Central National Bank v. Stevens

169 U.S. 432 (1898)

CENTRAL NATIONAL BANK
v.
STEVENS.

No. 38.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued October 15, 1897. Decided March 7, 1898. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

Mr. Charles E. Patterson and Mr. W.S.B. Hopkins for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Alpheus T. Bulkeley was on Mr. Patterson's brief, and Mr. William A. Sargent was on Mr. Hopkins' brief. Mr. Matthew Hale and Mr. Henry D. Hyde filed a brief for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. Edward Winslow Paige for defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiffs in error ask us to reverse the decree of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Supreme Court of New York, because the action of Stevens and others as a bill of review, or a bill in the nature of a bill of review, was not brought within the time limited by the practice of the courts for entertaining such bills; that, under the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of New York, bills for review have no place for errors appearing upon the face of the record; that the only remedy for such errors is by appeal; that, in so far as it is contended that the decree in the Sackett case was obtained by a fraudulent assertion or suppression of facts, the party aggrieved must move promptly upon the discovery of the fraud or of new facts; that the bill and the evidence adduced to sustain it do not disclose such a case of fraud or of newly discovered evidence, but do show a case free from actual fraud, and only, at the most, irregular by reason of a failure to include all the proper parties; that the parties complainant are to be visited with a knowledge of the proceedings in the Sackett suit by reason of the protracted and notorious character of the proceedings, and because knowledge of the proceedings in the Sackett suit must further be imputed to them, because they are represented in the effort to impugn the validity of that decree by counsel who had appeared for Sackett in his suit; and that hence the present suit should, on the well-established rules regulating bills of review and bills to impeach decrees on the ground of after-discovered evidence, have been dismissed.

Without expressing any opinion on such allegations of error, it is sufficient to say that they raised questions for the consideration of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, and that the disposition made of them by that court is binding upon us.

But those assignments of error which allege that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and of the Court of Appeals in affirming it erred in failing to give proper effect to the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States, and in granting a final injunction restraining the appellants from availing themselves of the provisions of such decree, certainly do present questions which are within our jurisdiction to consider.

Referring to the previous somewhat extended statement of the facts, we may briefly recapitulate a few of the principal dates. In August, 1880, Marvin Sackett brought his suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, on behalf of himself and all other holders and owners of bonds of certain railroad companies against Root, the Harlem Extension Railroad South Coal Transportation Company, the New York, Boston and Montreal Railway Company and David Butterfield, receiver of said company, praying for the appointment of a receiver and for a sale of the railroad and franchises for the benefit of the bondholders. On October 11, 1880, a receiver was appointed and qualified.

On April 2, 1881, on petition of the receiver, and after a report by an expert disclosing the necessity for expenditure to make the road safe and to enable trains to be run, an order was made by the court authorizing the receiver to issue and negotiate $350,000 in certificates, the same to be a first lien. The certificates were sold, and the proceeds expended under the approval of the court. On June 12, 1885, sale was made of the road and deed delivered to Foster and Hazard for $155,000, subject to the payment of the unpaid portion of the principal and interest of the certificates.

On April 9, 1886, the Central National Bank of Boston brought suit in the Supreme Court of New York, on its own behalf and that of others as owners of the certificates, against Foster, Hazard, the New York, Rutland and Montreal Railway Company and the American Loan and Trust Company. On March 24, 1887, the suit having been transferred on the petition of the defendants to the Circuit Court of the United States, after full hearing and argument the latter court rendered a final decree, establishing the rights of the Central National Bank of Boston and of others as owners of said certificates, declaring the latter to be a first lien, decreeing that Foster and Hazard were liable for any deficiency if sale should fail to realize enough to pay certificates. On March 23, 1892, sale under said decree to Foster for $7500, and on April 25, 1892, deed of conveyance by referee to Foster. On December 8, 1890, Stevens and others brought their suit in the Supreme Court of New York against the Central National Bank of Boston, the other holders of certificates, Foster, Hazard and others, to set aside decree in case of Sackett and to enjoin proceedings in the Circuit Court of the United States. On November 11, 1891, judgment setting aside sale in the case of Sackett and finally enjoining the Central National Bank of Boston and others, plaintiffs in the Circuit Court of the United States, from selling under the decree of the Federal court.

On May 16, 1892, sale and conveyance were made by referee under the decree in the present suit to Foster. On May 9, 1893, judgment of the general term, and November 27, 1894, judgment of the Court of Appeals was rendered, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court.

It will be perceived, on an inspection of these dates, that when the present suit was brought a final judgment had been rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States, establishing the title and rights of the holders of the certificates, directing a sale by a referee, and adjudging the personal liability of Foster and Hazard for an unpaid portion of said certificates after the application of the proceeds of sale; that when the judgment of the Supreme Court was entered in the present case, and without awaiting the result of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, a sale was had in which Foster became the purchaser on a bid of $7500; and that Foster was likewise the purchaser at the sale on the decree of the Circuit Court.

The record does not disclose what application was made of the purchase money paid by Foster on his respective purchases at the two sales, but it may be easily conjectured that, after the payment of the costs and of the expenses of the sales, little or nothing would be left applicable to the bonds and certificates. Thus the singular result, thus far reached, of this protracted and expensive litigation, is that Foster, who had with Hazard been the purchaser at the Sackett sale, has become the owner of the railroad upon the payment of a merely nominal sum, and that the bondholders and the owners of the certificates have realized nothing. And it further thus appears that ever since May 16, 1892, the controversy has really been between the holders of the receiver's certificates and Foster who has, for a trifling sum, become the owner of the railroad as improved by money procured by the sale of the certificates.

It may be that Foster, when he bought under the decree of sale in the present suit, did so in pursuance of some arrangement with the bondholders and as their trustee. But whether Foster, when he bought under the decree of the Circuit Court of the United States, subjected himself to that feature of the decree that made him personally liable for the unpaid portion of the certificates, and precluded himself from relying on the decree of the Supreme Court of New York setting aside the Sackett sale, and whether the setting aside the sale in the Sackett suit would invalidate receiver's certificates issued years before and whose proceeds had gone into the improvement of the property, and whether, in case of Foster's inability to respond to his personal obligation, the unpaid portion of the certificates would be a lien on the railroad in his hands and those of his vendees, are questions for the Circuit Court of the United States, which cannot be withdrawn from its determination by the subsequent proceedings in the Supreme Court of New York. Any confusion that might otherwise have arisen by reason of conflicting views between the Federal and state courts has been prevented by the fact that Foster, who himself originally invoked the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States, has become the purchaser of the railroad under the decrees of both courts, whereby the only substantial controversy that remains is between him, as such purchaser, and the holders of the certificates.

Those portions of the decree of the Supreme Court of New York and of the Court of Appeals which sought to compel the complainants in the suit pending in the Circuit Court of the United States to come into the state court and to there relitigate their titles to the certificates and the amounts thereof, and which sought to restrain them by injunction from proceeding under the final decree of sale of the Circuit Court, and from enforcing the other remedies adjudged to them by that decree, were, in our opinion, erroneous. Due effect was not thereby given to the judgment or decree of the Circuit Court, at least in so far as that decree had established the ownership and amounts of the certificates, and the injunction was a plain interference with the proceedings in another court which had full and complete jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter of the suit, and which jurisdiction had attached long before the suit in the Supreme Court had been begun.

It will suffice to cite a few of the cases:

"It is a doctrine of law too long established to require a citation of authorities, that, where a court has jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which occurs in the cause, and whether its decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, till reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court; and that, where the jurisdiction of a court and the right of a plaintiff to prosecute his suit in it, have once attached, that right cannot be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another court. These rules have their foundation, not merely in comity, but on necessity. For if one may enjoin, the other may retort by injunction, and thus the parties be without remedy; being liable to a process for contempt in one if they dare to proceed in the other. Neither can one take property from the custody of the other by replevin or any other process, for this would produce a conflict extremely embarrassing to the administration of justice. In the case of Kennedy v. The Earl of Cassilis, Lord Eldon at one time granted an injunction to restrain a party from proceeding in a suit pending in the Court of Sessions of Scotland, which, on more mature reflection, he dissolved; because it was admitted, if the Court of Chancery could in that way restrain proceedings in an independent foreign tribunal, the Court of Sessions might equally enjoin the parties from proceeding in chancery, and thus they would be unable to proceed in either court. The fact, therefore, that an injunction issues only to the parties before the court and not to the court, is no evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another and independent forum." Peck v. Jenness, per Mr. Justice Grier, 7 How. 612, 624.

"State courts are exempt from all interference by the Federal tribunals, but they are destitute of all power to restrain either the process or proceedings in the national courts. Circuit Courts and state courts act separately and independently of each other, and in their respective spheres of action the process issued by the one is as far beyond the reach of the other as if the line of division between them `was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye.' Appellate relations exist in a class of cases between the state courts and this court, but there are no such relations between the state courts and the Circuit Courts. Viewed in any light, therefore, it is obvious that the injunction of a state court is inoperative to control, or in any manner to affect, the process or proceedings of a Circuit Court, not on account of any paramount jurisdiction in the latter courts, but because in their sphere of action Circuit Courts are wholly independent of the state tribunals." Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166.

Whether due effect has been given by a state court to a judgment or decree of a court of the United States is a Federal question within the jurisdiction of this court, on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State. Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U.S. 141.

The exemption of the authority of the courts of the United States from interference by legislative or judicial action of the States is essential to their independence and efficiency. Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450; Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334; Rio Grande Railroad v. Gomila, 132 U.S. 478.

In Story's Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 2, § 900, it is said, referring to the power sometimes exercised by courts of equity, to restrain parties within their jurisdiction from proceeding in foreign courts: "There is one exception to this doctrine which has been long recognized in America, and that is, that state courts cannot enjoin proceedings in the courts of the United States; nor the latter in the former courts."

It is contended by the counsel for the defendants in error, in a supplemental brief that these principles, so long and so well settled, have been modified by some recent decisions of this court and the case of Moran v. Sturges, 154 U.S. 256, and of Shields v. Coleman, 157 U.S. 168, are cited in support of that contention. Such a conception of the import of those cases must have been formed from a hasty reading, for they are in perfect harmony with the previous cases, and, indeed, may properly be cited to sustain the reasoning upon which those cases proceeded.

In Moran v. Sturges, the Chief Justice, delivering the opinion of the court, cited the cases hereinbefore referred to and others, and stated the general rule to be that state courts cannot enjoin proceedings in the courts of the United States. In that case the Supreme Court of the State of New York had issued process against certain libellants in the District Court of the United States, and had, after hearing, enjoined them from taking any further proceedings on their libels. This judgment of the Supreme Court being affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the judgment of the latter court being remitted to the Supreme Court and entered there as its judgment, the libellants sued out a writ of error to this court, and it was here held that the state court had no jurisdiction in personam over the libellants as holders of maritime liens when the libels were filed; that the question of jurisdiction was one for the District Court to decide in the first instance; that the District Court had jurisdiction; and that the judgment under review was in effect an unlawful interference with the proceedings in that court.

It is true, as the report of the case shows, that two of the judges dissented, but not because of any disapproval of the principles laid down by the court, but because it was thought that the possession of the vessels in question had vested in the state court before the libels were filed in the District Court.

In Shields v. Coleman there was a controversy for possession of certain railroad property, and it was held that a Circuit Court of the United States has not the power to appoint a receiver of property already in the possession of a receiver duly and previously appointed by a state court, and cannot rightfully take the property out of the hands of the receiver so appointed by the state court. Such a decision, it is scarcely necessary to say, gives no support to the contention of the appellees.

The reasoning of the Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York, does not seem to us to comport with the law as established by the decisions of this court. It is claimed by the learned judge, who delivered the opinion of that court, that the rule is that "although the courts of one country have no authority to stay proceedings in the courts of another, they have undoubted authority to control all persons and things within their own territorial limits. When, therefore, both parties to a suit in a foreign country are residents within the territorial limits of another country, the courts of equity in the latter may act in personam upon those parties and direct them, by injunction, to proceed no further in such suit. In such a case these courts act upon acknowledged principles of public law in regard to jurisdiction. They do not pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but, without regard to the situation of the subject-matter of the dispute, they consider the equities between the parties, and decree in personam according to those equities and enforce obedience to their decrees by process in personam."

This language is quoted from Story's Eq. Jur. § 899; but the learned judge overlooked the passage immediately following, and hereinbefore quoted: "There is one exception to this doctrine which has been long recognized in America, and that is that the state courts cannot enjoin proceedings in the courts of the United States, nor the latter in the former courts. This exception proceeds upon peculiar grounds of municipal and constitutional law, the respective courts being entirely competent to administer full relief in the suits pending therein." Nor did the decision of this court in Peck v. Jenness, already cited, receive attention, wherein it was said, after adverting to the proposed distinction between enjoining a court and enjoining suitors therein, "The fact that an injunction issues only to the parties before the court and not to the court is no evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a party who is a litigant in another and independent forum."

Nor are we able to acquiesce in the reasoning of the learned judge when he says that "the setting aside of the judgment in the Sackett suit upon which the suit in the United States Circuit Court was founded, for fraud, was a new fact, occurring since the decree in that court, which gave jurisdiction in this action to enjoin proceedings thereon." Doubtless there may be facts occurring after the rendition of a judgment which would render its enforcement inequitable; such, for instance, as payment, or a reversal thereof on appeal by a superior court. But surely a judgment and injunction rendered subsequently in another and independent forum cannot constitute such new facts unless we are prepared to concede that, as between two courts of concurrent jurisdiction, it is the judgment of the court whose jurisdiction is last invoked which shall be entitled to prevail. This view does not overlook the decision of this court in Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, where it was held that a Circuit Court of the United States, in the exercise of its equity powers, and where diverse citizenship gives jurisdiction over the parties, may deprive a party of the benefit of a judgment fraudulently obtained by him in a state court, if the circumstances are such as would authorize relief by a Federal court if the judgment had been rendered by it and not by a state court. There the suit to restrain the owner of the judgment from enforcing it was brought in the state court that had rendered the judgment, and was removed into the Federal court on the ground of diverse citizenship, and it was sought to impeach the judgment for the fraud of the party who procured it. In the present case, no fraud of any kind is imputed to the plaintiffs in the Circuit Court of the United States, nor is it alleged that the action or proceedings in that court were founded in any mistake of facts, or were influenced by any misrepresentation or fraud practised upon the court. But the purpose of this suit was to practically nullify the proceedings in the Circuit Court, and to enjoin the suitors therein from pursuing their remedy in that court, not for any fraud of theirs used in promoting their cause, but for the alleged fraud of other parties in another court, and in a case in which these appellants were not parties.

It is claimed in the brief for the defendants in error that whatever may be the rule in ordinary cases there is no necessity in the present case for modifying the decree of the state court, and we are pointed to the statement in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that "there is nothing in the judgment at bar that attacks the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Court or questions the legality of its decree." We must suppose this language to mean that to enjoin the plaintiffs from proceeding to enforce the decree did not affect the legality or efficacy of the decree. Such must have been the meaning of the learned judge, because he proceeds to assert that "it is clear, both upon principle and authority, that this power [to enjoin the certificate holders] did exist, and that the sale under the decree of the United States court was without force or effect as to the parties to that suit, as they proceeded in violation of the injunction contained in the judgment at bar."

But it has been frequently determined by this court that the jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of the judgment, but continues until the judgment shall be satisfied. Thus it was said in Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, that "process subsequent to judgment, is as essential to jurisdiction as process antecedent, else the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution." And in Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall, 136, it was said: "The two sets of tribunals — state and national — are as independent as they are separate. Neither can impede or arrest any action the other may take, within the limits of its jurisdiction, for the satisfaction of its judgment and decrees."

"An execution is the end of the law. It gives the successful party the fruits of his judgment." United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8, 28. But it is scarcely necessary to quote authorities to show that to deprive a court of the power to execute its decrees is to essentially impair its jurisdiction. "Juris effectus in executione consistit." Co. Litt. 289.

The conclusions we have reached are that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York and of the Court of Appeals affirming the same are erroneous in so far as they command the Central National Bank of Boston, the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and other holders of the receiver's certificates whose rights, as such holders, were adjudged by the Circuit Court of the United States, to appear before the referee appointed by the Supreme Court in the present case, and which enjoin the Central National Bank of Boston and others, whose rights have been adjudged by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, from proceeding with the sale under the decree of that court.

The judgments of the Supreme Court of New York and of the Court of Appeals, in these particulars, are accordingly reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this court.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.