concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join Judge Mur.naghan’s opinion in all but Part II.A.
Elic and Roy Lee, father and son, were tried together and represented by the same trial counsel, Thomas Rasnic, who faithfully instructed the defendants as to the perils of joint representation. The district court did not conduct a Rule 44(c) hearing. During the fourth day of the trial, the government offered the defendants plea agreements in which Roy Lee would accept seven years imprisonment and Elic ten. Rasnic vehemently recommended that each defendant accept the plea agreement, which he characterized as a “mighty fine deal.” The defendants declined because they claimed they were not guilty of anything. Because neither professed guilt, the defendants perceived no conflict of interest with their joint representation and did not raise the issue with the district court. Both defendants were ably represented, but were convicted. Rasnic saw nothing to suggest that Elic pressured Roy Lee into rejecting the plea agreement which he had been offered. At sentencing, Roy Lee, now represented by new counsel, argued for the first time that his chosen trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because an actual conflict of interest arose when the government made the plea offer. In support of this argument, Roy Lee points to his apparent willingness to accept his plea agreement and Elic’s vehemence against accepting the plea agreement tendered him. The district court held that (1) the ineffective assistance of counsel argument was raised too late and (2) it was aware of nothing that occurred at trial which demonstrated a conflict of interest. Because the majority reaches the untenable conclusion that the district court should have conducted a Rule 44(c) hearing at sentencing, I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion begins, where it should, with Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 44(c). It provides:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged ... and are represented by the same ... counsel, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defendant’s right to counsel.
At first blush, it would appear Rule 44(c) requires a per se reversal where defendants are jointly represented and no eviden-tiary hearing is held, but we have declined to adopt such an approach. See United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202, 1205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910, 103 S.Ct. 218, 74 L.Ed.2d 173 (1982). There, we noted the omission of a Rule 44(c) hearing did not, in and of itself, necessitate a reversal despite the Rule’s apparent unequivocal language. Id. We relied on the Rule’s Advisory Notes, which state: “The failure *1059in a particular case to conduct a rule 44(c) inquiry would not, standing alone, necessitate the reversal of a conviction of a jointly represented defendant.”
In United States v. Tatum, we observed that “[t]he sixth amendment is implicated only when the representation of counsel is adversely affected by an actual conflict.” 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.1991). Numerous circuits have held that in the absence of a specific objection to joint representation, the defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict. See, e.g., United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Holley, 826 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960, 108 S.Ct. 1222, 99 L.Ed.2d 422 (1988). In United States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740, 744 (4th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3190, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987), we noted “[i]n the absence of a specific objection, the trial court may assume that joint representation does not present any conflict, unless the court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.” (citing United States v. Ramsey, 661 F.2d 1013, 1018 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005, 102 S.Ct. 1642, 71 L.Ed.2d 874 (1982)).
Thus, where a defendant makes no specific objection to joint representation, our circuit will disturb a conviction for failure to conduct a Rule 44(c) hearing in two distinct situations: (1) where an actual conflict is present or (2) where the district court knew or should have known that a particular conflict existed.
Under the first alternative, Roy Lee must show that an actual conflict existed. To demonstrate this, the defendant “must show that there was some ‘plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic’ that might have been pursued, [or] an alternative strategy that ‘was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.’ ” Guaraldi v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir.1985)) (further citations omitted). Roy Lee claims that, in the absence of dual representation, he would have accepted the seven-year plea offer. The record simply belies this assertion.
The record evidence demonstrates that Roy Lee and Elic were not inclined to accept the plea because they thought they could “beat the rap.” In addition, counsel at argument conceded that when he discussed the government’s plea offers with appellants, they perceived no conflict because they denied any wrongdoing. No conflict of interest arose because counsel strongly and fervently recommended that both appellants accept the plea agreements. As trial counsel noted, it was “a mighty fine deal.” What is patently clear is that Roy Lee perceived a conflict when it was posh to do so — after his conviction when facing a sentence substantially in excess of the seven years he had been offered. Here, Roy Lee’s objection relates solely to the sentence he received and not to any dissatisfaction with his chosen counsel’s performance at trial.
In Ramsey, the alleged conflict arose from trial counsel’s inability to zealously and effectively present each of the three jointly-represented defendant’s theory of defense. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to import marijuana, conspiracy to distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine. Defendants, Lee Ramsey and Sharon Wray, denied any involvement with illicit drug dealings. Defendant, Zed Ramsey, contended that while he had conversations with unindicted coconspirators regarding drug smuggling, these conversations were a hoax in order to obtain their assistance in financing his real estate developments. Id. at 1015-17. In holding that the appellants showed neither an actual conflict of interest nor that the district judge should have been aware of the possibility of some particular conflict, we noted: “Viewing these theories from the perspective of a completed trial, it is clear that there is nothing inherently inconsistent about [the defense theories], and that a competent trial attorney could zealously and effectively present each of the theories to a jury.” Id. at 1019.
Our case is analogous to Ramsey. There is nothing intrinsically inconsistent with the appellants’ defense theories — they both consist of a general denial of any wrongdoing. In addition, there was nothing inconsistent with appellants’ interests once the *1060government offered the plea agreements. While one could argue that separate counsel for Roy Lee could have bargained for a “sweeter deal” in return for Roy Lee’s testimony against Elic, this is not a rational assessment of the circumstances. First, both Roy Lee and Elic categorically rejected the plea agreements at the inception despite Rasnic’s recommendation. Second, Roy Lee and Elic unequivocally denied any involvement with illicit drugs. Third, reliance on Roy Lee’s testimony is misplaced in light of the fact that the government also offered Elic a plea, and thus, his testimony was unnecessary. Finally — this bears repeating — Rasnic strongly recommended acceptance of the plea offers. Thus, Rasnic fulfilled his obligation of zealously and effectively representing his clients.
This case is simply not on par with cases in which an actual conflict was found. For example, this is neither a case where defense counsel failed to cross-examine a prosecution witness whose testimony was material, nor one where counsel failed to resist the presentation of arguably admissible evidence. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 72-75, 62 S.Ct. 457, 465-67, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). In addition, this case is not one in which a jointly-represented defendant had a stake in the outcome of the proceeding. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.1990) (defendant’s trial counsel negotiated a cooperation agreement for defendant’s cocon-spirator, under which coconspirator became witness against defendant). These cases involve profoundly severe conflicts of interest as opposed to the non-existent conflict of interest currently before us. Under the circumstances, an actual conflict did not exist. Consequently, under the first alternative, no remand is warranted.
The second alternative places a burden on the district court to inquire into the existence of a potential conflict of interest when the district court “knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.” Ramsey, 661 F.2d at 1019. “If the court is aware, or should be aware, of a particular conflict, it should conduct a sua sponte inquiry into its existence.” Akinseye, 802 F.2d at 744. The majority concludes that the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing when Roy Lee raised the alleged conflict of interest at sentencing despite the fact that the alleged conflict occurred at trial and not at sentencing.
The majority’s novel insistence on a Rule 44(c) hearing at sentencing is misconceived. The cornerstone of placing this burden on the district court is to ensure that the trial continues without conflicts of interest. The Advisory Notes to Rule 44(c) state “the mere fact that a rule 44(c) inquiry was conducted does not relieve the court of all responsibility in this regard thereafter. The obligation placed upon the court by rule 44(c) is a continuing one, and thus in a particular case further inquiry may be necessary on a later occasion because of new developments suggesting a potential conflict of interest.” In Akinseye, where the alleged prejudice arose because one co-defendant took the stand and the other did not, we noted that once the testifying defendant took the stand “the better practice would have been for the trial court to conduct a further rule 44 inquiry when Akin-seye took the stand and, if necessary, secure a further waiver,” 802 F.2d at 745 (footnote omitted), although the one previously secured was sufficient to withstand attack on appeal.
The common thread throughout these authorities and its application here is that the district court’s burden of inquiry does not arise at sentencing where the alleged conflict arose at trial, there was nothing at the time the alleged conflict of interest arose to suggest that the district court knew or could have known that a particular conflict existed, and the conflict no longer exists. Rather, its duty to inquire arises where: (1) the circumstances suggest that a particular conflict of interest exists, (2) a specific objection to the joint representation is noted at the time the alleged conflict arises, or (3) a specific objection to the joint representation is noted at a time where the alleged conflict of interest continues to infect the pending proceeding.
Without question, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court knew or should have known of the possibility that a particular conflict of interest ex*1061isted at the time the government offered the plea agreements. The district court was not even tangentially appraised of any plea negotiations. Cf. Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 11(e)(1)(C) (district court shall not participate in plea negotiations). In addition, there was no specific objection at the time the alleged conflict of interest arose. Finally, the objection was raised at a time where the alleged conflict of interest did not infect the ongoing proceeding, sentencing, because Roy Lee was represented by separate counsel at sentencing and the trial had already concluded with the plea offer no longer available.
The majority’s approach, in essence, turns the sentencing hearing into round one of a § 2255 habeas proceeding. This, I opine will only create an unnecessary delay in an already complicated sentencing hearing. This unnecessary interference with sentencing is certainly neither the purpose of Rule 44(c) nor encompassed in the mandate that a trial judge make further inquiry if the judge knew or reasonably should have known that a particular conflict of interest existed. Moreover, I would suggest that when this issue is raised so belatedly, it is best left to a habeas proceeding rather than an evidentiary hearing at sentencing. Tatum, 943 F.2d at 379 (typically, competency of counsel is best left within the province of collateral review).
I harbor additional cause for concern because I suspect that the majority’s approach will instill a wait-and-see attitude in jointly-represented defendants. Jointly-represented defendants who did not receive a Rule 44(c) evidentiary hearing, or a further hearing when required, will now be inclined to go to trial and await the outcome of the jury verdict. If convicted, the jointly-represented defendants can conjure up an illustrious tale, similar I suspect to the one before us, as to why they were deprived of effective assistance of counsel, necessitating a Rule 44(c) hearing.
I am afraid the majority opinion, though disavowing this result, for all practical purposes, appears to adopt a per se rule requiring reversal in the absence of a Rule 44(c) hearing — a conclusion we have categorically rejected. Arias, 678 F.2d at 1205. In summary, I glean one resounding thing from this record — unlike Stewart’s struggle in Glasser, Rasnic’s “struggle to serve two masters [can] seriously be doubted.” Glasser, 315 U.S. at 75, 62 S.Ct. at 467. For these reasons, I would affirm the convictions and sentences of both defendants.*
Even if I strained to find a conflict of interest here, the record is sufficiently developed to conclude that Roy Lee waived his right to conflict-free representation. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 n. 5, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). Roy Lee was repeatedly appraised by his counsel of the perils of joint representation, but chose to attempt to "beat the rap” with his counsel of choice, Mr. Rasnic.