dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that Goland made a “contribution” to Ed Vallen’s campaign, and not an “independent expenditure” to Senator Alan Cran-*1455ston’s campaign. My disagreement with the majority’s holding rests on three grounds. First, I disagree with the majority’s application of the campaign contribution law, particularly in light of the fact that it is a specific intent crime. Second, the majority ignores the doctrine of lenity, which is especially important when First Amendment rights are involved. Third, the district court excluded critical evidence that was directly relevant to Goland’s state of mind.
I agree with the majority that a “contribution” under 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(A) does not require a direct payment to the candidate, ante at 1452, but I disagree that it is immaterial to conviction under this section that Goland’s efforts were actually in support of Cranston, ante at 1452. To the contrary, this fact is highly relevant to Goland’s culpability because he is charged with a specific intent crime. Thus, his subjective motive must be taken into account before a conviction can be rightfully returned.
At all times, Goland has maintained that he intended to make an independent expenditure to Cranston’s campaign. He took steps to conform to the requirements of independent expenditures by insuring that he would have no contact with Cran-ston. Because the evidence is insufficient to establish that Goland possessed the requisite specific intent to support a conviction for making excessive contributions to Val-len’s campaign in violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(l)(A) and 437g(d), I would reverse Goland’s conviction.
The government concedes the truth of Goland’s assertion that he financed the television commercial to promote Cran-ston’s reelection by siphoning votes away from Ed Zschau. The government also admitted during oral argument that the commercial was an independent expenditure with respect to Senator Alan Cranston. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that the “independent expenditures exception to contribution limits does not apply to Goland because: (1) agents of Vallen and Goland were acting in concert; and (2) Vallen cooperated with Goland by accepting the money and performing the commercial.” Ante at 1452.
I disagree. It can hardly be said that Goland and Vallen cooperated in this effort. Vallen made it clear that he would not accept support from a Zionist source. In fact, Vallen had been told that the support came from a patriotic conservative Republican. For his part, Goland despised Ed Vallen and supported Alan Cranston for his pro-Israel views.
The television commercial, which constitutes the allegedly illegal contribution, was conceived and written by Goland. The ad featured Ed Vallen, criticizing Ed Zschau, and stating that only he and Alan Cranston had integrity. Goland refused to approve script changes to satisfy Vallen, and Vallen acquiesced in the venture only because he felt that some air time was better than none. The commercial featured Vallen, but it did not clearly urge voters to elect him. Rather, the commercial focused on criticizing Zschau. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that Vallen and Go-land were working in concert. Each used the other to pursue an individual and independent agenda.
The majority applies the definition of “contribution” in too broad a manner. The law is not clear whether the statute encompasses tactics of using one candidate to further the election of another candidate. Testimony of the government’s expert witness at Goland’s first trial bears out this ambiguity. An associate general counsel of the FEC testified that when the regulations speak of cooperation with a candidate, they mean generally the candidate that the individual supports, and not the candidate that the individual opposes.1 Goland was not permitted to introduce this testimony at his second trial. Nor did the court allow Goland to cross-examine the FEC official to establish, at least hypothetically, that sponsorship of the Vallen commercial could rea*1456sonably be considered an independent expenditure.
The lack of clarity concerning the scope of activity prohibited by § 441a(a)(l)(A) mandates a finding that Goland did not possess the specific intent required for a conviction under the campaign contribution laws. “It is settled that when the law ... is highly debatable, a defendant-actually or imputedly-lacks the requisite intent to violate it.” United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir.1974)), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980, 104 S.Ct. 2363, 80 L.Ed.2d 835 (1984).
The doctrine of lenity offers additional support for reversing Goland’s conviction. It is well settled that questions concerning the ambit of a criminal statute are resolved in favor of lenity. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112, 99 S.Ct. 2190, 2197, 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979). “This practice reflects not merely a convenient maxim of statutory construction. Rather, it is rooted in fundamental principles of due process which mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited.” Id. “[T]o ensure that a legislature speaks with special clarity when marking the boundaries of criminal conduct, courts must decline to impose punishment for actions that are not ‘plainly and unmistakably’ proscribed.” Id. at 112-13, 99 S.Ct. at 2197 (quoting United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 410, 61 L.Ed. 857 (1917)). Under these principles, I cannot conclude that Go-land acted in concert or cooperated with agents of Vallen under the terms of the provisions in question.
We must be particularly sensitive in this case because we risk sanctioning punishment for First Amendment activity when we regulate critical expression. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40, 41, 96 S.Ct. 612, 645, 645, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (“specificity of the statutory limitation is required where, as here, the legislation imposes criminal penalties in an area permeated by First Amendment interests”). In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not regulate independent expenditures because such restrictions would “impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political speech.” Id. at 39, 96 S.Ct. at 644.
Goland believed that he made an independent expenditure in support of Cranston by financing the commercial. Goland wrote the words that Vallen spoke. Those words promoted Cranston. Moreover, Goland refused to make script changes to suit Val-len. These facts demonstrate that the commercial was a medium for Goland’s political speech and was in no way intended to support Vallen. The commercial should be considered an independent expenditure protected by the First Amendment. See Id. 424 U.S. at 44-47, 96 S.Ct. at 646-48 (discussing difference between contributions and independent expenditures in terms of First Amendment values).
Evidence raising doubts about Goland’s intent to violate the election laws was excluded from the jury’s consideration. Although evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial judge, evidence probative of a defendant’s state of mind in a case in which intent is contested is presumed to be relevant. See United States v. Wasman, 641 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir.1981), aff'd, 468 U.S. 559, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984); United States v. Platt, 435 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir.1970). A few years earlier, the FEC conducted an inquiry into Goland’s efforts against Senator Percy in the 1984 Illinois Republican primary. Goland used similar tactics in that election as he used here against Zschau. The FEC terminated its inquiry because it found no evidence of unlawful coordination. The FEC's own conclusion supports Goland’s theory of defense here that he believed his tactics to promote Cranston were an independent expenditure. For the reasons stated above, Goland’s intent is a key issue in this case. Evidence probative of that intent should not have been excluded.
The trial court excluded other evidence that was directly relevant to Goland’s state of mind. The court sustained relevancy objections and thereby excluded evidence that Barnes, the media consultant, made a *1457similar “independent expenditure” offer to another third-party candidate. The trial court also refused to allow Goland’s counsel to cross-examine Barnes and Morrow, who testified contrary to Goland, on previous inconsistent statements. In a trial where much depended on the credibility of the witnesses, the failure to allow this cross-examination disadvantaged Goland unfairly. The jury should have been allowed to consider this evidence in determining Goland’s intent regarding the commercial.
Under § 437g(d)(l)(A), the violation of the federal election campaign laws must be made “knowingly and willfully.” Thus, the government must prove as an element of the offense that Goland engaged in the prohibited conduct “voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.” 1 Dev-itt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 14.04 (3d ed. 1977). “Willful” in the criminal context includes a specific intent to do an act forbidden by law. Id. § 14.06; United States v. Drew, 122 F.2d 551, 552 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216, 104 S.Ct. 2661, 81 L.Ed.2d 367 (1984); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12, 97 S.Ct. 22, 23, 50 L.Ed.2d 12 (1976).
Goland’s intent was the central issue at trial. Because of the ambiguity regarding the scope of the federal election campaign laws and the excluded evidence relating to Goland’s intent, I believe that Goland lacked the requisite mental state to support a conviction for making excessive campaign contributions.
The majority’s holding is a novel interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms. As such, it is unfair to apply this new legal standard to Goland. Due process requires that a person be given fair notice of what constitutes illegal conduct so that he may conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2203, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). Goland had no such notice. Accordingly, I would reverse.
. Counsel for Goland informed us of this testimony at oral argument. It was not refuted by the government.