dissenting:
My main disagreement with the majority lies in their acceptance — for the purpose of Rule 23(b)(2) — of the common issue alleged by Forbush which, in my opinion, sweeps too broadly.1
As “Professors Wright and Miller state[,] a rule 23(b)(2) class action is appropriate when ‘the party opposing the class ... has established a regulatory scheme common to all class members.... What is necessary is *1107that the challenged conduct or lack of conduct be premised on a ground that is applicable to the entire class.’ ” Johnson v. American Credit Co. of Georgia, 581 F.2d 526, 532 (5th Cir.1978) (alteration in original) (quoting 7A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Pragtige and Progedure § 1775, at 19-20, 21 (1972)). Clearly, the district court was correct in distinguishing Dameron on the basis that “ ‘Dameron involves only one plan, [while] Forbush’s claims involve the analysis of at least four different J.C. Penney pension plans.’ ” Maj. op. at 1104 (quoting Amended Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Certification of a Class, Staying Case, and Certification for Interlocutory Appeal); see Dameron v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 815 F.2d 975, 980 (4th Cir.1987) (“Sinai employs a method of calculating an employee’s primary social security benefit which is not mentioned in the plan and which is unreasonable.” (emphasis added)).
Rule 23(b)(2) simply does not allow for such a broadly defined class. See Johnson, 581 F.2d at 532 (“In contrast, rule 23(b)(2) will not allow an action for this broadly defined class premised on her third argument— that a prior hearing is required because the six situations in which attachment is allowed are not ‘extraordinary situations’ under Fuentes. This argument obviously raises six discrete issues not common to the members of the broadly defined class.” (emphasis added)).2
For these reasons, and for the reasons stated by the district court,3 I respectfully dissent. See Richardson v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir.) (“Complex cases cannot be run from the tower of the appellate court”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 527, 78 L.Ed.2d 710 (1983).
. "The common issue alleged by Forbush is whether Penney’s alleged overestimation of social security benefits violates ERISA's nonforfei-ture provisions.” Maj. op. at 1106.
. The Johnson court went on to remark that, under Rule 23(c)(4)(B) which allows for subclasses, "Johnson may represent only a subclass consisting of all persons who, like her, have had or will have property attached prior to judgment because they allegedly were removing the property from the state.” Johnson, 581 F.2d at 532.
. Certification of the proposed class will not promote judicial economy, nor will class in-junctive relief be appropriate in light of the prevailing individual issues. Resolution of the issue of whether overcstimation of social security benefits for purposes of calculating pension benefits violates ERISA, does not, by itself, call for certification of a class action. In this case, class certification will not reduce litigation expenses in any appreciable quantity, of any persons seeking to recover past pension benefits or ensure proper calculation of future benefits. Each plaintiff will have to prove entitlement to relief on an individual basis. Each claim.will be based on facts and circumstances unique to the party involved.
Petitioner’s Record Excerpts, Tab 4, at 6-7.