concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s vacation of the fine, but I would also reverse the convictions.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) defines custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officials after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Miranda warnings are proper when “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” is present. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). To determine whether an arrest has occurred, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances and determine whether a reasonable person in the subject’s situation would feel free to leave. United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir.1987).
The sequence of events occurring in Paskett’s apartment demonstrate that she did not feel free to leave. She felt the need to ask permission to change into more appropriate clothing in her own home. Additionally, Agent Robinson accompanied her into the bedroom. These events definitely show that Paskett was not free to move from room-to-room in her own home without an escort. Consequently, it is difficult to understand how the majority finds that she felt free to leave.
Admittedly, Miranda states “volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the fifth amendment and their admissibility is not affected_” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. In determining voluntariness, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Blackburn v. State, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). Paskett’s statements cannot be considered voluntary. The very statement the majority uses to show voluntariness, “Take the money, just let me and my son go,” shows that Paskett felt coerced.
Additionally, Paskett’s statements in response to Agent Robinson’s questions should have been suppressed. After Pask-ett allegedly offered Agent Robinson a bribe, Agent Robinson continued to interrogate Paskett without explaining her Miranda rights. Agent Robinson further violated Paskett’s rights when she sought to secure a witness to the further interrogation and proceeded to question Paskett about the money’s origin, and whether more money, drugs, weapons, or contraband were in the house. Although the crime charged was completed when Paskett offered money to Agent Robinson in exchange for not arresting her, the officers did not advise Paskett of her rights until after Agent Robinson interrogated her and had attempted to secure a witness to the statements. Agent Robinson’s conduct demonstrates that her questions were not intended to be routine interrogation, but were meant to produce incriminating responses. See United States v. Glen-Archila, 677 F.2d 809, 815 (11th Cir.1982).
Finally, the majority relies heavily upon United States v. Castro, 723 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir.1984) for the proposition that Paskett’s statements were spontaneously volunteered. Castro is distinguishable, however, because it involved a spontaneous utterance. In this case, the officers had gone through the formality of obtaining a written and oral consent to search and were in the midst of investigating money laundering activities in which Paskett was a suspect. Paskett’s statements were not spontaneous. Thus, the majority’s reliance on Castro is misplaced.
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate Paskett’s conviction and sentence.