dissenting.
I agree that the pro se complaint must be liberally construed and dismissal is warranted only if the face of the complaint shows an insuperable bar to relief. In my view, Holt’s complaint should not have been dismissed under this standard. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
Prisoners charged with a disciplinary violation have a right of reasonable access to information necessary to put on a defense. Meis v. Gunter, 906 F.2d 364, 367 (8th Cir.1990). The right is circumscribed by legitimate penological considerations. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S.Ct. at 2978-80 (officials have discretion to limit access to protect legitimate goals); Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.1981) (right of access to information to prepare a defense not unqualified), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 1619, 71 L.Ed.2d 853 (1982); cf. Harrison v. Dahm, 911 F.2d 37, 41 (8th Cir.1990) (no right to have drug test results included in written notice of charges).
A threshold issue is whether Holt has sufficiently alleged the existence of documentary evidence. Nowhere in his complaint does he specifically state that documentary evidence was actually available. A district court is not required to “pretend that certain facts exist in order to foresee a theory of recovery not actually raised or reasonably [implied] by the pleader.” Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th Cir.1988). However, I believe Holt’s allegations that he sought the documentary evidence the board would use against him, that Smith refused to advise him of it or its substance, and that the refusal kept him from adequately preparing a defense, may be read to imply the existence of exculpatory evidence. Moreover, in his objections to the magistrate’s report, Holt stated his complaint alleged defendants deprived him of due process by “their failure to disclose and produce certain evidence defendants possessed.” Construed in this manner, Holt’s complaint does not lack an arguable basis in law and the factual allegations do not facially describe a “fantastic or delusional scenario.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328,109 S.Ct. at 1833. Thus it was error to dismiss the complaint as frivolous.
In my view, a legal basis exists for Holt’s claim that he was denied due process by the rule change. Wolff found procedures which included informing a prisoner orally of the charges, followed by further investigation “which may reshape the nature of the charges” at the time of the hearing, inadequate to provide the prisoner *1374with prior notice of the “actual charges.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. Thus, notice of the “actual charges” must go beyond a recitation of the conduct and include a specification of which rule the conduct violates. See Rinehart v. Brewer, 483 F.Supp. 165, 169 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (notice must contain description of incident and citation to rule violated).
This court has held that Wolff does not require the notice to specify whether the infraction was “serious or minor.” Jensen v. Satran, 651 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1981). In Jensen, however, the prisoner was found guilty of violating the same rule he was charged with, and unlike Holt, “did not argue that the charge was not clearly made known to him.” Id.
Holt’s claim against Caspari may be interpreted as based on a theory of responde-at superior, which will not support a section 1983 action. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 381, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1200, 1202, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). I read Holt’s claims against Caspari, however, as based not merely on Cas-pari’s role as a supervisor, but on Caspari’s own inaction. See Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.1988) (claim not based on theory of respondeat superior and supervisor liable for failing to correct violation in disciplinary proceeding). Caspari could thus be liable if any failure to take action amounted to deliberate indifference or a tacit authorization of a violative process. See Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir.1990).
I emphasize the posture in which Holt’s claims come before us: Holt’s in forma pauperis complaint was dismissed as frivolous prior to service of process. Under section 1915(d), such dismissals are proper only if the claims involve indisputably mer-itless legal theories or clearly baseless factual contentions. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1832. My discussion of Holt’s claims seeks only to demonstrate that they withstand scrutiny for frivolousness under Neitzke and therefore require an answer from the defendants. I express no opinion on the merits of his claims.
I do not believe that Holt’s guilty plea to criminal charges arising out of the same incident can negate his right to procedural due process in connection with the prison disciplinary proceeding. The guilty plea means only that Holt cannot demonstrate actual injury flowing from any due process denial that occurred. In another prisoner’s 1983 complaint before the Supreme Court in a similar posture, the Court stated:
[EJven if the subsequent hearing accorded petitioner minimized or eliminated any compensable harm resulting from the initial denial of procedural safeguards, his constitutional claim is nonetheless action-able_ “Because the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed ... the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.”
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 13 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (footnote and citations omitted)); see also Graham v. Baughman, 772 F.2d 441, 447 (8th Cir.1985).
I would reverse the district court’s order dismissing Holt’s complaint and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this dissent.