dissenting:
This writer is compelled to agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Supreme Court has voiced approval for a two-parent consent requirement with an adequate judicial bypass.7 However, in my view, the judicial bypass procedure at issue in the instant ease, as contained in both the statute and in the Mississippi Supreme Court’s procedural rules, is constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, the instant dissent is made from the decision of the majority to vacate the district court’s injunction against enforcement of Mississippi’s parental consent statute.
The foremost flaw in the majority opinion is its refusal to come to grips with the real issue presented by this appeal — that being whether Mississippi’s judicial bypass is- adequate in the context of a parental consent statute. In fact, the majority opinion skirts around the issue to the extent that it is difficult to discern its actual holding. Portions of the opinion suggest that the challenged language in Mississippi’s Rule 10.01 is *1344indeed invalid because it conflicts with Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979), and with Mississippi’s statutory requirements for the judicial bypass. If that is the majority’s intent, the majority is actually only objecting to the district court’s decision to continue the injunction rather than to surgically strike the offending language from the rule. It is difficult to believe that the majority intends this interpretation because that would make the bulk of the opinion nothing more than misguided dicta. Nevertheless, to the extent that this is the intended holding of the majority, this writer would whole-heartedly agree that the language in Rule lfl.Ol is invalid.8
On the other hand, portions of the majority opinion seem to approve Mississippi’s parental consent procedure simply because the statute itself complies with Bellotti. According to the majority, the unconstitutional requirements set forth in Rule 10.01 are of no moment because the statute must “trump” the procedural rule. What the majority forgets — or at least ignores — is that the Supreme Court has made it clear that a two-parent consent requirement is unconstitutional.9 Such a requirement can only be saved by an adequate judicial bypass. Because the procedural rule at issue is a part of the judicial bypass provided by Mississippi, this Court cannot avoid passing on the constitutionality of the language contained in Rule 10.01. The district court held that the language in Rule 10.01 meant that Mississippi’s judicial bypass was inadequate to save the two-parent consent requirement. Although the majority struggles mightily to avoid the issue, it is that precise holding of the district court that is now squarely presented for review.
Limitations on a Minor’s Right to an Abortion
At this hour, it is beyond debate that the Constitution protects the right of every woman to decide whether and when to conceive and bear children, including the right to choose to continue or to terminate a pregnancy. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, — U.S. —, —, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2816, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). This right is in no way diminished by a woman’s minority. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 433, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 2936, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990). Of course, as is the case for all other constitutional protections, a woman’s freedom in this area is not unlimited. The Supreme Court has recognized that the State has legitimate interests in the health of the pregnant woman and in protecting the potential life within her. However, any attempts by the State to further its legitimate interests must be calculated to inform a woman’s free choice, not to hinder it. “An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Casey, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2821.
To be sure, where the woman seeking an abortion is an unmarried minor, the State has a special interest in encouraging her to seek the advice and counsel of her parents. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 444, 110 S.Ct. at 2942; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 3046, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979). However, a State cannot lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 73, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). A parental consent requirement, although it would be unconstitutional standing alone, can nonetheless be saved by an adequate “alternative procedure” whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642, 99 S.Ct. at 3048. In such an alternative proceeding, a pregnant minor is entitled to show either (1) that she is mature enough and well informed enough to make the decision herself or (2) that the abortion would be in her best interests. Additionally, to allow the minor an effective opportunity to obtain an abortion, all acceptable judicial bypass procedures must (3) insure anonymity and (4) *1345be conducted with expediency. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 512, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 2979-80, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990) (Akron II); Bellotti 443 U.S. at 642, 99 S.Ct. at 3048.
Is Mississippi’s Ride 10.01 Constitutional?
The plaintiffs below admit that the statutory portion of Mississippi’s judicial bypass complies with the standards set forth in Bel-lotti. The statute itself provides that parental consent shall be waived if the court finds either: “(a) [tjhat the minor is mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on her own; or (b) [tjhat performance of the abortion would be in the best interests of the minor.” Miss.Code Ann. § 41-41-55. However, the statute specifically directs the Mississippi Supreme Court to issue rules to insure that the bypass proceedings are handled in an “expeditious, confidential and anonymous manner.” Miss.Code Ann. § 41-41-55(6). And it is one of the procedural rules so promulgated that has given rise to this litigation. Mississippi Chancery Court Rule 10.01(4), the actual procedural rule attacked by the plaintiffs, states that the minor’s petition for judicial authorization shall allege either or both of the following:
(a) [tjhat the complainant is sufficiently mature and well informed to intelligently decide whether to have an abortion without the notification of her parents, guardian, or custodian;
(b) [tjhat one or both of her parents, her guardian, or her custodian was engaged in a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse against her, or that the notification of her parents, guardian, or custodian otherwise is not in her best interest.
Miss.Ch.R. 10.01(4) (emphasis added).
The district court found that Rule 10.01 stood in direct conflict both with the Mississippi parental consent statute and with the standards enunciated in Bellotti. The district court reasoned that the pleading requirements set forth in the rule impermissi-bly narrow the Bellotti standards because they would have the effect of denying authorization to some minors even though abortion would be in their best interests. The district court noted that simply correcting the rule by striking the offending language would leave minors without any guidance as to how to proceed or what to allege in their complaints. Therefore the district court continued the injunction against enforcement of Mississippi’s parental consent statute until Rule 10.01 is amended.
Mississippi argues before this Court that the language in Rule 10.01 must be constitutional because identical language was approved by the Supreme Court in Akron II. However, as the district court correctly noted, Akron II dealt with a notice requirement, while the instant case deals with a consent requirement. Consent statutes are by nature significantly more burdensome and imposing than notice statutes and must be attended with greater protection.
From a constitutional standpoint, the key consideration for any parental involvement requirement is whether it results in another person having an absolute veto power over a minor’s right to have an abortion. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 73, 96 S.Ct. at 2843. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where a minor is mature enough to make her own decision or where the abortion would be in her best interests she must be permitted to have the abortion. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642, 99 S.Ct. at 3048. To the extent that a parental involvement statute results in veto power over a minor in either of these two classes, it is unconstitutional. Such a statute can nonetheless be saved by an alternative bypass procedure, if the bypass is adequate to ensure that minors in the two protected classes can obtain authorization for the abortion without any parental involvement.
A consent requirement like the one considered in Danforth expressly grants an absolute parental veto. Therefore, a consent requirement will only be valid if accompanied by an alternative procedure that guarantees that minors in the protected classes will be able to have an abortion without parental consent. On the other hand, a parental notice requirement does not expressly grant absolute veto power. The Supreme Court has declined to equate notice with consent in all cases. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 n. 17, 101 S.Ct. 1164, 1172 n. 17, 67 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981). Nonetheless, the Court *1346has recognized that there are circumstances where a requirement of notice would be equivalent to a requirement of consent — for example, when parents hold strong views on abortion and could be expected to obstruct or prevent the minor from exercising her rights, perhaps by resorting to physical or emotional abuse. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 451, 110 S.Ct. at 2945-46. To the extent that a notice requirement results in a parental veto and to the extent that this veto affects the two protected classifications of minors, the notice requirement would be unconstitutional. To save such a notice requirement, an adequate judicial bypass need only address those situations where notice can be the equivalent of consent — in other words, situations where notice would not be in the minor’s best interests such as where the minor has been the victim of physical or emotional abuse.
Thus, in Akron II, it was constitutionally acceptable for Ohio to require a minor seeking a judicial bypass to allege either that she was mature enough to make her own decision or that one or both of her parents were engaged in a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse against her or that the notification of her parents was not in her best interests. The situations where notice would amount to consent are amply covered by this language, and a notice requirement is only objectionable to the extent that it amounts to a parental veto for one or both of the protected classes of minors set out in Bellotti. Therefore, under the language in Ohio’s notice requirement, any minor constitutionally entitled to a judicial bypass would be able to satisfy the pleading requirements.
When the same language approved in Akron II is applied to a consent requirement, however, the situation is very different. As the district court noted, under Mississippi’s Rule 10.01, an immature minor who could show that an abortion was in her best interests but who could not show that notification of her parents was not in her best interests (as would be the ease if she had understanding and supportive parents who nonetheless were opposed to abortion on religious grounds) would be unable to obtain authorization for an abortion. Therefore, the district court correctly held that Rule 10.01 “impermissibly narrows the standards deemed essential in Bellotti." Though identical language was approved by the Supreme Court as part of a notice requirement, the language in Rule 10.01 is invalid as a part of a consent requirement because it would result in some minors being unable to obtain authorization for an abortion even though the abortion would be in their best interests.
The Appropriate Remedy
The majority apparently does not disagree with this writer’s view that the language in Rule 10.01 is unconstitutional. Yet the majority holds that the district court’s order should nonetheless be reversed because the language in the statute itself is constitutional. The majority notes that, under Mississippi state law, a procedural rule cannot trump a state statute. While this is an accurate assessment of Mississippi law, the majority’s confidence that the statute and the rule necessarily conflict is misplaced. At the risk of being branded “hypertechnical,” it seems entirely possible — albeit constitutionally impermissible given the language in Rule 10.01— for a state court to give effect to both. The pleading requirements set forth in Rule 10.01 are very different from the rules of decision found in the statute. For the purpose of this appeal, it is immaterial that the “official position” of the Mississippi Attorney General’s office is that a court would be required to grant a minor’s petition if she can show that an abortion would be in her best interests; a minor will never have a chance to make such a showing if she cannot satisfy Rule 10.01’s pleading requirements.
It is clear that the language contained in Rule 10.01 impermissibly narrows the Bellot-ti standards for an adequate judicial bypass. As a result, Mississippi’s judicial bypass cannot save the otherwise unconstitutional two-parent consent requirement. Given the conclusion that the language in Rule 10.01 is unconstitutional, the most sensible remedy is the one imposed by the district court — to continue the injunction until Mississippi amends Rule 10.01. Instead, the majority leaves the constitutional infirmity intact and assures, with a sly wink and a nod, that no Mississippi court would actually follow the language in Rule 10.01.
*1347In my view, the district court made the right decision when it continued the injunction against the enforcement of Mississippi’s parental consent requirement until the offending language in Rule 10.01 was corrected. I would affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.10
. A two-parent consent requirement has never been approved by the Supreme Court. In Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990), the Court did approve a two-parent notice requirement that provided for a judicial bypass. A majority of the Justices agreed that any legitimate state interest in requiring parental notification would be fully satisfied by a requirement that one parent be notified. Id. at 450, 110 S.Ct. at 2945 (Stevens, J.). The requirement that both parents be notified was therefore held to be unconstitutional. The same would obviously be true for a two-parent consent requirement since consent requirements are much more burdensome than notice requirements and must be examined more closely. Nonetheless, a different majority in Hodgson held that a two-parent notice requirement, though unconstitutional standing alone, could nonetheless be saved by an adequate judicial bypass. Id. at 497, 110 S.Ct. at 2970 (Kennedy, J.). While the issue was not before the Supreme Court, I must agree that this same majority strongly indicated that a two-parent consent statute with an adequate judicial bypass would also be constitutional.
. This writer would still affirm the judgment of the district court for the precise reason given by Judge Wingate. Merely striking the offending language in Rule 10.01 would leave minors without direction on how to proceed or what to allege in their complaints.
. See supra note 7.
. As an alternative ground for reversing the district court, the majority notes that this is a facial challenge to a statute. As such, the majority contends that it should only succeed if the plaintiffs have shown that there is no set of circumstances under which the statute would be constitutional. While the majority correctly quotes this principle of constitutional law, it completely misapplies it to the facts of this case. It is immaterial that Mississippi’s regulations will only have an unconstitutional impact upon a small percentage of the minors seeking to obtain judicial consent for an abortion. “Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects .... The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.” Casey, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2829. In this case, the proper focus is on those immature minors seeking abortions who can show that an abortion is in their best interests but who cannot show that notification of their parents is not in their best interests. For the women in that group, the application of Rule 10.01 will mean that there is no set of circumstances where they will be able to obtain judicial authorization for an abortion.
The majority suggests that this dissent misunderstands its argument on this point. Even if so, this writer doubts that he will be the only one to misunderstand. But in the interests of increased understanding all the way around, let me be perfectly clear on my point: In a case like this, the majority's application of the "no-circumstances principle” is just plain wrong. Whatever the merits of such an approach in another context, virtually every abortion case to reach the Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade has involved just this type of facial attack on state regulation. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, - U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2816, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 110 S.Ct. 2926, 111 L.Ed.2d 344 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986).