concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The government certainly presented sufficient evidence to convict Smith of attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and use of a firearm in a drug trafficking crime. However, the majority is plain wrong in holding that the prosecutor’s conduct in this case constituted plain error. During a criminal trial defense counsel and the prosecutor frequently find themselves in sharp, even vitriolic, exchanges. Such are not too unusual given the high emotions that often surround the charges against the defendant and the atmosphere of the trial. Such emotion and gamesmanship, and the prof*937fers of virtue by each side, do not justify unfairness or misconduct; however, I think this court should be careful about overestimating the actual impact of the prosecutor’s comments upon a jury. Plain error is an extremely demanding standard, and I do not believe that any miscarriage of justice occurred in this case.
We can all agree that the prosecutor was out-of-bounds when he said that “the court wouldn’t allow” him to do anything wrong. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.1980) (government may not place its prestige behind a witness’ testimony), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942, 101 S.Ct. 3088, 69 L.Ed.2d 957 (1981); United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.1979) (improper for prosecutor to assert to jury that government has no interest in convicting innocent people). But he did not run off the reservation, and it is important to keep in mind what was happening here. Defense counsel had clearly hinted that the prosecutor would not mind if his witness “shaded the truth” a bit if that would help secure a conviction. This is an old tactic. Such insinuations are almost bound to trigger a response from the other side.1
Recognizing that the prosecutor made a mistake here does not lead to an inevitable conclusion that plain error should also be found. To reverse a conviction on this basis, we must find that the prosecutor’s conduct “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)), or effected a “miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1473 (9th Cir.1988). Unless the prosecutor’s statements were clearly calculated to affect the jury’s ability fairly to consider the totality of the evidence — that is, unless it tainted the verdict and deprived Smith of a fair trial — reversal is unwarranted. Wallace, 848 F.2d at 1473.
No such miscarriage of justice occurred here. In the first place, the majority’s discomfort notwithstanding, substantial evidence other than Brown’s testimony supported the jury’s verdict. See United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir.1990) (closeness of case against defendant is a factor to weigh when considering claim of prosecutorial misconduct). The jury knew that Smith followed his co-conspirators to the restaurant where the trade with the undercover agent occurred and that Smith was apprehended by the police while he was sitting in his car with a loaded shotgun lying on his lap. Regardless of the prosecutor’s gratuitous comments, a rational juror could readily conclude that the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith was guilty. That is enough to preclude a finding of plain error. See United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir.1989) (“We will seldom find plain error when evidence against the defendant is so strong that the absence of the prosecutor’s misconduct would not have changed the verdict.”) (citing United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, *9381199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979)).
In any event, it simply is not true that the prosecutor’s comments were “so pronounced and persistent that [they] permeated the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Flake, 746 F.2d at 542. But that is the level to which the entire case must have descended in order to warrant reversal of Smith’s conviction. Id. (citing United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Bella v. United States, 447 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 2991, 64 L.Ed.2d 856 (1980)). Defense counsel’s comments to the effect that hoarding money might be considered evidence of drug dealing, and that the prosecutor would not mind if his witness told a story that helped the government’s case, were clearly provocative, and it is likely the jury even expected that the prosecutor would not let this go without response. The prosecutor’s reply was inartful and ill-considered, but was not alone so out-of-bounds that a reasonable juror could not simply have concluded that what he really was saying was that he did not intend to risk his reputation and career by seeking convictions by any means possible. The prosecutor’s conduct was isolated, and unlike the situation in Roberts and Garza, he did not drag in matters outside the record. Nor did he make any attempt during the conduct of his side of the case to place the prestige of his office behind the witness.
Assuming that the prosecutor’s comments exaggerated the purport of defense counsel’s statements, they were “an insignificant blemish on what otherwise was an entirely fair proceeding.” Skarda, 845 F.2d at 1511. Accordingly, I do not believe that the incident complained of justifies reversal of Smith’s convictions.
. I do not go so far as to insist that defense counsel in fact invited the prosecutor’s responses. Defense counsel was certainly casting doubt on the government witness’ testimony, although he did not, as in United States v. Flake, 746 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1225, 105 S.Ct. 1220, 84 L.Ed.2d 360 (1985), and United States v. Skarda, 845 F.2d 1508 (8th Cir.1988), accuse the prosecutor of suborning perjury or withholding evidence. There is a distinction between undermining a witness’ veracity and accusing him of perjuring himself as part of a deal with the prosecutor. Given that distinction, courts have often refused to find "invitation” even where the defense lawyer has said things much worse than this. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 4-5, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1040-41, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (defense counsel called prosecutor’s tactics "reprehensible" and "poison[ous]” and implied that prosecutor had not "acted with honor or with integrity.”); United States v. O’Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1429 n. 19 (8th Cir.1988) (defense counsel labeled prosecutor's tactics "unfair,” "wicked,” and "poison[ous]”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1011, 109 S.Ct. 799, 102 L.Ed.2d 790 (1989); Skarda, 845 F.2d at 1510-11 (no invitation where defense counsel strongly implied that prosecutors manufactured witness testimony and induced witness to support government theory by threatening to recommend harsh sentence for witness in another case). Perhaps we are justified in making allowances for the defense but holding the prosecutor — the agent of justice — to a higher standard. Nonetheless, the whistle does not automatically blow with every overreaching.