Mary Elizabeth Hudson v. Normandy School District

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.

Mary Elizabeth Hudson, who served as a bus driver for the Normandy School District until her discharge, allegedly for violation of a traffic law, brought this action against Normandy for age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The jury awarded Hudson backpay in the sum of $33,000 and the district court added another $33,000 upon the finding of a “willful violation” of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The district court1 added $10,000 in attorneys fees to the award. Following denial of post-trial motions for judgment N.O.V. or a new trial, Normandy appeals the judgment and asserts that Hudson failed to prove her case for damages and therefore Normandy should have judgment N.O.V. or a new trial or alternatively contends that the evidence in Hudson’s case failed to establish any willful violation; thus the award of liquidated damages must be vacáted. Finally, appellant objects to the attorneys fees award as excessive. We affirm the district court on all issues but liquidated damages, agreeing that the record does not establish a willful violation of ADEA.

I. BACKGROUND

Our review of the district court’s denial of judgment N.O.V. requires us to give Hudson the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Patchell v. Red Apple Enters., Inc., 921 F.2d 157, 158 (8th Cir.1990). With this in mind, the relevant facts are as follows.

On February 9, 1987, Normandy School District terminated Hudson from her employ as a school bus driver. Hudson had worked for Normandy since 1962, had never been reprimanded, and received several commendations. In December 1984, Donald Audrain, Normandy’s then-Assistant Superintendent for Transportation, sent a letter to all bus drivers stating that Normandy prohibited drivers from speeding or *412driving carelessly while on the job and that traffic convictions would be dealt with severely.2 On March 18, 1985, police ticketed Hudson while driving a school bus with no students on board for driving 32 m.p.h. while in. a 20 m.p.h. zone. Hudson testified that she immediately told Audrain about the ticket and that Audrain responded by telling her to pay the fine herself and to avoid the “speed trap” in the future. Tr. at 19-20. Audrain denies that Hudson told him about the ticket.

Hudson presented evidence at trial that Audrain was biased against older women drivers. Floretta Porter, who had been employed as a Normandy driver for ten years, stated that when Audrain learned she was sixty-four, in October 1985, he encouraged her to quit. Tr. at 59. Later, Porter testified that Audrain assigned her to a bus with a malfunctioning seat that he refused to fix. Porter testified that Au-drain’s intransigence forced her to retire. Tr. at 61-63. Margaret Archambault worked for Normandy as a driver until she was sixty-five. During her last year of work, in 1985, she testified that Audrain encouraged her to retire several times, asking her “aren’t you old enough?” Tr. at 41. When Audrain learned that Hudson was sixty-three years old at her birthday party on March 13, 1986, he told Hudson, “Mary, I didn’t know you were that old.” Tr. at 22.

In October 1986, police ticketed Normandy driver Gary Cooper for speeding. Au-drain suspended Cooper as a result. Cooper complained to James Westbury, Normandy’s Superintendent of Schools, that Normandy had not disciplined other drivers guilty of speeding. Tr. at 140. Westbury relayed Cooper’s concerns to Philip Sack, Normandy’s Director of Personnel. Sack ordered Audrain to investigate whether any other Normandy drivers had been ticketed in violation of Normandy policy. Police told Audrain that they had ticketed two other Normandy drivers for traffic violations: Hudson and Cleo Henry, who was in his mid-thirties. Sack ordered Audrain to discharge both drivers, Tr. at 153, and Au-drain obliged on February 7, 1987. Au-drain gave Hudson a disciplinary action notice stating that she was discharged for refusal to obey the orders of a supervisor. Plaintiff’s Ex. 1. The notice did not mention the traffic ticket Hudson had received two years earlier.

Hudson subsequently filed an age discrimination claim and commenced this action. After a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Hudson, awarding her $45,000 in backpay and lost benefits. The jury further concluded that Normandy willfully violated the ADEA, entitling Hudson to double damages. The court reduced the jury’s award to $33,000 in damages, the amount Hudson requested, and awarded Hudson $33,000 in liquidated damages. The court awarded Hudson $10,000 in attorneys fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), and costs. The court denied Normandy’s motion for judgment N.O.V. or in the alternative for a new trial.3 This appeal followed.

*413II. DISCUSSION

We agree with the district court’s finding that Hudson presented sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably find that age was a factor in Normandy’s decision to terminate her. Normandy argues that Hudson presented no evidence disproving that it fired her because she violated Normandy’s policy against speeding. We disagree. Normandy waited two years before firing Hudson for a minor traffic violation. Hudson had an exemplary work record, and had worked for Normandy for twenty-five years. The jury could have inferred from Normandy’s abrupt and unusual treatment of Hudson that her age factored in Normandy’s decision to terminate. See Patchell, 921 F.2d at 159; Morgan v. Arkansas Gazette, 897 F.2d 945, 951 (8th Cir.1990).

We, however, determine from a reading of the record that Hudson failed to present sufficient evidence of willfulness to sustain an award of double-damages. An employer must either willfully, knowingly or recklessly violate the ADEA to be liable for liquidated damages. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126, 105 S.Ct. 613, 624, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). To prove willfulness, an employee must present evidence of her employer’s state of mind at the time her employer violated ADEA. Blake v. J.C. Penney Co., 894 F.2d 274, 280 (8th Cir.1990); Tolan v. Levi Strauss & Co., 867 F.2d 467, 471 (8th Cir.1989). To establish an employer’s discriminatory state of mind, an employee must prove that the people who decided to fire her knowingly or recklessly violated ADEA. Compare Blake, 894 F.2d at 280 (employer, and not co-workers, must willfully discriminate for court to award liquidated damages); Morgan, 897 F.2d at 952 (liquidated damages not appropriate when plaintiff's only evidence of intent is that employer’s reason for discharge was pretextual) with Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1356 (8th Cir.1991) (liquidated damages appropriate when officials who made employment decision displayed age-bias); Rademaker v. Nebraska, 906 1309, 1313 (8th Cir.1990) (single statement of employer who discharged plaintiffs proves willful violation); Neufeld v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 335, 341 (8th Cir.1989) (plaintiff proved willful violation where employer admitted “getting rid of the old people” to others).

Hudson argues that evidence of Au-drain’s discriminatory comments and actions prove that Normandy willfully violated ADEA. However, the evidence at trial did not establish that Audrain had made Normandy’s decision to fire Hudson. Normandy presented evidence that Phillip Sack ordered Audrain to discharge all drivers guilty of traffic violations without regard to their age. Hudson presented no evidence that Sack, the person who decided to fire her, intended to discriminate against her.

We note that Hudson presented sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer that Normandy’s stated reason for her discharge was pretextual. In awarding compensatory damages, a jury may make inferences from evidence that it may not make when deciding whether to award liquidated damages. See generally Neufeld, 884 F.2d at 340 (stating “if the people making the employment decision know that age discrimination is unlawful, and if there is direct evidence — more than just an inference from, say, an arguably pretextual justification — of age-based animus, the trier of fact may properly find willfulness”). Here, the jury could make inferences that justify an award of compensatory damages. The lack of direct evidence of Sack’s motivation compels us to set aside the liquidated damages.

Normandy also appeals the district court’s award of $10,000 in attorneys fees to Hudson under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Normandy disputes the court’s findings regarding the quantity and quality of time that Hudson’s counsel spent preparing her case. We disturb findings in this area only if the court has abused its discretion. Patchell, 921 F.2d at 159. Af*414ter careful review of the record, we reject Normandy’s arguments on this issue.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in all respects, except that we vacate the award of liquidated damages. Appellee is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys fees on this appeal.

. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri.

. The letter read:

December 21, 1984
To All Normandy Bus Drivers:
We at Normandy Transportation have a fine safety record, and public relations regarding pupil transportation. This was not aquired [sic] by accident, it comes from everyone keeping students [sic] safety number one, at all times, from the planning of routes to the drivers transporting the students.
Since the beginning of the school year I have had numerous complaints, related to the driving of a few of our buses. These complaints range from speeding to careless driving, and lack of consideration for the safety of the students we haul, and other motorist [sic] on the streets.
This type of action will not be tolerated by this department. We are here to transport students to and from schools, and other destinations, safely and courteously.
In the future, drivers violating these rules, will be dealt with severely. I am not going to let a few drivers ruin what we have all worked so hard to achieve, as the majority of our drivers are doing a splendid job.
The following district rule applies, # 14 "REFUSAL TO OBEY ORDERS OF SUPERVISOR." *
Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
/S/ Donald F. Audrain Assistant Supervisor of Transportation
‘VIOLATION SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE
Defendant’s Ex. B.

. As for Normandy’s motion for a new trial, we examine the evidence not as strongly in Hudson’s favor, using an abuse of discretion stan*413dard. See Patchell v. Red Apple Enters., Inc., 921 F.2d 157, 159 (8th Cir.1990). After review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying a new trial to Normandy.