concurring in the judgment.
I agree with my colleagues that conflict of interest forms filed by members of the Environmental Protection Agency’s Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) and Science Advisory Board (SAB) may be withheld under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. I reach this result, however, not as they do under exemption 3,1 but rather under exemption 6.2
Judge Alarcon finds, and Judge Rymer agrees, that the pre-1985 version of section 207 of the Ethics in Government Act qualifies as a mandatory withholding statute. I cannot agree with this conclusion. Judge Alarcon apparently relies upon “[t]he language of the pre-1985 section 207(a)[, which] specifically exempted the reports filed under that section from the Ethics Act’s public disclosure requirements in sections 205(a), (b), and (d).” Alarcon opinion at 1501. But section 205 provides only that certain reports must be made available to the public; exempting reports from that requirement does not mean that they must not be made available. As Judge Alarcon correctly notes, for exemption 3 to apply “the statute must ‘require[ ] that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue.’ ” Id. (quoting 5 USC § 552(b)(3)) (emphasis added). Exempting a report from a mandatory disclosure requirement leaves disclosure within the discretion of the agency. The pre-1985 version of section 207 therefore does not satisfy the requirements of exemption 3.
*1504The key to this case is the 1985 amendments to section 207(a). First, Congress enacted section 207(a)(1) in its present form, requiring the President to issue regulations prescribing what is to be filed and by whom. Second, it added 207(a)(2), providing that “[a]ny information required to be provided by an individual under this subsection shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to the public.”
The EPA argues, and the appellant concedes, that the language of 207(a)(2), if it applies, turns section 207 of the Ethics in Government Act into a mandatory nondisclosure provision within the meaning of FOIA exemption 3. Appellant, however, correctly points out that this language does not cover the reports that are the subject of the FOIA request. By its own terms, the new language applies only to “information required to be provided by an individual under this subsection.” The reports in question were prepared and submitted pri- or to the 1985 amendments and therefore couldn’t have been submitted thereunder. Hence, this statute does not specifically exempt from disclosure the matters at issue, and does not bring these reports within FOIA exemption 3.
The new statutory language is relevant, however, in analyzing FOIA exemption 6. Although the district court based its ruling on FOIA exemption 3, we may affirm the district court’s decision on any ground that was before the district court. Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N. W., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564-65 (9th Cir.1984).
The Supreme Court has construed exemption 6 to require “a balancing of the individual’s right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of the Freedom of Information Act ‘to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.’ ” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976); see also Department of State v. Ray, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 541, 547-48, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991). This balancing also implicates important public policy concerns. Here, for example, the EPA must be able to recruit highly qualified scientists to serve on its advisory panels; the risk that information provided in conflict of interest forms will be made public may deter qualified individuals from serving on these panels. The problem is particularly acute because the scientists are part-time government employees who will continue their private sector employment, and information contained in the conflict of interest forms may be divulged to their competitors or potential employers and clients.
Appellant points out, however, that the scientists’ dual professional employment gives rise to a competing interest in public disclosure of the scientists’ private sector employment and financial interests. Congress created the panels to render independent scientific advice to the EPA; disclosure of information concerning panel members’ ties to the petrochemical and pesticide industries might reveal potential biases or conflicts of interest. The public has a significant interest in being made aware of such biases so that it may properly assess the soundness of the panels’ advice.
In the typical exemption 6 case, we would be required to balance these competing interests. Ray, 112 S.Ct. at 548-50. In this highly unusual case, however, Congress has already performed the balancing. The new language passed in 1985 is an expression of congressional policy on the precise question presented to us. Congress balanced the public’s interest in disclosure and the individuals’ interest in privacy; it concluded that the type of personnel information appellant seeks should not be disclosed.3 We are not free to second-guess the balance struck by Congress. Accordingly, the EPA properly withheld the *15053120-1 forms pursuant to FOIA exemption 6.
For this reason, I agree that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
. Exemption 3 allows the government to withhold matters
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
5 USC § 552(b)(3).
. Exemption 6 allows the government to withhold "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
. Judge Rymer suggests that "Congress has done nothing more than merely declare, without expressing its reasons, that henceforth certain information should not be disclosed.” Rymer opinion at 1505. When that information is personnel reports such as those involved in this case, however, such a congressional determination necessarily elevates privacy interests over disclosure. This conclusion does not render exemption 3 "superfluous,” as Judge Rymer also suggests. See id at 1505 n. 3. If the reports sought did not implicate privacy concerns, exemption 6 would be inapplicable.