dissenting:
Jones Act claims often arise from the same incidents that beget general maritime law claims, however, both involve different standards of proof, causation and review. See Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1354 (5th Cir.1988). Evidence that will support one claim may not be enough to prevail in the other. While the district court properly applied the principles involved in general maritime law, the same standard should not have been utilized when deciding Gavagan’s Jones Act claim. Although the majority certainly writes a persuasive opinion for affirmance, I believe the district court did not apply the correct standard when applying the Jones Act.
In an action under the Jones Act, “all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply....” 46 U.S.C.App. § 688. Thus, Jones Act claims are governed by rules of causation governing claims under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1939); Simeon v. T Smith & Son Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1430 (5th Cir.1988). FELA provides that railroads will be liable for any injury “resulting in whole or in part from [their] negligence.” 45 U.S.C. § 51. This higher standard of duty owed to seamen stems from the fact that as a class, they are considered “wards of the court.” Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1975).
Liability under the Jones Act arises when there is negligence and proximate cause. Myles v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, Inc., 302 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.1962). “Proximate cause is not destroyed merely because the plaintiff may have also contributed to his own injury.” Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 966 (5th Cir.1969) Since “defendants] must bear responsibility if [their] negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury,” Chisholm v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir.1982) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)), employers may not easily avoid liability. This is not to say they are absolutely responsible for all injuries that may result; comparative negligence will reduce their liability. Meyers v. The M/V Eugenio C, 876 F.2d 38 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that even though contributory negligence might be shown, it will not bar recovery as a matter of law). Even a highly reckless plaintiff may still obtain recovery, though he will bear the burden of his own negligence. Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968, 109 S.Ct. 497, 102 L.Ed.2d 533 (1988) (stating “contributory negligence, however gross, does not bar recovery, but only mitigates it.”).
Although the district court found the valve unseaworthy, it denied plaintiff recovery under the Jones Act. This seems to fly in the face of precedent. The district *1023court incorrectly cites Spinks, 507 F.2d at 223, for the proposition that a “defendant’s negligence must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs harm and must be more than ‘merely negligible negligence.’ ” Spinks was only commenting on the Restatement Second of Torts § 435(1) view of legal cause. The court subsequently contrasted that view with the slightest negligence standard of the Jones Act. “It would be anomalous to allow an overly strict interpretation of proximate cause to defeat the remedial purposes of admiralty tort law.” Id. The district court used the wrong standard on Gavagan’s Jones Act claim.
The district court also found Gavagan to be the sole and proximate cause of his own injuries because “he failed to exercise due care in his employment in regards to his injured finger.” That proposition was supported by the district court in a footnote which cited Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 91 S.Ct. 514, 27 L.Ed.2d 562 (1971). Usner, however, does not deal with the Jones Act. Further it is contrary to Jones Act analysis. That conclusion only bears upon denying Gavagan’s general maritime claim.
The district court also concluded that “defendant’s negligence in failing to un-tape the valve assembly was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, but was at most, a mere condition upon which plaintiff’s injuries were received, and is not a basis for imposition of liability upon the defendant.” The court cites Manning v. M/V Sea Road, 358 F.2d 615 (5th Cir.1965) in support of this proposition. Manning is a general maritime law case employing a different, stricter standard, and does not support the district court’s denial of Gava-gan’s Jones Act claim.
The district court concluded Gavagan was not entitled to recovery because “all of the negligence which caused the injury resulted from plaintiff’s negligence, [and therefore] is not entitled to recover under his general maritime law claim of unseaworthiness, nor is he entitled to recover under his claim of negligence based upon the Jones Act.” The court below relied upon Keel v. Greenville Mid-Stream Service, Inc., 321 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.1963). Keel dealt with a seaman who slipped on a soapy floor he was washing; the momentary unseaworthy condition was created by “reason of his own negligence, it being one hundred percent.” Id. at 904. The case at bar differs; the negligence in leaving the valve taped was exclusively defendant’s.
While the district court could conceivably have meant that Gavagan was one hundred percent negligent by working with a healing hand and therefore not entitled to any recovery, this is inconsistent with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial judge does not explain how Gavagan’s actions were the sole cause of the injury. Several other individuals failed to open the valve before the tape was removed at which time it easily turned. Although it is apparent Gavagan was not wise in not informing his employers of his condition, the district court should have mitigated damages instead of finding no right of recovery at all.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.