concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part:
I concur only in the judgments reached by the court in Parts III and V of its opinion. In Parts II and IV of its opinion, respectively, the court reverses for insufficiency of the evidence appellant Blackwell’s conviction for money laundering and appellant Baker’s conviction for attempting to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. I dissent from these parts of the opinion because there was substantial evidence to support both convictions.
I.
The government introduced substantial evidence in support of Blackwell’s money laundering conviction. The government’s theory was that Blackwell enlisted Odas White, a friend and partner of Blackwell’s in the drug trade, to purchase a boat from Darrell McKamey with Blackwell’s drug transaction proceeds and to have McKamey retain title so as to disguise the true nature of the transaction.
It is undisputed that the government introduced evidence at trial that White did purchase a white boat with blue trim from McKamey with $30,000 in cash and did “front” McKamey one kilogram of cocaine, and that McKamey retained title to the boat. The majority holds, however, that this and the balance of the evidence introduced by the government was inadequate to support Blackwell’s conviction because, it concludes, there was insufficient evidence from which a juror could infer that Blackwell was responsible for White’s purchase of the boat from McKamey.
The underlying error of the majority, and the error that causes it to adjudge the government’s evidence on each of the above grounds insufficient, is that it refuses to permit the jury to make any inferences at all from the taped conversations between White and McKamey, because, it says, “neither McKamey nor White stated who the ‘he’ was who was keeping the boat.” Ante at 1254. Says the court, as a result of this “indefinite reference,” the tapes are “too inconclusive.” This is a remarkable holding. White and McKamey repeatedly referred to “Tiny,” which is Blackwell’s nickname. They noted that “Tiny” was a Hell’s Angel, which Blackwell was. They referred to the fact that “he” and his wife had “split up,” which Blackwell and his wife had. J.A. at 287, 969. They alluded to the fact that “Tiny’s girl friend” had been questioned by authorities, which Patricia Richards, Blackwell’s girlfriend, had. Id. at 815-18. And they discussed the fact that a friend of “his” in the Hell’s Angels had “rolled” and informed authorities of “his” boat purchase, which Blackwell’s friend, Terry Norman, a former Hell’s Angel, had recently done with respect to Blackwell. Not only is there no legitimate basis for denying jurors the inference that White and McKamey were referring to Blackwell in these conversations; as a matter of common sense, it seems inconceivable that they were referring to anyone other than Blackwell.
When the evidence from the transcripts of the conversations between White and McKamey is properly considered, it is apparent that for each fact as to which the majority asserts that the evidence was insufficient, there is substantial, and in most instances overwhelming, record support.
The majority concludes, for example, that there was no evidence from which a juror could reasonably infer that the white and blue trim boat purchased by White was Blackwell’s boat or possessed by him. Ante at 1254. There was, however, an abundance of evidence to support either inference. White acquiesced in, if not con*1262firmed, a statement by McKamey during their conversation of March 23, 1990, that Blackwell was keeping on the coast the boat that White bought from McKamey. J.A. at 287. And in the April 10, 1990, conversation between White and McKa-mey, White told McKamey that the Hell’s Angel who “rolled” on Blackwell knew that Blackwell had a boat that he had bought in Charlotte, the location of White’s purchase, and that law enforcement officials were interested in this boat. Id. at 355-57. Additionally, Terry Norman, the former Hell’s Angel and friend of Blackwell’s, informed law enforcement officials that Blackwell and his girlfriend Patricia Richards were towing a blue and white boat when they visited him in Winston-Salem in 1989, id. at 436-47; likewise, Special Agent Warren testified that Richards had stated to him in an interview that she and Blackwell were towing a blue boat when they visited Norman in Winston-Salem. Id. at 816-18.
The majority concludes on a related score that “[t]he government never established that the man who accompanied White to the marina was Blackwell” and that “[e]ven if a reasonable jury could find that this man was Blackwell, the government failed to show that he was in any way involved in the transaction.” Ante at 1254. There was, however, a host of evidence from which the jury could have inferred both that Blackwell was the man accompanying White when he met with McKamey and that Blackwell was “involved in the transaction.” The transcriptions of the tapes of the conversations between White and McKamey establish to a virtual certainty that Blackwell was involved in the transaction. They certainly are sufficient to permit the inference that he was behind the transaction. The government was not even required to prove that Blackwell accompanied White on the visit when he purchased the boat. But there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could make this inference. McKamey, for example, testified in court that Blackwell fit the description of the man who had accompanied White on the day when White purchased the boat. J.A. at 214-18. In concluding that there was insubstantial evidence that Blackwell was “involved in the transaction,” see ante at 1254, the majority seizes upon McKamey’s testimony, J.A. at 217, that the man accompanying White “walked away” before White actually proposed to McKamey that he purchase the boat. The mere fact that Blackwell “walked away” at the moment of the transaction in no way undermines the possibility of the inference that he was involved in the transaction. If anything, particularly given the nature of the crime, the fact that he walked away just before consummation of the sale tends to reinforce the permissibility of the inference that he was involved and merely wished to disguise his role in the transaction.
The majority next concludes that the evidence “never showed that [Blackwell] was the real owner” of the boat and that “[i]n fact, McKamey said that the boat was his.” Ante at 1254. Again, the transcribed tapes of the conversations between White and McKamey all but conclusively establish that the boat purchased by White belonged to Blackwell. The fact that title remained in McKamey's name, of course, is entirely consistent with, in fact an integral part of, the money laundering offense of which Blackwell was convicted.
Finally, the majority determines that the government never proved that the $30,000 used by White to purchase the boat was Blackwell’s or that it represented drug proceeds. Id. The jury obviously could reasonably infer that the purchase money was Blackwell’s from the substantial evidence that he was present when the boat was purchased; that he was repeatedly seen in the possession of the boat after the purchase; and that he attempted to disguise his ownership of the boat by having White purchase it and by arranging that McKa-mey retain title. Likewise, the jury could permissibly infer that the funds used to purchase the boat represented drug proceeds from the considerable evidence that Blackwell was a drug dealer and that, for no other apparent reason, he attempted to hide his ownership of the boat from authorities.
*1263Because the government introduced substantial evidence that Blackwell had laundered money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, I would affirm Blackwell’s conviction. Indeed, in my view, the court’s reversal of this conviction represents a disturbing example of an unabashed substitution of an appellate court’s view of the evidence for that of the jury.
II.
The evidence proffered by the government as to Baker’s attempt to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine also was more than sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
There was testimony at trial that Baker had distributed cocaine in the past. See, e.g., J.A. at 534-36. Although not without discrepancy, both Roy and Dwayne Langley testified that Baker intended to withdraw money from the bank on June 19, 1987, for the purpose of purchasing cocaine from Roy. See id. at 642-43, 736-37. Roy also testified that Baker had sufficient assets that he could have afforded to buy “any amount” of cocaine that day. Id. at 643. Because Baker was at the bank when Roy was arrested while in the possession of one kilogram of cocaine, id. at 644-46, and because there was testimony that Baker had the financial wherewithal to purchase this amount of cocaine, a jury could reasonably infer that Baker intended to purchase that amount. Of course, a jury can permissibly infer an intention to distribute from the attempted possession of a kilogram of cocaine.
That Baker attempted to cash a counter check at one bank for only $100 does not, contrary to the majority’s view, see ante at 1257, defeat the permissibility of this inference, because the government also introduced evidence that Baker subsequently went to a second bank to withdraw money to purchase cocaine from Roy Langley. J.A. at 644, 737-38. There was no testimony as to how much cash Baker planned to withdraw from this bank. But again, as the majority notes, there was testimony that Baker was “well off financially,” see ante at 1259-60 & n. 8, and that Baker could afford to purchase “any amount” of cocaine.
A jury surely could reasonably conclude based upon this evidence that Baker had the intent and the means to purchase up to a kilogram of cocaine with the purpose of distributing it, and that his efforts to obtain the funds necessary to purchase the cocaine from Roy Langley constituted a substantial step toward achievement of that objective. Because the government produced sufficient evidence to support Baker’s attempt conviction, I would also affirm the jury’s guilty verdict on this charge.