dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The district court added two points to the offense level for Furlow’s “aggravating role” under guideline section 3B1.1 based on the finding that Furlow had recruited and utilized Cynthia Diane Freeman to perpetrate an identical fraud scheme in Georgia. After asking several rhetorical questions, the court concluded that Furlow’s activities in Missouri and Georgia were “so intertwined and the testimony of the witness ... so positive and so in keeping with the totality of the circumstances,” to be considered “one in the same offense.” The court concluded that Furlow’s leadership role warranted an enhancement under section 3B1.1. We have frequently held that findings of fact in sentencing proceedings are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. The court today makes no mention of these findings in reaching its determination. I am satisfied that the district court’s findings provide a sufficient basis to uphold the district court’s application of this enhancement. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s enhancement based on Furlow’s aggravating role. The issues of whether the Georgia conduct was collateral and whether the guidelines amendments apply retroactively simply are not before us.
Similarly, I would affirm the district court’s rejection of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Here, the government made a detailed statement as to the extensive scope of Furlow’s activities, including his passing of bad checks throughout the United States, and outlined the extent of Furlow’s “acceptance of responsibility.” The government stated that Furlow gave no statement to the FBI of his involvement in the crimes outside of Missouri, except to say that his criminal activities extended to all 48 continental states and 200 different cities, and that Furlow made no statements to authorities after his arrest. The government also stated that Furlow did not voluntarily withdraw from criminal conduct and continued to participate in illegal activity. In response, Fur-low’s counsel argued that a stipulation had been prepared admitting to other conduct. It was in this context that the district court stated, “Doesn’t the law say, that the mere pleading guilty, is not in itself, sufficient to indicate acceptance of responsibility?” (S. Tr. 8-9).
The court today holds this statement by the district court to be contrary to our earlier decisions. In United States v. Knight, 905 F.2d 189 (8th Cir.1990), the district court commented that the defendant “didn’t do much more than plead *174guilty,” and that on the record before it, it would be duty bound to find acceptance “in every single case where the defendant pleaded guilty.” Id. at 190-91. The district court further stated that it was “hard pressed to find anything more than a guilty plea, and the commentary suggests that is not enough in and of itself.” Id. This court remanded the case for resentencing because we could not determine from the record whether the district court inquired into whether the defendant demonstrated “recognition and affirmative responsibility” and “sincere remorse” for his conduct. Id. at 192. The essence of our holding was that the district judge may have believed that the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility could not be granted unless something more than a guilty plea was present, and that a district court may find such a reduction called for even if the guilty plea is the only evidence before it. Id.
Similarly, in U.S. v. Sklavenitis, 905 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.1990), we observed that the district court stated that the mere fact that a defendant pleads guilty and admits to an incriminatory conduct does not mean that he has accepted responsibility. Id. at 1168. We remanded the case for resentencing because we concluded that the district court may have mistakenly believed that its hands were tied in prohibiting the reduction unless the defendant does something more than enter a guilty plea.
I believe that this case is distinguishable from Knight and Sklavenitis. Here, the district court had both the positions of the government and Furlow’s attorney before it, found the government’s position persuasive, and concluded that Furlow was not entitled to a reduction based on acceptance of responsibility.
Guideline section 3El.l(c) states: “A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right.” U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(c) (Nov. 1990). I see nothing in the statement of the district court that does more than echo this guideline. Application notes 3 and 5 are also instructive. Note 3 states that entry of a guilty plea “combined with truthful admission of involvement in the offense and related conduct” is significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility, but “may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n.3) (Nov. 1990). Here, the United States attorney outlined the limited extent of Furlow’s admission of involvement. Note 5 also observes that the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.5) (Nov. 1990). Applying the guideline and these application notes, I have no hesitation in concluding that the district court did not err in denying Furlow a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
I do not believe these views require a result contrary to Knight and Sklavenitis. Those cases, if they do not come dangerously close to creating a bright line rule, appear to cloud comments of district judges that a guilty plea does not entitle the defendant to the acceptance of responsibility reduction. The guidelines clearly state that a defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility as a matter of right, but district courts that have referred to this plain language have had their comments interpreted in a manner so as to justify reversal. I believe our earlier opinions in this respect are in error, and should be considered en banc.