concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority opinion’s analysis and holdings respecting “relevant conduct,” including conduct beyond the offense of conviction.1 However, I cannot agree that this record permits Frierson’s sentence to be affirmed where the sentencing judge conditioned a two-level reduction in Frierson’s offense level for “acceptance of responsibility”2 on Frierson’s admitting that he had possessed and brandished a gun — an admission that would incriminate Frierson in a future state criminal prosecution. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434-39, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1145-48, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984).
Accordingly, I would vacate Frierson’s sentence and remand to the district court for a determination of the incident or incidents on which the district court relied when it decided not to grant Frierson the two-level reduction. Such a determination is mandated by the Supreme Court’s unequivocal instruction that the State may not seek “to induce [an individual] to forgo the Fifth Amendment privilege by threatening to impose economic or other sanctions ‘capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1146, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 2136, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977)).3
A.
Three different incidents occurred which implicate Frierson’s constitutional rights under Murphy. First, the record reveals that the FBI interviewed Frierson about two weeks after the bank robbery to which he pleaded guilty. During that interview, *665Frierson denied having used a gun to commit the robbery. I agree with the majority, (Maj. Op. at 662), that this denial is, on this record, untainted by any threat implicating the Fifth Amendment. Nothing in this record establishes that when, during his FBI interview, Frierson denied using a gun, he had been threatened or made aware of any coercive threat. The second and third incidents involving Frierson’s denial of the use of a gun, however, present far different situations.
B.
During Frierson’s pre-sentence interview, he again denied having used a gun. This second denial occurred after the government had informed Frierson of the facts and oral rulings in an unreported ease from the District of Delaware, United States v. Eugene Dean, No. 88-42 (D.Del.), thereby confronting Frierson with the choice of either incriminating himself to obtain a lesser sentence or suffering a greater sentence by his denial. In Eugene Dean, the judge withheld Dean’s two-level reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” because Dean refused to admit that he had possessed a gun. By bringing that opinion to Frierson’s attention, the government implicitly threatened Frierson that Frierson would forfeit the two-level reduction in his offense level if he did not admit to his possession and use of a gun during the bank robbery.
The doctrine of Murphy should thus preclude the district court from relying on Frierson’s denial as reported in the presen-tence report. The Court in Murphy taught that a state may not threaten anyone with a penalty if the resulting admission would incriminate that person in a future criminal proceeding. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 438 & n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1146, 1148 & n. 7.
While the Court held that no violation of the Fifth Amendment occurred in Murphy, it did so on the ground that Minnesota had made no threat that, should Murphy fail to admit his earlier conduct, it would revoke his probation. Id. at 436, 437-38, 104 S.Ct. at 1147, 1147-48. The Court in Murphy found that a probation condition that required Murphy to be truthful with his probation officer “in all matters” did not threaten to penalize nondisclosure. “On its face, Murphy’s probation condition proscribed only false statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to answer particular questions....” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 1147. Thus, Murphy was not threatened with the loss of his probationary status if he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Court’s discussion of such a threat, had it been made, however, makes clear that an admission resulting from such a threat would be an unconstitutional coerced admission.
The majority opinion misconstrues Murphy to stand for the proposition that a threatened penalty implicates the Fifth Amendment only if it is “specifically addressed to the exercise of the privilege.” (Maj. Op. at 661). Yet the Court in Murphy asserted just the opposite view: “There is ... a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the State either expressly or by implication asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation ... the failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in criminal prosecution.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 104 S.Ct. at 1146 (emphasis added). Here, the government’s threat to Frierson violated the doctrine of Murphy because it effectively denied him the right to remain silent without incurring a penalty.
The majority also errs when it asserts that for Murphy’s answers to have been considered compelled, “it was not enough that [Murphy] may have reasonably believed his probation would be revoked for failing to answer his probation officer’s questions.” (Maj. Op. at 661), In fact, the Murphy Court explicitly determined that Murphy had no reasonable cause to believe that his silence would be penalized and that therefore Murphy was never threatened. “If Murphy did harbor a belief that his probation might be revoked for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege, that belief would not have been reasonable.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 438, 104 S.Ct. at 1148. *666Frierson, in contrast, was told quite clearly that his silence would be penalized. After the government made Frierson fully aware of the Eugene Dean opinion, it had to be evident to Frierson that his continued denial of the possession of a gun could lead to no alternative but a greater sentence.
C.
The third incident that implicated Frier-son’s rights under Murphy was Frierson’s decision. not to testify at the sentencing hearing. Having already been threatened by the prospect of a greater sentence, Fri-erson was cognizant of the constitutional dilemma which he faced: if he admitted the possession of a gun, he stood in jeopardy of another criminal prosecution; if he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege, he would lose the opportunity of obtaining a two-level reduction in his offense level. Frierson’s decision not to testify, like his denial at the presentencing interview that he had possessed a gun, could not therefore support the district court’s decision to deny Frierson a two-level reduction in his offense level.
D.
The record does not reveal on which of these three incidents the district court based its refusal to award Frierson the two-level reduction.4 When the district court ruled that it would withhold a two-level reduction because Frierson had failed to accept responsibility by admitting to the possession of a gun, the court did not specify whether it was relying on (1) Frierson’s post-arrest denial that he possessed a gun which he made to the FBI agent; (2) Frier-son’s denial of possession which he made to the probation officer at the presentence interview; (3) Frierson’s failure to testify at the sentencing hearing, or (4) some combination, if not all, of these three incidents. The instruction of Murphy satisfies me that the district court, if it had relied on Frierson’s denial to the probation officer or on Frierson’s failure to testify at the sentencing hearing, would have violated Frier-son’s constitutional rights. If, however, the district court had focused solely on Frierson’s encounter with the FBI which took place soon after the bank robbery, then no coercive threat was made; nor was Frierson, according to the present record, made aware of any such threat which could affect his Fifth Amendment rights.
I acknowledge that the district court had the discretion to rely upon any or all conduct of Frierson in deciding whether Frier-son had “accepted responsibility” so as to be entitled to a two-level reduction in his offense level.5 Unfortunately, the record is devoid of any discussion by the district court as to the basis for its § 3E1.1 decision. Even though Frierson’s conduct at the time of the FBI interview could support a denial of a two-level reduction, this court cannot cure the absence of the district court’s reasoning or a finding, particularly a finding so essential to the district court’s exercise of its discretion.6
*667I would vacate Frierson’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentenc-ing limited to the district court’s reconsideration of whether a two-level reduction should be afforded to Frierson in light of the above considerations.
I therefore dissent from the majority judgment which affirmed the district court’s judgment of sentence.
. I therefore join the majority of the court in affirming the three-level enhancement of Frier-son's sentence for possession of a gun.
. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 addresses adjustment of the offense level based on a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility:
Acceptance of Responsibility
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the offense level by 2 levels.
(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this section without regard to whether his conviction is based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by the court or jury or the practical certainty of conviction at trial.
(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right.
. See also Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 803-07, 97 S.Ct. at 2134-36 (state could not remove political party officer from position and bar him for five years from holding any other party or public office on basis of his refusal to waive privilege against compelled self-incrimination); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-84, 94 S.Ct. 316, 324-25, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973) (state may not bar public contractors from state contracts because of contractor's refusal to waive Fifth Amendment privilege); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276-79, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1915-16, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968) (policeman who refused to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege may not be dismissed from office because of that refusal); Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 283-85, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 1919-20, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968) (city workers were unconstitutionally discharged from employment where discharge was based on their refusal to waive their right against self-incrimination).
. The majority reads the record to exclude the possibility that the district judge based its denial of the two-point reduction on anything that happened at the sentencing hearing. (Maj. Op. at 662 n. 6). The record contains nothing to support this conclusion. Even if the majority is correct in this, however, it would still be necessary to remand the case to the district court in order to determine whether the district court relied on' Frierson’s statements to the FBI agent or on his statements to the probation officer.
. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 1(g)) (“In determining whether a defendant qualifies for this provision, appropriate considerations include, but are not limited to, ... the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility."). Even where a defendant ultimately accepts responsibility for conduct encompassed within the offense of conviction by pleading guilty, a denial of the conduct at some earlier stage in the case may provide a basis for a district court to withhold the two point reduction. See § 3El.l(c) ("A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right.”).
.Nor could we hold, on facts that could either defeat the district court's ruling or that could support it, that the failure to provide the basis for the determination or to make an essential finding was harmless error. See Arizona v. Fulminante, — U.S. -, -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1256-58, 1260-62, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (harmless error analysis measured by reasonable doubt standard).