dissenting.
Insofar as the majority characterizes Mr. Lafferty’s competence to stand trial as the pivotal issue in this case, I must agree. It is a troublesome issue indeed. I must respectfully dissent, however, from the loose interpretation of governing law and the myopic review of the record necessary to *1557support the majority’s opinion vacating Mr. Lafferty’s conviction.
I. COMPETENCY STANDARD
At the threshold, we recognize that competency to stand trial is an issue of constitutional significance. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 838, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). Therefore, we must first determine whether the trial court applied the appropriate test for determining competency. This determination is most certainly a question of law subject to de novo review.
The time-honored constitutional test to determine competency to stand trial is whether an accused has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). The record unmistakably reveals this is the test applied by the Utah trial court:
The Court wants to also make it clear that, as to the previous finding by the Court that the defendant was not incompetent to proceed, that should in no way be construed as merely a factual finding. Under any definition of the word “rational,” which the Court in Dusky v. United States could have intended, this Court believes, from all of the evidence, including the Court’s observation on nine trial days and also on numerous other times, at numerous other times prior to that trial, believes that the defendant’s:
(a) Understanding of the proceedings, in his understanding of the punishment which could be imposed, that is the nature of the proceedings, the punishment that could be imposed; and his ability to consult with his lawyer, with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, are believed and held to be rational as well as factual understandings.
Notwithstanding the trial court’s full and accurate recitation of the applicable test, the majority embarks on a quest to articulate the one true legal definition of competency. Focusing in particular on the definition of “rational understanding,” the majority discriminately cites cases which are factually distinct — cases leaving little doubt as to the petitioners’ incompetence or the necessity of a competency hearing — to conclude the state court wrongly found Mr. Lafferty competent.
For example, the majority quotes and relies heavily upon the circuit court opinion which led to the Supreme Court’s Dusky decision. Maj. op. at 1550. However, when characterizing this excerpt as the basis of “rational understanding” the majority fails to address the significant underlying factual differences between petitioners Dusky and Lafferty. Dusky was diagnosed as a schizophrenic suffering from “visual hallucinations, tension, insomnia, emotional turmoil, ambivalence, morbid preoccupations, depression, feelings of inadequacy and unworthiness, and a long history of alcoholism and inadequacy.” Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir.1959). Mr. Lafferty never exhibited this range of behaviors. The majority also fails to note that despite this long history of mental disorders, on remand Dusky was found competent, and was tried and convicted a second time. Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998, 82 S.Ct. 625, 7 L.Ed.2d 536 (1962). Most significantly, the standard applied on remand and upheld by the Eighth Circuit as characterized by then-Judge Blackmun1, is strikingly similar to *1558that articulated and applied by the Utah court in the present case.
The other cases cited by the majority represent unfortunate individuals who, among other things, believed they sported golden auras when they were around Buddhist monks, blew kisses to prosecutors while in the courtroom and were unable to maintain their composure, United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 294 (2d Cir.1990); or who were never able to communicate with their lawyer, assist in their defense and who thought they were being pursued by the CIA, Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir.1984); or who were the childhood victims of sexual abuse at the hands of a prostitute and who now suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder because of their Vietnam wartime experiences, Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 590 (5th Cir.1990). The majority fails to discuss the relevance of these extreme conditions to each individual competency determination or to the determination of Mr. Lafferty’s competence. The majority appears to suggest that a court’s assessment of a particular defendant’s contact with reality may and should be divorced from an analysis of the type and manifestation of the defendant’s mental condition. Maj. op. at 1551 n. 3.
Using the diagnostic nomenclature from these cases, sans their factual circumstances, to support the notion that reality is the touchstone for ascertaining the existence of a rational understanding strains legal logic. These cases do not establish as a matter of law that the Utah court employed an improper legal standard. They merely illustrate that “rational understanding” eludes any attempt at uniform definition. Nonetheless, the majority has utilized these cases as a constitutional smoke screen behind which it impermissi-bly substitutes, de novo, its findings as to Mr. Lafferty’s rational abilities for those of the trial court.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
On federal habeas review, a state court’s determination on the merits of a factual issue is entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added);2 Case v. Mondragon, 887 F.2d 1388, 1392 (10th Cir.1989) (explicit and implicit fact findings by state trial and appellate courts entitled to presumption of correctness), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1035, 110 S.Ct. 1490, 108 L.Ed.2d 626 (1990); Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 658 (10th Cir.1987) (federal court must accord presumption of correctness to state court fact findings unless statutory exceptions apply), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1035, 98 L.Ed.2d 999 (1988). The United States Supreme Court characterizes competency to stand trial as a factual issue. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117, 103 S.Ct. 2261, 2264, 76 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). As such, the Utah court’s conclusion regarding Mr. Laf-ferty’s competency is entitled to such a presumption. Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, —, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 2225, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990). We are therefore constrained to accord deference to the Utah *1559court’s finding that Mr. Lafferty was competent to stand trial unless that finding “is not fairly supported by the record.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8).3
The parameters of our inquiry are well defined by plain, unambiguous statutory language. Section 2254 reads, in pertinent part:
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit—
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such fart of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (emphasis added).
The majority has purposely excised that phrase of the habeas statute which says we examine “that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8), as support for its restricted review of the record. Only by ignoring Defendant’s own words and behavior exhibited before, during and after the trial, and by ignoring crucial observations made by the judge and the attorneys can the majority conclude that the Utah court’s competency determination is not fairly supported by the record.
This approach does not comport with the full text of the federal habeas statute. The *1560plain and unambiguous language of the statute requires us to consider “reliable and adequate written indicia,” which necessarily includes the trial transcript. It also requires us to consider the record “as a whole.”
The majority’s selective examination of the record is also inconsistent with Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. In Pate, 383 U.S. at 386, 86 S.Ct. at 842, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a defendant’s “demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity____” (Emphasis added.) The Court further stated that a defendant’s demeanor at trial cannot be relied upon to dispense with a competency hearing. Id. The implication of Robinson is that demeanor at trial is relevant to a determination of competency.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), is consistent with Robinson. In Drope, the Supreme Court explained:
The import of our decision in Pate v. Robinson is that evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated. That they are difficult to evaluate is suggested by the varying opinions trained psychiatrists can entertain on the same facts.
Id. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 908 (emphasis added).
Likewise, this court examined the state record in Coleman v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 22, 111 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990) (per cu-riam), before it determined that the petitioner was not wrongly denied a competency hearing.4 The significant portion of our opinion states:
Petitioner further argues that he was deprived of a constitutionally adequate determination of competency because (1) the state trial court did not sua sponte conduct an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s competency to stand trial, and (2) the court failed to make an independent judicial determination of petitioner’s competency to stand trial. We must disagree.
The parties do not disagree concerning the underlying due process right not to be tried while incompetent, or the legal standard for determining competency to stand trial. The question presented is whether, in light of the information available to the trial court, “the [court’s] failure to make further inquiry into petitioner’s competence to stand trial denied him a fair trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 174-75 [95 S.Ct. 896, 905, 43 L.Ed.2d 103] (1975).
We have carefully reviewed the record, and conclude that there was insufficient evidence before the trial judge to mandate an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s competency to stand trial.
Id. at 1223-25 (footnotes omitted & emphasis added).
In addition, in Hemsi, 901 F.2d at 295-96, a case cited by the majority, the court wrote:
The [competency] inquiry involves an assessment of whether the accused can assist “in such ways as providing accounts of the facts, names of witnesses, etc.” United States v. Mercado, 469 F.2d 1148, 1152 (2d Cir. 1972). But it is not sufficient merely that the defendant can make a recitation of the charges or the names of witnesses, for proper assistance in the defense requires an under*1561standing that is “rational as well as factual.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. at 402 [80 S.Ct. at 789]. In making its assessment, the court may take account of a number of factors, including the defendant’s comportment in the courtroom. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 [95 S.Ct. 896, 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103] (1975)....
Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
The law is clear. The Utah court’s competency determination is entitled to a presumption of correctness, and upon review, support for that determination may be found in the record as a whole.
III. SUPPORT OF RECORD
Although some of the facts in the record — including Defendant’s suicide attempt, the last diagnosis of his doctors and the abbreviated record review by the Prosecution’s doctor — disturb me as they do the majority, two principles regarding competency determinations are well-settled. First, “[n]ot all people who have a mental problem are rendered by it legally incompetent.” Bouchillon, 907 F.2d at 593. And second, “[t]he court is free to disregard the testimony of expert witnesses (such as psychologists) as to the competency in favor of that of lay persons if there is sufficient evidence to justify doing so.” Id. at 594 n. 15; see also Maggio, 462 U.S. at 117-18, 103 S.Ct. at 2264 (court of appeals, when reviewing a competency determination, erroneously substituted its judgment as to witness credibility for that of the state court). The majority appears to have disregarded these principles.
The evidence in this case, as revealed by the trial record and supported by the observations of the judge, attorneys and prosecution psychologist fairly supports the trial court’s determination that Mr. Lafferty had a rational understanding of the legal proceedings which were affecting him. A thorough review is in order.
Mr. Lafferty’s competency to stand trial became an issue almost immediately after his arrest. The matter was raised because Mr. Lafferty and his brother refused appointment of counsel, and because their behavior during arraignment hinted they would claim the State could not try them because their actions were directed by God.5 In any event, the State filed a petition for inquiry into the Laffertys’ competence, beginning a course of events that resulted in numerous examinations and reports by expert psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as discussions between the Laffertys, their attorneys and the trial judge.6
The two physicians who examined Defendant in October 1984 generally believed he *1562was incompetent.7 One of the doctors limited his conclusion, writing only that Defendant “may not be competent to proceed with the court processes because of his mental illness.” Oct. Washburn Letter. Both interviewed him and found him cooperative, although one noted he refused to take any written psychiatric tests. Oct. Washburn Letter. Dr. Groesbeck reported Defendant was well aware of being charged with murder but refused to accept appointed counsel because he felt all lawyers are corrupt. He said Defendant could very quickly and easily outline the functions of the judge, attorneys, defendant and jury, and noted he was fully oriented to time, place and person. In addition, Defendant knew he faced the death penalty and insightfully avoided discussing anything incriminating. Oct. Groesbeck Letter at 3-7. “His intellectual level appeared to [be] average or above,” according to Dr. Groesbeck. Id. at 7.
Nevertheless, both doctors thought Defendant was incompetent due to mental illness. They wrote he suffered from “grandiosity” and was afflicted with a paranoid personality system or disorder. Oct. Groesbeck Letter at 8-9; Oct. Washburn Letter. For example, Defendant described his claim of divine revelations to Dr. Groes-beck as a “flow of intelligence in the mind” that is “sweet” and “expanding.” Oct. Groesbeck Letter at 5. The doctors firmly felt he could not effectively represent himself and questioned his ability to assist any attorney appointed for him. Dr. Groesbeck wrote that even though Defendant comprehended the nature of the proceedings, he did not realize how serious things were. Id. at 9.
Later, at a hearing, Defendant and his brother attacked the doctor’s conclusions, arguing they were competent and capable of representing themselves at trial. Defendant maintained the main reason for refusing appointed counsel was “because we feel that we have our own best interests at heart.” He felt he was competent for the same reason and also took issue with the paranoid personality disorder diagnosis that was made, according to him, on the basis of his divine revelations:
And this delusion system or the problems that he [Dr. Washburn] mentioned here, I don’t understand these long words here, he relates that to the fact that we claim to have received direct revelation from God, which of course we do claim; but we have been taught since we were knee-high-to-a-grasshopper that that was what we were supposed to do in the church that we were in. So that shouldn’t be such a shock to an individual, and especially when the individual is a member of that same church.
The Laffertys, acting as their own counsel, then proceeded to call and question various witnesses who knew or were acquainted with the Laffertys. Some testified the Laf-fertys were competent, while others expressed doubt. None of the witnesses were experts, except for Dr. Washburn who stood by his letter to the trial judge.
During the two day hearing the court painstakingly explained how foolish it was for the brothers to represent themselves.8 During this time the court saw how the Laffertys behaved through its discussions with them and it further observed them deal with witnesses. In the end, the court ruled they were competent. It said if either of them suffered from mental illness, a preponderance, or clear preponderance of the evidence did not reveal they were so impaired they could not comprehend the nature of the proceedings or punishment they faced. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (Repl.Yol.1990).
Defendant’s next mental health exam came only a month later, and it followed his attack on a guard. The guard requested the exam because Defendant seemed “physically out of control and did not appear to be mentally in control of his facul*1563ties” at the time of the attack. A team of doctors from Utah State Hospital, including one clinical and forensic psychologist and three physicians, examined Defendant for twenty-two days. Dr. Groesbeck, who examined Defendant in October and thought him incompetent then, was a member of the November team. This time, all four doctors, including Dr. Groesbeck, found Defendant competent.9
The November exam, which was much more thorough, disaffirmed October’s results and concluded that Defendant was competent. During the exam, Defendant’s “limited willingness to participate in formal psychological testing” was noted. Nov. Letter. Defendant’s paranoid traits were also recognized, along with his “fundamentalist religious beliefs and a fervent interest in a strict interpretation of constitutional law.” Id. Defendant was persuaded to take two psychological tests, including an I.Q. test and the Rorschach Inkblot test. The I.Q. test showed an above-average intellectual ability, while no evidence of formal thought disorder was suggested by the Rorschach. R. Howell, Ph.D., Psychological Assessment (Nov. 29, 1984) at 3. Some history compiled during the November exam revealed the possibility Defendant once suffered from a “bipolar affective disorder” but there were no signs or symptoms of it during the exam nor had there been for several years.10 Nov. Letter. The court, on the basis of the reports, again found Defendant competent for trial.
The state of affairs shifted drastically when Defendant attempted suicide by hanging on Saturday, December 29th, 1984. This incident prompted another mental health examination as to his competency to stand trial was ordered. In the week before the suicide Defendant was agitated, having just had his trial date set. Apparently in response to the setting, he claimed to be possessed by an evil spirit and attacked his brother at the jail. R. Verville, Psychiatric Evaluation (Jan. 21, 1985) at 2. As for his mental health immediately after the suicide attempt, the Utah State Hospital team concluded after twenty days of evaluation that Defendant was incompetent and exhibited numerous signs of diffuse organic brain damage.11 Individual reports noted a range of problems. For example, Defendant had great trouble dressing and could not remember his age, the date or current events. On various psychological tests, which he willingly took, he scored in the brain damaged category. His I.Q. results were twenty points lower than the results from October 1984.
Although the mental health effects from the suicide attempt were initially severe, they eventually began to resolve. About a month after the attempt Defendant again knew he was charged with murder. He generally remembered what happened and told one doctor his personal problems were caused by others. He named Chloe Low as a person who intruded in “family affairs” and said “this wouldn’t have happened if Chloe Low had minded her business.” P. Heinbecker, M.D., Psychiatric Evaluation, (Jan. 21, 1985). This view of Chloe Low was, of course, consistent with statements previously made to Ms. Low by Defendant.
Later, at a competency hearing on January 28, 1985, Defendant knew the charges he faced and believed he could discuss events surrounding the homicides if he wished. He was, however, weak and had lingering memory problems. He could not, for instance, remember anything about the suicide attempt itself. On questioning from the judge, Defendant testified his memory was coming back everyday. Nevertheless, the judge concluded in the end that Defendant was not yet competent to stand trial, although his overall condition was improving, and suggested he soon *1564would be competent. In his review of Judge Bullock’s ruling at this point in the case, the Magistrate observed “Judge Bullock was obviously taking a concerned, conservative approach.” The competency proceedings overall also convinced the Magistrate that the state had a “deep and intense consideration” of the Defendant’s condition. After independently examining the record, we agree with both of these observations.
The final competency hearing on April 2, 1985, was literally a battle of the experts. On one side, doctors from Utah State Hospital concluded that Defendant’s mental health had deteriorated into a religious delusional system containing strong elements of paranoia and an inability to “determine the boundaries between himself and good and evil spirits.” 12 On the opposing side, a Prosecution expert testified Defendant was competent.
The state hospital doctors believed Defendant factually knew he was charged with murder and would be tried in a courtroom before a judge and jury. March Letter at 2. They did not, however, think he possessed a rational understanding of his situation. Id. And they attributed this lack of rationality to a personality change caused by oxygen deprivation to the brain during the attempted suicide. As a result, the doctors said Defendant’s religious beliefs were now so delusional they “interfere[d] with his ability to meaningfully function, either independently in a courtroom or with the aid of counsel in a courtroom.” They further noted defendant was again uncooperative when it came to taking psychological tests which could more specifically identify his mental state. Finally, signs of Defendant’s lingering problems included one focal seizure involving his left hand and arm, and a doctor’s note that Defendant was having trouble playing pool. Defendant seemed to forget which ball was the cue ball, and whether he was supposed to hit the striped or colored balls. R. Howell, Ph.D., Psychological Addendum (March 22, 1985). Their bottom line mental health diagnosis stated Defendant suffered from amnesia and paranoia. March letter at 2.
The Prosecution’s doctor viewed the paranoid diagnosis as nothing but a “straw dog.” For him, the existence of a paranoid delusional system was not relevant to whether Defendant “can assist counsel and understand the proceedings in this court, and understand the punishment.” After framing the issue this way and studying Defendant’s medical records for four hours,13 he found Defendant competent. In support of his position he offered a generally functional view of rationality centering on whether a person can piece things together, see relationships between incidents, remember information, and thereby factually and theoretically assist in his defense. The Prosecution’s doctor maintained a paranoid delusional system by itself does not mean incompetency to stand trial. See maj. op. at 1552-53.
After listening to both sides, the state trial court came down on the Prosecution’s side and ruled Defendant competent to stand trial. Utah v. Lafferty, No. 9303, memorandum decision at 12 (Apr. 8, 1985). Specifically, the court found that even though Defendant suffered from mental illness, his condition was not so severe that it prevented him from comprehending the nature of the proceedings or the punishment he faced. Id. at 6. The court’s findings in support of its position were detailed:
[Defendant] has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; his elementary mental processes are such that he knows and understands that he is in a court of justice and is charged with criminal offenses of two counts of criminal homicide, two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder; he knows and understands the penalties prescribed and he knows and *1565understands that he could be given the death penalty although he may not believe it will occur, he understands that there will be a trial, that there will be a judge on the bench, a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of criminal charges; knows and understands that he has a lawyer appointed for him who will undertake to defend him against those charges; he knows he will be expected, if he so chooses, to tell his lawyer the circumstances, to the best of his ability, of the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the law violations are alleged to have occurred; he knows that there will be a jury present to pass upon the evidence adduced as to his guilt or innocence of such charges; that he has sufficient mamory [sic] of material events that with the aid of memory reconstruction techniques he can relate these things in his own personal manner if he chooses to do so.
Id. at 6-7.
Turning to the paranoia diagnosis, the court conceded Defendant may be paranoid. But it was not persuaded the evidence — including the suicide attempt— meant Defendant was too paranoid or irrational for trial. The trial court wrote:
Although the defendant may be operating within a paranoid delusional system, there is no evidence, except a suicide attempt, of irrational behavior within that system or within the system of his religious beliefs. In fact, his refusal to cooperate, assist counsel or admit that he is amenable to the laws of the State of Utah are all consistent with his paranoia and any delusional system pertaining to religion.
Id. at 7.
This factual recount, as evidenced by the record, illustrates the basis upon which the trial court could and did fairly find Mr. Lafferty competent. Despite Mr. Lafferty’s contention that his behavior at hearings after the suicide attempt demonstrates incompetence,14 the record makes clear that Defendant’s uncooperativeness was present both before and after the attempt. Therefore, his uncooperativeness cannot be attributed to any appreciable personality change appearing after the suicide attempt. The Defendant’s own Utah State Hospital doctors admit in their final evaluation that “his personality structure and his demean- or have come to approximate his condition prior to [the] December 29[th]” suicide attempt. March Letter at 1.
The record is filled with instances where the Defendant was factually tuned in to the proceedings and rationally participating. The same trial judge observed Defendant in both the competency hearings and trial, and commented during the trial on Defendant’s behavior. He noted, for example, that during the trial Defendant consulted with his attorney “quite frequently at the counsel table.” His personal observations left him “more convinced now that I was ... that he’s competent to proceed; or, to put it another way, that he’s not incompetent to proceed.” At the conclusion of the trial, the judge reaffirmed his views:
1. During a full and complete trial of the matter, from April 25, 1985 to May 7, 1985, a period of twelve days, which included approximately nine trial days, for the jury selection process, the trial and the penalty phase; the Court observed nothing in the words or conduct of the defendant, throughout the trial, which in any way showed or tended to show that he:
(a) [W]as unable to comprehend the nature of the proceedings;
(b) Was unable to understand the punishment specified for the offenses charged; or
(c) Was unable to assist counsel in his defense.
2. The Court wants to also make it clear that, as to the previous finding by the Court that the defendant was not incompetent to proceed, that should in no way be construed as merely a factual finding. Under any definition of the word “rational,” which the Court in Dusky v. Unites States [sic] could have *1566intended, this Court believes, from all of the evidence, including the Court’s observation on nine trial days and also on numerous other times, at numerous other times prior to that trial, believes that the defendant’s:
(a) Understanding of the proceedings, in his understanding of the punishment which could be imposed, that is the nature of the proceedings, the punishment that could be imposed; and his ability to consult with his lawyer, with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, are believed and held to be rational as well as factual understandings.
The Prosecuting attorney also noted how Defendant conversed with his lawyer. Moreover, at one point during the trial, Defendant’s attorney reported to the court that Defendant:
indicated in direct answer to my inquiry that there is nothing that he wants presented that I am not going to present. And, secondly, that there is nothing that I have done now that he takes exception to or thinks it was inappropriate or was not done. In fact, he has been complementary [sic] until now, and complimentary a few minutes ago. So, as of this time I think that what I’m doing is in accordance with either his clear desire or certainly him agreeing that my judgment is probably best.
Lastly, the record shows Defendant assisted in his defense and, at one point, even ordered his attorney to stop pursuing testimony from his doctors. If admitted, Defendant’s attorney could have used the testimony to argue Defendant was guilty of manslaughter, but not murder. Defendant, however, rejected this because he viewed this tactic as admitting guilt for a lesser charge. This action indicates Defendant obviously knew what was happening at trial, and it further shows his memory was clear because he recalled the specific information his attorney was pursuing from the doctors before he heard it again at trial.
IY. CONCLUSION
The majority is unable to point to any evidence which shows Mr. Lafferty was not accurately perceiving reality as it related to the murder charges and courtroom proceedings. Rather, it relies solely upon the testimony at the last competency hearing and upon Mr. Lafferty’s refusal to present an insanity defense as evidence of incompetence. From this fragment of the record, the majority concludes Mr. Lafferty was a person suffering from mental illness to such a degree that he was unable to make decisions on the basis of a realistic evaluation of his own best interests. Maj. op. at 1549, 1554, 1555. In reaching this conclusion, the majority substitutes its judgment of what is “realistic” and “best” for Mr. Lafferty. By taking issue with the subjective wisdom of Mr. Lafferty’s decisions concerning how he wanted his case handled, the majority in effect chills constitutionally protected individual decision-making.15
We review the record only to ensure that a permissible decision was made in light of the evidence. We do not retry the case and we do not substitute our judgment for that of the state court. On the contrary, we must give the state court factual findings a presumption of correctness. “[W]e cannot reverse the District Court’s ruling merely because the evidence arguably supports a different result and we might have ruled differently.” Bouchillon, 907 F.2d at 594.
A trial, reduced to its essence, is the investigation and determination of one or *1567more doubtful facts. In the case before us, the fact under inquiry is Mr. Lafferty’s competence. The state trial court found Mr. Lafferty competent. The Utah Supreme Court found no error. The majority, under the guise of reviewing the legal standard applied by the Utah court, parsed the record and in effect made its own determination of competency believing the law permits only a review of the pretrial proceedings. When the evidence is evaluated under the correct standard there exists no doubt the state court’s finding of competency is fully and fairly supported by the record.
Properly and carefully reviewing the record as a whole, and giving proper deference to the trial court’s findings under the Dusky standard, I cannot in good faith conclude that the Utah court’s competency determination is not fairly supported by the record. I would affirm Mr. Lafferty’s conviction.
. Dusky appealed his second conviction. The Eighth Circuit, per then-Judge Blackmun, noted the following with respect to Dusky's competency to stand trial:
The present appeal is the culmination of that reversal and remand. The required new hearing to ascertain the defendant's competency to stand trial was held October 3, 1960____ Dr. John Kendall Dickinson, a staff psychiatrist at the Springfield Medical Center, whose testimony at the subsequent trial is hereinafter described, and Dr. Joseph C. Stur-gell, chief of the psychiatric staff there, both testified at that hearing. Their testimony and the June 1960 written report of the Center’s staff were to the effect, specifically, that the defendant was then oriented as to time, place and person; that he had some recollection of *1558the events surrounding the offense with which he was charged; that he had present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; that he had a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings in court against him; and that, generally, he was competent to stand trial. Defense counsel expressed his confidence in the psychiatrists and acknowledged to the court that he was not then experiencing the difficulty in consulting and working with his client which he had encountered at the time of the first trial. It will be noted that the evidence produced at this hearing was along the exact lines of the test set forth by the Supreme Court at page 402 of 362 U.S., at page 789 of 80 S.Ct. Judge Ridge accordingly found that the defendant was competent to stand trial.
Dusky v. United States, 295 F.2d at 746.
. Section 2254(d) reads in relevant part:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless____
(Emphasis added.)
. The Supreme Court has directly addressed this threshold issue:
A state court’s determinations on the merits of a factual issue are entitled to a presumption of correctness on federal habeas review. A federal court may not overturn such determinations unless it concludes that they are not "fairly supported by the record." See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We have held that a state court’s conclusion regarding a defendant's competency is entitled to such a presumption. Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 [103 S.Ct. 2261, 2264, 76 L.Ed.2d 794] (1983).... Accordingly, under § 2254’s presumption of correctness, the state court’s factual finding as to Baal’s competence is binding on a federal habeas court. See Maggio, supra; see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 [103 S.Ct. 843, 74 L.Ed.2d 646] (1983) (§ 2254(d)’s presumption of correctness required federal ha-beas court to accept state court’s factual findings on the issue of respondent’s credibility).
Baal, 110 S.Ct. at 2225.
We are not at liberty to adjust this analysis. Nonetheless, the majority would have us insert an additional, preliminary step into our review process. At the threshold, the majority would have us determine whether the presumption is applicable by reviewing the record to determine whether the competency finding was a proper factual finding. See maj. op. at 1549. This approach is circular and unsupported by authority. Furthermore, the result of this approach directly contravenes the presumption of correctness standard Congress mandated in § 2254(d). The relevant inquiry under this standard is the correctness of the competency finding, not the applicability of the presumption. To suggest otherwise is to sidestep precedent and to distort the analysis.
. No meaningful distinction can be made, nor is made, in the text of § 2254(c), between the appropriate scope of review in those cases addressing a trial court’s determination of competency and those addressing a determination of entitlement to a hearing on competency. The well-settled and logical requirement that we examine the whole record to determine if the state court erred is applicable in either situation.
. The following exchanges occurred between the court and Defendant Ron Lafferty:
THE COURT: ... This is a temporal court, it's structured along the lines where people deal with people’s problems, and as to where truth comes down in that setting, that’s the way the system is, to have the truth come out. But it’s from people — from so-called witnesses and others who have some association with or knowledge of the facts that are important.
MR. RON LAFFERTY: So this court is not prepared to deal with matters pertaining to religion and that sort of thing; is that what you are saying?
THE COURT: Well — .
MR. RON LAFFERTY: Or spiritual matters?
THE COURT: Well, this is not a spiritual court. This is a temporal court.
MR. RON LAFFERTY: I needed to know that.
THE COURT: I’ll proceed with you, Ronald Lafferty, to the information and the five counts therefore that has just been presented. Are you prepared at this time to enter a plea? Six counts, excuse me.
MR. RON LAFFERTY: I guess I’m not, your honor, because of the statement that you made because of the religious overtones and spiritual overtones in this matter. You just mentioned that this court doesn’t deal with that sort of thing so it seems to me that you— perhaps you don’t have jurisdiction here. As a result, I’m not prepared to enter a plea because I don’t want to give up my right to challenge the jurisdiction of this court, sir.
THE COURT: The court will then enter a plea of not guilty on your behalf.
. Competency examinations of criminal defendants are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 et seq. (Repl.Vol.1990). The first Petition for Inquiry into Competency was filed on Sept. 27, 1984.
. Letter from C. Jess Groesbeck, M.D. to Judge J. Robert Bullock (Oct. 9, 1984) (hereinafter Oct. Groesbeck Letter); Letter from Philip Wash-burn, M.D. to Judge J. Robert Bullock (Oct. 10, 1984) (hereinafter Oct. Washburn Letter).
. Defendant was ultimately represented at trial by counsel because at his final competency hearing he would not state for the record that he wished to represent himself.
. Letter from Drs. Austin, Howell, Heinbecker & Groesbeck to Judge J. Robert Bullock (Nov. 27, 1984) (hereinafter Nov. Letter).
. A bipolar affective disorder is more commonly known as manic/depressive behavior. See generally American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 213, 225 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (setting forth diagnostic criteria for mood disorders and bipolar disorders).
.Letter from Drs. Heinbecker, Austin, Howell & Groesbeck to Judge J. Robert Bullock (Jan. 22, 1985) (hereinafter Jan. Letter).
. Letter from Drs. Austin, Howell, Heinbecker & Groesbeck to Judge J. Robert Bullock (March 19, 1985) (hereinafter March Letter).
. The question of whether the opinion of a psychiatrist was given after sufficient examination goes to the weight of the evidence and thus is a question for the trier of fact.
. At the final competency hearing, Mr. Lafferty was asked if he wanted to represent himself at trial. He responded to all inquiries by taking the Fifth Amendment and refusing to answer.
. I doubt whether the court would be so quick to hold an individual incompetent to stand trial who refused to raise an insanity defense because of unorthodox political beliefs. For example, tax protesters and other political protesters are often in court expressing their extreme and inaccurate beliefs about the Constitution in bizarre ways. See, e.g., Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir.1990). Although these individuals are wrong and may make decisions contrary to their best legal interest, they are not necessarily incompetent. Like Mr. Lafferty, they may possess a factual understanding of court proceedings and can, if they choose, consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. When one is judged incompetent for rejecting his attorney’s advice we will then have truly established the elitism of the bench and bar.