dissenting.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) requires that police officers be primarily engaged in work-related duties during meal periods to warrant compensation for those meal periods. Armitage v. City of Emporia, Kansas, 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir.1992). The Chicago police officers (“the Officers”) claim that FLSA requires the City of Chicago (“the City”) to pay them as a matter of course when the Officers do nothing more than eat during their meal periods.1
The majority sets out the facts alleged in the Officers’ complaints. The majority does not mention, however, that the City pays the Officers overtime in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between the Officers and the City. The agreement requires the City to pay a police officer if the officer works during a meal period. The Officers make no allegation that the City does not comply with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The issue in this case, then, is whether FLSA requires the City to pay the Officers during their meal period even if they do nothing other than eat during this time and adhere to the restrictions listed in the Officers’ complaints. I disagree with both the majority’s analysis of the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor (“the Secretary”) and with the majority’s interpretation of decisions by other courts in similar cases. I will address each in turn.
The majority properly points out that two regulations guide our decision in this case. Both of these regulations interpret FLSA to mean that meal periods are not compensable when employees — here, the Officers — are “completely relieved from duty.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.223(b), 785.19(a). The majority points out, and I agree, that the two regulations are not separate and distinct. I part company with the majority because I believe that the regulations indicate that the Officers do not allege facts that entitle them to automatic compensation for their meal periods.
Section 785.19(a), the broader of the two regulations, illustrates by example that “an office employee who is required to eat at his desk or a factory worker who is required to be at his machine is working while eating” and therefore must be compensated under FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). Similarly, section 553.223(b), which applies specifically to cases, like this one, involving law enforcement personnel, states that “[wjhere law enforcement personnel are required to remain on call in barracks or similar quarters, or are engaged in extended surveillance activities (e.g., ‘stakeouts’), they are not considered to be completely relieved from duty, and any such meal periods would be compensable.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.223(b).
Taking the two regulations together, as the majority does, does not change the analysis. Both of these regulations indicate that when employees covered by FLSA, including police officers, are required to be at a particular place — at a desk, machine, barracks, or location involving extended surveillance — the employee is working and must be paid. The implication of the Secretary’s examples is that when employees are not so rigidly restricted to a particular place, like the Officers here, they are not entitled to compensation under FLSA.
With no explanation and without any support from precedent, the majority announces that the examples in the regulations are “arbitrary, and certainly not all-encompassing.” *343While I agree that the examples are not all-encompassing, I do not agree that they are arbitrary. Rather, the examples in sections 785.19(a) and 553.223(b) represent the Secretary’s reasoned judgment in interpreting FLSA. The majority errs by describing the examples contained in the regulations as arbitrary. Even if FLSA is considered ambiguous, we still must defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of FLSA so long as it is based on a permissible construction of that statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Martin v. The Refrigeration Sch., Inc., 968 F.2d 3, 5 (9th Cir.1992). The majority apparently does not believe the Secretary’s examples warrant even a cursory discussion. Instead, they are dismissed as “arbitrary and not all-encompassing.” I believe that the Secretary’s examples are based on a permissible construction of FLSA. See Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1157 (10th Cir.1992) (relying on the Secretary’s examples in section 553.223(b)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1414, 122 L.Ed.2d 785 (1993); Lee v. Coahoma County, 937 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir.1991) (same). Sections 785.19(a) and 553.223(b) — and the examples contained therein — demonstrate that the Officers do not allege facts sufficient to show that they are so confined to a particular place during their meal periods that they should be compensated.
I similarly disagree with the majority’s use of precedent. In Lee, for example, several deputy county sheriffs sued the defendant county for alleged violations of FLSA. On appeal, the deputies challenged the district court’s finding that their meal breaks were not compensable. Id. at 225. The deputies claimed that FLSA required the county to pay them for their meal periods because the periods were often less than thirty minutes and the deputies could be called back to duty if an emergency arose. Id. The Fifth Circuit looked to the examples contained in section 553.223(b) and concluded that “[t]he meal breaks of the ... deputies in no way resemble [these] example[s].” 937 F.2d at 225. The court added that it was “not dis-positive that the deputies could be called if an emergency arose and this contingency does not mean that they remained on duty.” Id. The court also found it insignificant that the meal periods were often less than 30 minutes. Id. For these reasons, the court rejected the deputies’ claims and affirmed the district court’s decision that the deputies’ meal periods were not compensable. Id. at 228.
In Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir.1992), relied on by the majority, the Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in an analogous case. There, police officers sued the City of Shawnee, Kansas for alleged FLSA violations because the city did not pay them for their 30-minute meal peiiods. Id. at 1147. The court noted that the officers were relieved from duty during meal periods but, like the Officers here, had to respond to emergency calls, citizen requests, and crimes committed in their presence. Id. at 1149. Also like the Officers in this case, the officers in Lamon were required to leave a telephone number where they could be reached or to monitor a portable radio during their meal periods. Id.
In Lamon, the Tenth Circuit had to define the Secretary’s “completely relieved from duty” standard in order to decide whether FLSA required the city to compensate the officers for their meal periods.2 The court stated that in the context of FLSA section 7(k), 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) — the same statute at issue here — “a law enforcement employee is considered to be completely relieved from duty during a meal period when the employee’s time is not spent predominantly for the benefit of the employer.” Id. at 1155. The court added that “FLSA requires remuneration for meal periods during which a police officer is unable comfortably and adequately to pass the mealtime because the officer’s time or attention is devoted primarily to official responsibilities.” Id. at 1155-56.
As in Lee, the Lamon court relied on section 553.223(b) instead of the more gener*344al section 785.19(a). Id. at 1156-57. The court noted that section 553.223(b) illustrated circumstances “involving law enforcement personnel that would run afoul, if not compensated, of the ‘completely relieved from duty’ standard” and pointed to the regulation’s examples of “personnel required to remain on call in a barracks or similar quarters or assigned to extended surveillance duties, such as stakeouts.” Id. at 1157 (citing Lee, 937 F.2d at 225). The court found those examples different from the restrictions placed on the officers in Lamon and found the differences “instructive.”3 Id. at 1157. The court therefore concluded that “a police officer must primarily be engaged in work-related duties during meal periods to warrant compensation therefor. That a police officer is on-call and has some limited responsibilities during meal periods does not perforce mean the officer is working.” Id. at 1157. The court held that the district court had erred by ignoring section 553.223(b) and instructing the jury with language that tracked only section 785.19. Id. at 1156, 1158. The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the meal period issue and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 1159.
The Tenth Circuit applied Lamon to a suit brought by police detectives against the City of Emporia, Kansas. Armitage v. City of Emporia, Kansas, 982 F.2d 430 (1992). In Armitage, the police detectives were required to take an unpaid lunch break of at least 30 minutes. Id. at 431. The police detectives had to notify the dispatcher of their location in case they were needed, were not allowed to consume alcohol during lunch, and were required to respond to questions from the public if approached during lunch. Id. Also, like the Officers here, the police detectives in Armitage were paid at the overtime rate if they were called back to duty during lunch. Id. The police detectives sued the city pursuant to FLSA. After a bench trial, the district court awarded back pay for the police detectives’ lunch periods. Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed because La-mon “require[d] a different outcome under these facts.” Id. As articulated in Lamon, the court in Armitage stated that “the proper standard for determining compensability of a meal period is whether the officer is ‘primarily ... engaged in work-related duties during meal periods.’ ” Id. at 432 (quoting Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1157). The Armitage court determined that the facts, as found by the district court, indicated that the police detectives were not primarily engaged in work-related duties during their meal periods. 982 F.2d at 432. Accordingly, the court reversed the award of backpay for meal periods. Id. The court did not remand the case for a new trial, as in Lamon, but instead substituted its judgment for the district court’s and instructed the district court to enter judgment for the city. Id. at 433.
The majority in this case accurately observes that Lee, Lamon, and Armitage all involved trials whereas here, the district court dismissed the Officers’ complaints. The gist of Lee, Lamon, and Armitage, however, demonstrates that dismissal was proper. In all three cases, the courts ruled against the deputy sheriffs, police officers, and police detectives. In Lee, the court affirmed the district court’s decision that the meal periods were not compensable. In La-mon, the court reversed a district court’s decision that meal periods were compensable. Finally, Armitage — the most recent pronouncement on the issue — is perhaps the most instructive because the court in that *345case had the obvious advantage of interpreting and applying both Lee and Lamon. In Armitage, the court simply looked at the facts, decided the case against the plaintiff police detectives as a matter of law, and ordered the district court to enter judgment for the defendant city. The Armitage court’s conclusion that FLSA did not require the defendant city to compensate the police detectives for their meal periods is one that we should follow here. Numerous other courts have similarly interpreted FLSA. See, e.g., Brinkman v. Department of Corrections, 804 F.Supp. 163, 172 (D.Kan.1992) (merely because corrections officers may be on-call and retain some other duties over their lunch period does not of necessity require compensation); City of Univ. Park v. University Park Police Ass’n, 766 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.Ct.App.1989) (police officers’ mealtime not com-pensable when mealtime break not spent predominantly for the benefit of defendant city); Weeks v. Chief of Wash. State Patrol, 96 Wash.2d 893, 639 P.2d 732 (1982) (state troopers not entitled to overtime compensation for lunch hour when lunch hour was included in their salaries and when troopers were paid at time and a half rate if called out during lunch hour).4
The trend is clear. FLSA does not require municipalities to pay police officers unless the officers work during their meal period — that is, unless the officers are primarily engaged in work-related • duties. The facts alleged in the complaints are no different than the facts found after trial in Lee, La-mon, and Armitage. In fact, this is an even stronger case for the City than for the municipalities in those cases. Here, the City is bound by the collective bargaining agreement which requires that the Officers receive overtime rates when they work during their meal periods. The Officers do not allege that the City has breached the collective bargaining agreement and, absent such an allegation, I assume the City fully complies with its terms. Consequently, the City pays the Officers if they work during their meal periods and does not pay them if they do not work during their meal periods. FLSA requires no more.
There is no need for further factual development of the Officers’ case when the facts alleged — -taken together with the collective bargaining agreement — so clearly indicate that the City has not violated FLSA. I do not believe that the district court’s already full docket should be cluttered with this case when the Officers’ complaints are doomed. Finally, I do not believe that federal courts should micro-manage municipal police departments when, as in this case, a collective bargaining agreement provides for a compensation plan that fully comports with FLSA’s requirements and the police officers do not allege that the municipality has violated such an agreement. I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Officers’ complaints.
. The Officers apparently envision the following scenario as a possibility. Two Chicago police officers park their squad car and walk into a local restaurant. They sit down, order a meal, and then spend 30 undisturbed minutes eating. Afterwards, the two officers return to their squad cars and continue their patrol duties. The Officers argue that FLSA requires the City to pay these two officers — at no less than overtime rates — for this "work." I dissent because I do not agree that such a meal period is compensable under FLSA.
. As the majority points out, the “completely relieved from duty” standard is contained in both sections 785.19(a) and 553.223(b).
. In full, the Lamon court stated:
[Section] 553.223(b) goes on to illustrate circumstances involving law enforcement personnel that would run afoul, if not compensated, of the 'completely relieved from duty' standard, citing the examples of personnel required to remain on call in barracks or similar quarters or assigned to extended surveillance duties, such as stakeouts. We find these differences instructive in determining the reach of the completely relieved from duty standard pursuant to § 553.223(b).
Lamon, 972 F.2d at 1157. The majority describes my characterization of Lamon's reliance on the Secretary’s examples in section 553.-223(b) as "misleading.” As the above excerpt from Lamon indicates, however, there is nothing misleading about my characterization of that case. The Tenth Circuit in Lamon clearly relied on the Secretary’s examples in section 553.-223(b).
. I also disagree with the majority's interpretation of Wahl v. City of Wichita, 725 F.Supp. 1133 (D.Kan.1989). I do not agree with the majority's assertion that the restrictions the City places on the Officers in this case are more restrictive than those in Wahl. In fact, I believe the opposite is true. The Wahl court found the following restrictions, none of which are alleged in this case: officers were prohibited from eating lunch with their wives; officers had limited reading privileges during their meal period; some officers were prohibited from going through bank drive-throughs or using automatic teller machines; other officers were not allowed to watch television or play pinball or video games. Id. The court therefore held that "[b]ccauso the plaintiffs arc subject to substantial limitations and duties during their meal periods, they are entitled to compensation for those periods under the FLSA.” Id.
As an initial matter, Wahl is factually distinguishable from the instant case because the restrictions in Wahl are more extensive than those alleged here. Also, in Armitage, the Tenth Circuit observed that the district court in that case (.Armitage) partially relied on Wahl to award the plaintiff police detectives compensation for their meal periods. Armitage, 982 F.2d at 431. The Tenth Circuit rejected that result, noted that La-mon set forth the correct standard, applied that standard, and ordered the district court to enter judgment for the defendant city. Id. at 431-33.