dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this matter.
After conviction by trial, the defendant appeals the order of the district court that denied his motion to suppress statements made to federal officers obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3501. The facts as found and relied upon by the district court are as follows.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez was arrested by Los Angeles Sheriffs Deputies on narcotics charges on August 5, 1988, during the execution of a search warrant on defendant’s residence. It is not clear whether the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department was told that the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office would decline prosecution (Declaration of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Deputy Abraham Hernandez), or if the case was never presented to the District Attorney for a prosecutorial decision (Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Detective John McCann). However, because counterfeit money totaling $2,260.00 was recovered from defendant’s residence, the Secret Service was notified on Monday, August 8, 1988.
At about 11:30 a.m. on August 8, 1988, defendant, while still in state police custody, was interviewed by United States Secret Service Special Agents Lipscomb and Bozzuto, and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department Deputy Abraham Hernandez, the latter being fluent in Spanish. Defendant was advised of, and agreed to waive, his Miranda rights, and confessed to knowingly possessing counterfeit money. Defen*1407dant was taken into custody by the special agents in the afternoon of August 8, 1988.
After returning to the United States Courthouse in Los Angeles, California, the arresting officers proceeded to put the defendant through the necessary booking procedures. By the time they had completed these procedures, they were told that the magistrate’s calendar was filled, and that the defendant could not be brought before a magistrate on August 8, 1988. Defendant was brought before the magistrate on the morning of August 9, 1988. An indictment was subsequently returned against the defendant charging him with possession of counterfeit money with the intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. He was convicted.
We are mandated to review the claimed violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 de novo. United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir.1988).
DISCUSSION
At the time this case arose, Title 18 of the United States Code § 3501 read as follows:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (3) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of volun-tariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by ■ the trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate or other officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily *1408by any person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person who made or gave such confession was not under arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term “confession” means any confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (emphasis added).1
This section was passed to ameliorate the effect of Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). The legislative history reveals the congressional view of the effect that Mallory was having on criminal prosecutions:
Voluntary confessions have been admissible in evidence since the early days of our Republic. These inculpatory statements have long been recognized as strong and convincing evidence — often called the best evidence of guilt. In Mallory v. United States, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 354 U.S. 449 [1 L.Ed.2d 1479] (1957), the U.S. Supreme Court declared inadmissible voluntary confessions made during a period of unnecessary delay between the time of arrest and the time the suspect is taken before a committing magistrate. The case of Alston v. United States [121 U.S.App.D.C. 66], 348 F.2d 72 (D.C.Cir.1965), is indicative of the illogical and unrealistic court decisions resulting from the application of the Mallory rule. The Honorable Alexander Holtzoff, U.S. district judge for the District of Columbia, testified before the subcommittee as follows:
On the other hand, the District of Columbia circuit takes an extreme position and practically holds that an arrested person must be taken to a magistrate immediately, even in the dead of night, subject to necessary time to make a record of the arrest, fingerprinting the defendant, and similar mechanical processes. This is illustrated by the case of Alston v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 348 F.2d 72, in which the conviction of a self-confessed murderer whose guilt was not in dispute, was reversed. The facts are startling. The defendant was brought to police headquarters at 4:30 a.m. He was questioned by the police for about 5 minutes and then immediately confessed on the advice of his wife who had accompanied him with the police. It was held by the court of appeals that the arresting officers should have taken the defendant before a committing magistrate immediately and that the questioning, even for 5 minutes, was not permissible — the conviction was reversed. It is my understanding that the indictment thereafter was dismissed on the motion of the U.S. attorney in view of the fact that he felt that without the confession he did not have sufficient evidence to convict (Hearings, at 260-61).
The rigid, mechanical exclusion of an otherwise voluntary and competent confession is a very high price to pay for a “constable’s blunder.”
S.Rpt. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2124.
In United States v. Halbert, 436 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir.1970), this court held that a voluntary confession given more than six hours after the defendant was taken into custody by state officer was admissible.
The pertinent facts were as follows:
1. Defendant Halbert was arrested by state officers in the afternoon of November 11, 1969. He was booked in the Bowie, Arizona jail.
2. On November 12, between 9 and 10 a.m., state officials notified the FBI of the arrests and possible Dyer Act violation. The FBI received confirmation that the car in which the defendant had' been arrested had been stolen in California.
3. On November 13, 1969, an FBI agent interviewed Halbert and obtained his confession at about 3:26 p.m.
4. The United States Attorney requested the FBI to determine if local authorities *1409in Los Angeles would prosecute the defendant. They declined and so notified the Arizona FBI agents on November 13, 1969.
5. On Friday, November 14, 1969, FBI agent Bogley was assigned other routine duties and did not present the matter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Arizona until Monday, November 17, 1969. A complaint was filed, and a warrant was issued. Hal-bert first appeared before the U.S. Magistrate on November 17, 1969.
The appellate panel’s summary continued:
Halbert moved to suppress the confession given in the interview on November 13 with Agent Bagley on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of (1) the Fifth amendment and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), (2) Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957), and (3) 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
The district court granted the motion. The district court found (1) that a proper Miranda warning had been given, (2) that the confession was voluntary under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b), but (3) that the delay between the state arrest and the confession and delay in holding a committing hearing was not reasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). The precise finding on the latter issue was:
“Not only was this confession not obtained within six hours of the arrest or detention, but the delay in holding defendant’s committing hearing cannot be excused in light of ‘the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest such available magistrate or other officer.’ ”
Id. at 1226.
The Halbert panel held that 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) does not automatically render all confessions made after 6 hours of detention inadmissible:
Thus, subsection 3501(b) instructs the trial judge to consider delay in arraignment in determining the voluntariness of a confession but leaves him with a great deal of discretion on what to make of it. In this context, subsection 3501(c), in providing that confessions shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in arraignment, if otherwise voluntary and given within six hours of arrest, merely removes some of the discretion given to the trial judge under subsection 3501(b) in determining voluntariness. Discretion remains in the trial judge, under subsection 3501(b), to exclude confessions as involuntary solely because of delay in arraignment, during which a confession is given, that exceeds six hours.
This construction is consistent with the language of section 3501 and a scheme under which the admissibility of confessions turns on voluntariness. The integration, however, is not perfect. The effect of the proviso of subsection 3501(c) is to remove discretion from the trial judge by requiring him to admit a confession, otherwise voluntary, given more than six hours of arrest during a delay in arraignment if the delay was reasonable considering problems in transporting the defendant to the magistrate.
One must conclude then that subsection 3501(c) was intended to make voluntary confessions within six hours after arrest, clearly admissible without reference to delay. The provision as to confessions made more than six hours after arrest pinpointed an excuse for delay, caused by transportation and distance difficulties. After the express statements in § 3501(a) that the confession “shall be admissible in evidence if voluntarily given,” and the statement in subsection 3501(b) that in determining the voluntariness the court shall take into account “the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment,” we cannot say that Congress intended by the provision in subsection 3501(c) to undo all it had done with the preceding subsections. The legislative history which we review hereafter clearly confirms our view, and we think it would be error to reach a different interpretation.
Id. at 1234.
The Halbert panel then discussed the legislative history and concluded that it *1410supported their interpretation. The Hal-bert panel concluded:
We conclude that confessions given more than six hours after arrest during a delay in arraignment are admissible if voluntary, although the trial judge under subsection 3501(b) may take into account delay in arraignment in his determination of voluntariness. The district court here found Halbert’s confession voluntary under subsection 3501(b). This conclusion of the district court was correct. The confession was given two days after Hal-bert’s arrest and he was, as discussed above, given the Miranda warnings. There was no evidence that he was subjected to oppressive police practices prior to his confession or that the delay between arrest and confession contributed in any way to the confession.
The delay after the confession and before his federal arraignment obviously had no effect on the prior confession and would not render it inadmissible. United States v. Mitchell (1944), 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140, United States v. Campbell (9th Cir.1970), 431 F.2d 97, note 2.
Id. at 1237.
An examination of the cases which have involved an application of '18 U.S.C. § 3501 since Halbert is equally instructive.
In United States v. Stage, 464 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.1972), the defendant was arrested on August 20, 1970. Federal agents began questioning him soon after his arrest and gave Stage his Miranda warning on August 20, 1970. Stage indicated that he did not want to make any statements until he talked to an attorney. No attorney was' ever furnished. On August 25, 1970, after a continued interrogation by state and federal officers, Stage filed a “waiver of rights” and confessed to a Dyer Act violation. His conviction was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions to dismiss the indictment.2
In United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.1974), the defendant was arrested by state officers on December 26, 1973 for a parole violation. Wanted by the FBI, a federal hold was placed upon him. When his parole hearing occurred on January 7, 1974, the disposition of the state parole charge was postponed until disposition of the federal charges. On January 19, 1974, federal agents interviewed Mand-ley. He signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and confessed, following a two hour interview. Mandley was taken before a magistrate on January 14, 1974, nineteen days after his initial arrest, and seven days after the state hearing was suspended. The Ninth Circuit panel held that the confession was admissible, stating:
Prior to enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 appellant’s. contentions could well have had merit under Rule 5, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Supreme Court decisions in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 37 L.Ed. 819 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). Section 3501 has, however, substantially changed the law.
United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d at 1105.
In United States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.1976), a rape occurred on an Indian reservation in Arizona on November 1, 1975. After a preliminary investigation, the United States Attorney authorized prosecution of the defendant. The FBI notified the Bureau of Indian Affairs that it could make the arrest. After his arrest on November 4, 1975, the defendant signed a waiver of his rights and an admission was obtained approximately 7 hours after being taken into custody and before being taken before a magistrate. The panel affirmed the trial court’s finding that the confession was voluntary.
In United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908 (9th Cir.1983), the following events occurred. On August 3, 1981, the body of one Howard was found on an Arizona road. On August 4, 1981, Manuel and two other suspects were arrested. All three were *1411heavily intoxicated, and a decision was made to allow the defendants to sleep off the effects of the alcohol. On August 5, 1981, Manuel was questioned by FBI Agent Fish, starting shortly after 8:00 a.m. After being instructed as to his Miranda rights, Manuel confessed his role in the killing of Howard. Following this interview, the United States Attorney authorized prosecution of Manuel, but did not authorize arrest. The Indian tribe declined to prosecute, and on November 21, 1981, Manuel was indicted. The appellate panel affirmed the trial court’s determination that the confession was admissible at trial, stating:
We find nothing in the record that would exclude Manuel’s confession. The delay between his arrest and interrogation was reasonable under the circumstances. Uncontradicted testimony showed that Manuel was very heavily intoxicated when arrested on the afternoon of August 4. Questioning him in such a condition would have been much more likely to produce an unfair and involuntary confession than the procedure actually used. The tribal police provided Manuel with a meal and with sleeping accommodations so that he could regain sobriety. Although we do not sanction delay of any kind in bringing an accused person before a magistrate, delay engendered by such humanitarian motives can hardly be deemed unreasonable per se. See United States v. Isom, 588 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Bear Killer, 534 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S. 846, 97 S.Ct. 129, 50 L.Ed.2d 118 (1976). Under the circumstances of this case, the delay did not render the appellant’s confession involuntary.
Apart from the delay, appellant does not seriously contend that the incriminating statements he made on the morning of August 5 were involuntary. The district court specifically found the confession to be voluntary. We cannot say that this finding was incorrect; it was supported by evidence that FBI agent Fish carefully explained to Manuel his Miranda rights prior to beginning the questioning, which immediately elicited Manuel’s confession. We find that the district court properly applied the standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) to admit Manuel’s confession, see United States v. Mandley, 502 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir.1974); Halbert, 436 F.2d at 1237.
In United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.1988), the Navajo Tribal Police Department received a call on May 3, 1985 regarding an unconscious child at the Public Health Service Hospital. The child’s mother told the Tribal Police her common law husband had spanked the child with a shoe. The FBI in Gallup, New Mexico was notified. The FBI instructed the Navajo police to get a written statement from the mother and to keep the FBI informed. Wilson was arrested by tribal officers later the same day. He was placed in solitary confinement and special security precautions were taken to monitor him frequently during his custody upon their arrival at the tribal jail.
Sgt. Hawkins told the FBI agents that Wilson was to be arraigned on the tribal charges that day. He further stated that if the court started taking arraignments during their interview, he would make arrangements to take Wilson before the judge himself after the agents had finished the interview.
FBI Agents Babcock and Coffman started their interview sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. on May 10, 1985. The court’s summary of this interview is as follows:
Agents Babcock and Coffman spoke with Wilson for more than two hours. Preliminary questioning revealed that Wilson had only a seventh grade education and had been- arrested only on tribal or drinking offenses. Agent Bab-cock then read Wilson his Miranda rights, and asked Wilson to read them to himself, then aloud. Wilson declined to have his rights read to him in the Navajo language. He said he understood his rights and would talk to the agents about his son. The agents questioned Wilson about Melvin for approximately 1 hour and 42 minutes. Wilson thrice denied abusing his son. Agent Babcock told Wilson that he was lying and that it would be easier for him if he “got it off his chest.” Babcock then asked Wilson whether he had been a victim of child *1412abuse himself. At this point, Wilson broke down and started crying. He then confessed to having abused Melvin.
The FBI concluded its questioning at approximately 4:00 p.m., by which time the tribal court, which met upstairs in the same building, had completed the day’s arraignments. Because he was being questioned, Wilson missed the regularly scheduled arraignment calendar. After Wilson confessed, Sgt. Hawkins took him up to the judge’s chambers to be arraigned specially.
United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d at 1083.
The Wilson panel reversed the trial court’s determination that Wilson’s confession was voluntary stating:
The government’s reliance on the waiver of Miranda rights becomes weaker as the period of pre-arraignment detention increases. If unreasonable delay in excess of six hours can itself form the basis for a finding of involuntariness, that same delay may also suggest involuntariness of the Miranda waiver. See Frazier v. United States, [136 U.S.App.D.C. 180], 419 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C.Cir.1969) (noting that the government’s “already ‘heavy burden’ of showing effective waiver” increases with the delay between arrest and confession).
Given our holding in Fouche and the long delay which undermines a valid waiver of Wilson’s Miranda rights, we cannot say that Wilson’s apparent waiver of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present will overcome the other factors which support a finding of involuntariness. The purpose embedded in § 3501 — to prevent confessions extracted due to prolonged pre-arraignment detention and interrogation, and to supervise the procession of defendants from as early a point in the criminal process as is practicable — are frustrated when the arraignment of a defendant who has been in custody for more than six hours is further delayed for no purpose other than to allow further interrogation for the defendant. If we countenance the police procedure followed here, we given officers a free hand to postpone any arraignment until a confessions obtained. That was not the legislative intent beyond § 3501. It was error to deny the suppression motion.
Id. at 1087.
The Halbert analysis, and the cases that have followed make it clear that 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), (b), and (c) should be construed together. The failure to bring a defendant before a magistrate within six hours of his or her arrest does not, in and of itself, render a confession given in the interim inadmissible. The Court’s inquiry should center on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the confession to determine if it was voluntarily given.
In the case before the Court, there is no evidence that any delay in bringing Alvarez before the magistrate was used to lengthen the interrogation of this defendant. Further, the defendant knew the nature of the charges pending against him.
As the defendant was being booked, and not in response to any specified question, he asked, "is this about the counterfeit money?” The defendant admitted possession of the counterfeit money shortly after the beginning of the interrogation by Special Agents Lipscomb and Bozzuto of the Secret Service.
I would affirm the ruling of the trial court denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and would affirm defendant’s conviction.
. The bill as originally passed, referred to "commissioners." The word "magistrate” was inserted wherever the word "commissioner” originally appeared.
. One member of the panel dissented, but agreed that the confession of Stage was not admissible.