dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the business activities to be carried out under the franchise and distribution agreements are so inextricably intertwined that they should be arbitrated as a package. See, *1311e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (statutory ADEA employment claim, not arising from a term in employment contract, must be arbitrated under general language found in securities dealer registration agreement). The economic relationships contemplated by these interrelated contracts cannot, through any realistic analysis, be efficiently parsed out or compartmentalized for separate arbitration and judicial consideration.
In my view, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), buttressed by the decision in Gilmer dictate that the antitrust claims of appellees are subject to arbitration. Such claims are based, at least in part, on a “hand in glove” relationship between the franchise agreements and the distribution agreement. The difficulty the majority encounters in explaining how these interwoven issues can be presented for both judicial and non-judicial consideration makes my point.
I would reverse the district court and remand with directions to order arbitration of all the claims set forth in Counts I through IX of the counterclaims filed by appellees.