigation threatened. Admittedly, the requirement of willfulness makes this a very close case,1 but I would let the jury verdict stand.
Nor am I persuaded that the late-filing of the EEOC charge clearly bars the refusal to rehire claim. The principal basis for imputing knowledge of new hires to Aungst is a memorandum containing the names of two recently hired engineers. These are not identified on the document as recent hires, Aungst Dep. Ex. 15, and I think we are placing a heavy burden on Aungst to fit the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together and “know” about developments of which there is no clear evidence he was informed.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
. I find telling, however, the trial judge’s first opinion — issued in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the discrimination count — that Westinghouse's repeated offers of early retirement to Aungst (beginning before the company hired the two younger, inexperienced engineers) were probative of willfulness. Order on Summary Judgment at 8 (June 6, 1989).