dissenting:
This is a most troublesome case. A young public defender has been permanently tarnished by a summary contempt conviction for seeking to perform as an advocate exercising warm zeal in a criminal case. The trial judge, after an unrelated dispute in another case, and after denying Mr. Holloway’s request to withdraw from this case, summarily held Mr. Holloway in contempt of court. The certified contempt charge cited Mr. Holloway for “posing questions which the court had already ruled impermissible.” The majority commendably attaches a transcript of the pertinent colloquy between the trial judge and the advocate. I cannot peruse that transcript without being convinced that the messages of the trial judge were confusing and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the majority holds today that a public defender must resolve all doubts against his own client and shrink from his ethical duty to represent his client zealously and to the fullest extent under the law. If an attorney misunderstands a court’s ruling, or misinterprets the limits imposed upon him by the court, he may be summarily convicted of criminal contempt, and jailed, fined, or both, simply for asking a question that was arguably within the ambiguous limits set by the court. I dissent.
I.
In April 1991, Mr. Holloway represented Kelvin Raseoe on a charge of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in a multi-defendant trial before Judge Norma Holloway Johnson. During the suppression hearing, Judge Johnson threatened Mr. Holloway with contempt when he attempted to rephrase a question that she had previously ruled was impermissible. The threat of contempt shocked Mr. Holloway, and led him to believe that his representation of Mr. Raseoe would be jeopardized by the judge’s obvious inclination to resort to contempt for any minor infraction of her orders. It occurred to Mr. Holloway that perhaps the tension generated between himself and the judge in a previous trial had not yet subsided and was infecting their working relationship. The next morning, before jury selection began, Mr. Holloway moved to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Raseoe. Mr. Holloway stated:
[Bjecause of indications by the court that you would hold me in .contempt, as you indicated yesterday, and having indicated on two previous occasions in the prior trial that just completed on Monday of this week, that I felt as though my effectiveness in representing Mr. Raseoe stood the good prospect of being diminished because of fear of a contempt citation in the course of my conduct in the course of this trial
I would like to say to the court that I do not intentionally violate any court orders .... I would just say to the court that I — it is oftentimes hard for me to personally keep as good track as to where I am in my notes as I would want to, and I *1094would also tell Your Honor that I’m a human being.
Judge Johnson refused to allow Mr. Holloway to withdraw as counsel. She explained to Mr. Rascoe that although Mr. Holloway “forgot himself one day last week” when he refused to move after she asked him to be seated, Mr. Holloway “knows what the law is with respect to contempt, and knows that unless he behaves contemptuously there is no possible way for him to be held in contempt of court.”
A. The Incident Giving Rise to the Contempt Conviction
The evidence at trial showed that Mr. Ras-coe was arrested with his five co-defendants on March 8, 1991, when police executed a search warrant at a two-story rowhouse which contained a quantity of crack cocaine. Mr. Rascoe was found in a bedroom on the second floor with his girlfriend, Tammy Fel-ton. Mr. Rascoe’s defense to the charge of possession with intent to distribute was that the drugs found in the bedroom were not his, but rather his girlfriend’s, and that she possessed the drugs for her own personal use.
The government’s case against Mr. Rascoe rested on the testimony of a single police officer, Edward Truesdale. Officer Trues-dale testified that while executing the warrant, he entered a second floor bedroom and saw Mr. Rascoe standing in front of a couch tossing numerous ziplock bags of crack cocaine. Other officers who entered the bedroom did not see Rascoe toss any objects. One of those officers, Bradley Belden, was on Officer Truesdale’s heels as he burst through the bedroom door, but did not see Mr. Ras-coe throw anything as they entered the room. According to Officer Belden, Mr. Rascoe was simply standing in front of the couch when the officers entered the room.
Shortly after Rascoe’s arrest, Officer Truesdale gave an account of the circumstances of the arrest to a fellow officer, Officer Young, who typed the information onto an arrest form, commonly called a “PD-163.” Officer Truesdale’s statement was then photocopied and inserted onto a “Gerstein affidavit” which was sworn to by a third police officer, Officer Condit. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (requiring sworn evidence, which may contain hearsay, establishing probable cause). Neither Officer Young nor Officer Condit was present in the bedroom at the time of Mr. Rascoe’s arrest, and neither officer had personal knowledge of the surrounding circumstances.
Because Officer Truesdale’s testimony was the only evidence that linked Mr. Rascoe to actual physical possession of any drugs, Mr. Holloway believed it was critical to the government’s case against his client. In an effort to lay a proper foundation for use of the PD-163 and the Gerstein affidavit to challenge Officer Truesdale’s testimony, Mr. Holloway called Officer Young as an adverse witness in Rascoe’s case-in-chief. Mr. Holloway sought to explain to the jury, through Officer Young’s testimony, that the Gerstein affidavit constituted triple-level hearsay. Mr. Holloway had already attempted, earlier in the trial, to question Officer Truesdale about his statement recorded in the PD-163, but Judge Johnson cut off his line of questioning because Officer Truesdale was not the author of the document. By calling Officer Young to the stand, Mr. Holloway hoped to expose the questionable police practice where an arresting officer’s statement is typed on to a PD-163 form by one officer, and then photocopied and sworn to by a third officer. Mr. Holloway hoped that the jury would afford less credence to the statement of facts in the Gerstein affidavit if Officer Young admitted to the jury that the Gerstein affidavit, which was sworn to by Officer Con-dit, consisted entirely of hearsay, and was actually a photocopy of the PD-163 statement that Officer Young had prepared.
Before Mr. Holloway could commence his examination of Officer Young, Judge Johnson called him to the bench and asked him to explain the relevance of his line of questioning. Mr. Holloway told Judge Johnson that the PD-163 and the Gerstein affidavit were “word-for-word identical” and that he was attempting to lay a foundation for questioning Officer Condit, the officer who swore to the Gerstein affidavit. At this point, the following colloquy occurred:
*1095The Court: Excuse me, Mr. Holloway. There is absolutely nothing on [this affidavit] that demonstrates that this witness, Mr. Young, has ever seen this particular document before. There is absolutely nothing.
Now, if you want to present it to him and ask him if he has ever seen this particular document before, and not its contents, but the document itself, I will permit you to do that. But because it may have the same contents, because in fact Condit may have just taken his 163 and xeroxed it, to swear to it doesn’t carry any more weight than that.
Now, if you want to give this to this witness to determine whether he has ever seen this document before as opposed to these contents, I would think that would be relevant. I will hear from you.
The Prosecutor: Your Honor, I don’t think he can cross-examine this witness as to the contents provided in that document that is sworn to by, I believe, Officer Con-dit. He can show him, but other than cross-examining or questioning him about the contents, I don’t think he should be permitted to.
The Court: As I said, I don’t see its relevance. It appears improper to me.
Anybody else care to be heard?
Other Defense Counsel: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
The court then gave several procedural instructions regarding the removal of the affidavit from the court jacket. Mr. Holloway asked if he could remove the document from the jacket and have it marked into evidence, but the court denied those requests. At the end of this discussion, Mr. Holloway asked for clarification of the court’s earlier ruling.
Mr. Holloway: Is Your Honor — just clarification as to what I can ask or not ask.
The Court: I have already told you the limits.
Mr. Holloway: I cannot ask him to compare the two documents?
The Court: No, no, no.
Mr. Holloway: Why is that improper, Judge?
The Court: If this man has never seen that document before — and that’s why I told you must ask him if he has seen that document, not just those paragraphs contained on it — then he can’t testify to it.
Mr. Holloway: Well, can he look at it now? I mean, can he look at it now and compare it?
The Court: He may not compare it until you have made certain determinations, Mr. Holloway. And I don’t know how often I have to say that. That’s the third time I have repeated it.
(IN OPEN COURT:)
The Court: Mr. Young, if you will come back now, please. Why don’t you use the pink — keep the pink paperclip on it so we can use that as an identifying mark.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: Sir, I’m showing you a document entitled “United States v. Kelvin Rascoe.” It is a document dated March 9, 1991.
The Prosecutor: Your Honor, he can identify it if he can recognize it.
The Court: He can say that. Go ahead.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: It is a document dated March 9, 1991. It is signed by Robert W. Condit, and it has the number 91-0183 on it, and it has a pink paperclip. Would you look at this, please.
The Court: He’s asking you to look at it to determine whether or not you have ever seen that document before.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: Have you had a chance to look at it?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: Okay. Do you know what that document is?
The Court: No, no, no. First of all, we must determine if he’s ever seen it before. That’s the first step.
Have you ever seen that document before now?
Mr. Holloway: Judge—
The Witness: No, ma’am.
*1096Mr. Holloway: Judge, I would ask the Court to allow counsel to complete his examination.
The Court: Excuse me, Mr. Holloway. The purpose of our last bench conference in which I ruled on that legal question said that the first thing you must do is determine whether he has ever seen this document before, and his answer is no, he has not seen it before today.
Was not that your answer?
The Witness: Yes, ma’am.
The Court: You may proceed.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: Do you know what that document is?
Mr. Christian: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: If he has never seen it before, we are not going to ask him if he knows what it is.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: Have you seen it now? Have you looked at it just now?
A: Yeah, I see it now.
Q: Okay. Having looked at it now, can you now tell us what it is, what that document is?
The Prosecutor: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: The objection is sustained. And, Mr. Holloway, this is the last time I’m going to tell you the objection is sustained.
By Mr. Holloway:
Q: Do you recognize any of the wording set forth in that document?
The Prosecutor: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: Mr. Holloway, approach the bench, please.
(AT THE BENCH:)
The Court: Mr. Holloway, I hold you in summary contempt of this Court and I shall sentence you at the conclusion of this trial. Ask another question — ask that question another way and I shall hold you in summary contempt again.
Mr. Holloway: Your Honor—
The Court: I have ruled.
Mr. Holloway: Your Honor—
The Court: Let’s proceed.
Mr. Holloway: May I make—
The Court: There is nothing for you to say after a ruling.
B. The Contempt Certificate and Sentencing
On the same day as the incident described above, Judge Johnson issued a written order summarily adjudging Mr. Holloway in contempt of court. In the contempt certificate, the district court described its version of the events leading up to the contempt adjudication. The court’s version is different from the transcript of record in significant respects, as it omits the numerous ambiguities in the exchange and portrays her directions as much clearer than they actually were. The court summarized the charge against Mr. Holloway as follows:
“Holloway attempted three times to pose a question to the witness as to the contents of the document, when the Court had, at the prior bench conference, made it abundantly clear that such questioning was improper. In defiance of the Court’s explicit order not to pursue a particular line of questioning, Holloway contumaciously persisted in posing questions which the Court had already ruled impermissible.”
The court further stated that the contempt “caused serious and substantial interference and delay in the proceedings ... and obstruction to the orderly administration of justice.”
At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Johnson advised Mr. Holloway that he was no longer allowed to appear in her courtroom other than in connection with this case. Thereafter, Judge Johnson communicated this order to Mr. Holloway’s supervisor, A.J. Kramer, the Federal Public Defender.
Mr. Holloway moved to vacate the contempt citation as well as the order barring him from appearing in Judge Johnson’s courtroom. Mr. Holloway also requested that Judge Johnson refer the proceedings to another district judge. In an affidavit attached to his motion, Mr. Holloway explained that his questions were meant to establish a foundation for challenging Officer Trues-dale’s trial testimony, and that he did not *1097understand the court to have prohibited all further questions about the Gerstein affidavit, or to have precluded all attempts to establish that Officer Young was the author of the narrative portion of the Gerstein affidavit which was sworn to by Officer Condit. Mr. Holloway further suggested that because the court had allowed Officer Young to examine the document, and to respond to the question whether he had seen the document “now,” Mr. Holloway believed that he was permitted to inquire whether Officer Young recognized the document’s wording. Mr. Holloway emphasized that he “never would knowingly or deliberately impede or obstruct the orderly administration of justice of any court,” and that he “never intended to engage in contumacious conduct in the course of his examination of Officer Young.”
On March 10, 1992, immediately prior to pronouncing sentence, Judge Johnson denied Mr. Holloway’s post-conviction motion on the grounds that the merits of the underlying contempt adjudication were not properly before the court at sentencing. Judge Johnson added, however, that she found “incredible” Mr. Holloway’s assertion “that he did not understand the scope of the court’s orders regarding permissible questions.” Judge Johnson also denied his request for recusal because summary contempt was not entered against Mr. Holloway “out of any personal animosity.” Judge Johnson did not address, however, Mr. Holloway’s request that she vacate her directive permanently barring him from appearing in her courtroom.
Before sentence was imposed, Mr. Holloway expressed remorse over the incident and reiterated that he simply did not understand what limits the court had imposed on his questioning of the witness. Judge Johnson imposed a $1000 fine which has been stayed pending appeal.
II.
The circumstances described in the contempt certificate do not warrant a summary contempt conviction. What occurred between Mr. Holloway and Judge Johnson was quite typical of the frequently murky and unproductive exchanges that characterize so much of trial practice. Every day, lawyers banter with judges, argue with opposing counsel, raise objections, and creatively maneuver within court orders and commands. The arguments advanced by attorneys and the orders delivered from the bench are often spontaneous and reflexive; unlike the considered arguments presented in briefs on appeal, trial attorneys are required to think on their feet, respond deftly to apparent obstacles to their clients’ cause, and press forward with their clients’ interests uppermost in their mind. Indeed, trial attorneys are ethically obligated to argue with the court, to challenge its actions, and to attempt to change its mind. These duties inevitably create tremendous conflict and tension between the court and counsel, and misunderstandings borne of impatience and frustration are commonplace.
Nevertheless, we have adopted this adversarial system as our own, and have entrusted to it the liberty of individuals whose fate rests in no small part on the efforts of their attorney before the court. In fact, we rely upon the aggressive conflict inherent in our adversary system to produce “just results.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The theory is that only by providing counsel the right “to press his claim, even if it appears farfetched and untenable,” Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9, 72 S.Ct. 451, 455, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952), can we feel confident that the public interest has been advanced in both truth and fairness. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S.Ct. 445, 449, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981).
In light of the interests at stake in our adversarial system, it is incumbent upon courts to distinguish between courtroom conduct that we merely do not want to encourage, and that which merits a criminal sanction. This is especially so in the area of criminal contempt. Nowhere in our political system can an individual exercise unilateral authority comparable to that of a judge summarily convicting someone of criminal contempt. By finding someone guilty of contempt and ordering that person jailed, fined or both, a court combines the roles of grand jury, prosecutor, and judge, almost with impunity. There is no notice, no right to be *1098heard, no right to a jury — virtually no due process at all — for an attorney summarily held in contempt of court.
Appellate courts have not been blind to the inherent dangers of the summary contempt power. Quite to the contrary, appellate courts have sought to limit use of the contempt power in light of its capacity for “grave abuse.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 274, 68 S.Ct. 499, 508, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). The Supreme Court has made clear that “before the drastic procedures of summary contempt power may be invoked ... there must be an actual obstruction of justice.” In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 234, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 1291, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962). And even where there is a threat of actual obstruction, courts are limited to “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1808, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975), quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). Where obstruction of justice is not imminent, the court is bound to follow the “normal procedure” articulated in Rule 42(b), which calls for disposition only after notice and hearing. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 165, 86 S.Ct. 352, 354, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965). In other words, a court’s summary contempt power should be invoked only as a last resort.
A. Obstruction of Justice
There is no evidence on the record that Mr. Holloway’s questioning of Officer Young actually obstructed justice. See In Re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1005 (D.C.Cir.1971) (“actual, not theoretical obstruction is the test, and [ ] any claimed obstruction must be proven precisely”). Judge Johnson does not even attempt to explain how Mr. Holloway’s questions obstructed the business of the court other than to make the conelusory statement that “the above-described conduct ... caused serious and substantial interference and delay in the proceedings.” This claim strikes me as implausible, since the government concedes that Mr. Holloway did not raise his voice or treat the judge with disrespect, and the entire incident covers two pages of the transcript and probably consumed less than a minute. As stated by the Supreme Court in In Re McConnell,
The arguments of a lawyer in presenting his client’s case strenuously and persistently cannot amount to contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create an obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of judicial duty.
In Re McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236, 82 S.Ct. at 1292.
In In Re McConnell, a lawyer had been repeatedly ordered to refrain from a certain line of questioning to the witness. The lawyer, after continued persistence and a warning from the judge, indicated that he would not refrain from the questioning “unless some bailiff stops us.” Id. at 235, 82 S.Ct. at 1292. At this point, a bailiff was called and the lawyer never returned to the forbidden question. The Supreme Court reversed the attorney’s conviction because it had not been “clearly shown” that “an actual obstruction of justice” occurred. Id.
Surely, the conduct in this case no more warrants a criminal conviction than that in McConnell. By the same token, other appellate courts have declined to find obstruction in cases involving conduct far more egregious than that at issue here. In United States ex rel. Robson v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1972), for example, the defense counsel “deliberately asked a provocative and inflammatory question, unfounded in evidence, which disrupted the trial,” but the contempt conviction was reversed because the court could have simply “stricken [the remarks] from the record with an appropriate instruction to the jury.” And in United States v. Meyer, 462 F.2d 827 (D.C.Cir), on remand, 346 F.Supp. 973, 975 (D.D.C.1972), although the defense counsel addressed the court in an “insulting, derogatory and disrespectful” manner, and repeatedly resisted the court’s instructions to cease argument and be seated, the government failed to establish actual obstruction of justice. See also, United States v. Sopher, 347 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir.1965) (although defense counsel knowingly made material misstatements of fact in his closing argument, the government’s prompt objection and the court’s immediate ruling and comment remedied the situation, and therefore there *1099was no clear showing that counsel “actually obstructed” the court’s performance of judicial duty).
The reluctance of appellate courts to uphold contempt convictions where the evidence falls short of actual obstruction rests on the awareness that a less restrictive standard would necessarily chill desirable advocacy. If courts can hold attorneys in contempt every time their representation arguably exceeds the amorphous bounds of acceptable advocacy, some advocacy that is entirely beneficial to our judicial system inevitably will be deterred. See Louis S. Raveson, Charting the Boundaries of Contempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy, 65 Wash.L.Rev. 743 (1990).
B. Willfulness and Contumacious Intent
One of the effective means of safeguarding beneficial advocacy which has, until now, been steadfastly enforced by this Court, is the requirement that the contempt certificate must set forth facts which establish a finding of willfulness and contumacious intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., In Re Brown, 454 F.2d at 1007 (“[kjnowledge that one’s act is wrongful and a purpose to nevertheless do the act are prerequisites to criminal contempt”). This prudential requirement is aimed at insulating trial attorneys from contempt convictions at all times except when it is clearly established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an attorney actually intended to flout the court’s authority.
Since the aim of the intent requirement is to protect vigorous advocacy, an attorney’s ethical obligation to zealously represent his clients must be factored into any determination of whether he possessed the requisite intent. Thus, it is well established in this circuit that “[g]ood faith pursuit of a plausible though mistaken alternative is antithetical to contumacious intent,” In Re Brown, 454 F.2d at 1007, and “any ambiguity in the court’s direction ... precludes the essential finding of willful and contumacious resistance to the court’s authority.” See, e.g., Traub v. United States, 232 F.2d 43, 47 (D.C.Cir.1955). As explained by this Court in In Re Brown, before an individual may be punished for contempt for violating a court order, “the terms of such order should be clear and specific, and leave no doubt or uncertainty in the minds of those to whom it is addressed.” In Re Brown, 454 F.2d at 1008 n. 49 (quoting McFarland v. United States, 295 F. 648, 650 (7th Cir.1923)).
Judge Johnson’s directions to Mr. Holloway regarding what he was entitled to ask Officer Young can hardly be characterized as • “clear and unequivocal.” Traub, 232 F.2d at 47. It appears that even the prosecutor was unclear about what Mr. Holloway could ask the witness. After Judge Johnson issued her first set of instructions to Mr. Holloway regarding his questioning of Officer Young, the prosecutor replied:
Your Honor, I don’t think he can cross-examine this witness as to the contents provided in that document that is sworn to by, I believe, Officer Condit. He can show him, but other than cross-examining or questioning him about the contents, I don’t think he should be permitted to.
Indeed, the whole exchange is muddled and confused. Even after a careful read of the transcript, it is still not apparent whether the court was simply prohibiting Mr. Holloway from comparing the two documents or something more.
Mr. Holloway, throughout his questioning of Officer Young, merely sought to have Officer Young acknowledge that he had provided the information which was contained in the Gerstein affidavit, that he had received that information from Officer Truesdale, and that a third officer, who was not present at the scene of the arrest, swore to its accuracy. That the process is convoluted is hardly the defendant’s fault. Moreover, the fact that one officer is “swearing” to information that he does not know first hand is hardly a commendable practice. Yet, the practice is tolerated in our courts and the defendants must work with it.
When Judge Johnson initially provided Mr. Holloway with instructions regarding the scope of his preliminary examination of Officer Young, she stated that he could not ask Officer Young to compare the two documents until he had established whether the officer had seen the Gerstein affidavit before. *1100Then, after a protracted conversation on a procedural matter, Mr. Holloway asked for clarification of the judge’s earlier ruling. Judge Johnson then stated that Mr. Holloway had to make “certain determinations” before asking Officer Young to compare the two documents, but never specified what those determinations were. Of course, it could be assumed that the “certain determinations” simply involved asking Officer Young if he had ever seen the Gerstein affidavit before; however, that would not explain why the judge told Mr. Holloway he could “proceed” with his questioning of the witness about the document even after the witness stated that he had never seen it before. No doubt, Mr. Holloway was confused by the court’s directions to him at that point. It would have been unreasonable for Mr. Holloway to interpret “[y]ou may proceed” as an order to abandon his line of questioning, since Mr. Holloway made clear to the judge that his primary reason for calling Officer Young to the stand was to ask him about the preparation of the PD-163 and the Gerstein affidavit. If he was prohibited from further questioning about the document, his questioning of the witness would be over and there would be no reason to “proceed.” Thus, Mr. Holloway reasonably assumed that there must be another way to approach the issue or make the “certain determinations” which were necessary to proceed with his examination. When he rephrased the question, and asked the officer if he had seen the document “now,” no objection was made, and the court allowed him to continue. At this juncture, Mr. Holloway could only have believed that he had succeeded in finding a way to make the “certain determinations” despite the fact the witness had never seen the document before. Nevertheless, when Mr. Holloway asked his next question, the court summarily convicted him of contempt.
The danger in holding attorneys in contempt for violating orders that are vague, or susceptible to multiple interpretations, should be obvious. Any law or judicial order which requires people of “common intelligence [to] necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,” violates due process. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). That the writer of this opinion, a member of the bar for over 40 years, remains confused about the specifics of Judge Johnson’s holding may only be an indication of his thick headedness. But it may also indicate that the trial court’s directive was less than crystal clear.
There are real consequences to upholding contempt convictions where the instructions from the trial court are even arguably ambiguous. Attorneys, wary of the perils of proceeding in the face of mixed messages and indefinite language, will begin to 'resolve all doubts against their client and “restriet[] their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.” Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1322, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (discussing the chilling effect of vague prohibitions on free speech). A lawyer who is fearful of crossing a line that is less than clear to him cannot deliver the warm zeal that criminal defense attorneys must have for the process to function properly.
Amici in this case, the Criminal Law and Individual Rights Section of the District of Columbia Bar, the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, support Mr. Holloway’s appeal, and urge this Court to establish clear limits on the use of the summary contempt power so that attorneys will not be deterred from aggressive and vigorous advocacy on behalf of their clients. As Amici point out,
[attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in their client’s behalf. An attorney may with impunity take full advantage of the range of conduct that our adversary system allows. Given this extreme liberality necessary to a vital bar and thus the effective discovery of truth through the adversary process, an attorney possesses the requisite intent only if he knows or reasonably should be aware in view of all the circumstances, especially the heat of the controversy, that he is exceeding the outermost limits of his proper role and hindering rather than facilitating the search for truth.
*1101In Re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
Amici argue that this Court should limit the trial court’s summary contempt power by requiring a warning, a specific inquiry into counsel’s intent, and the use of the least onerous alternative. Use of the least onerous alternative is, generally speaking, already a requirement for use of the summary contempt power. See, e.g., In Re McConnell, 370 U.S. at 233, 82 S.Ct. at 1290 (when dealing with contemptuous behavior courts should use the “least power possible” adequate to the end proposed). The other two suggestions, the requirement of a warning and a specific inquiry into counsel’s intent, while not required by the language of the contempt statute or Rule 42(a), do make prudential sense. These limitations on the summary contempt power would help to define the boundaries of appropriate advocacy and insure trial attorneys that they would have sufficient notice that their activity was considered contemptuous before finding themselves convicted of a criminal offense.
Interestingly, the majority suggests that Mr. Holloway received adequate notice because Judge Johnson “three times reiterated her order about the threshold showing required to inquire about the Gerstein affidavit.” Maj.Op. at 1086. Yet this “threshold showing” is precisely what was so unclear in Judge Johnson’s orders. Certainly, the reiteration of ambiguous orders and the allowance of some, but not all, questions regarding the forbidden topic, can hardly constitute adequate notice. It would have taken but a few seconds for the court to clarify its order and explain the boundaries of permissible questioning regarding the document (if further questioning about the document was permissible at all). If there were no permissible questions after Officer Young denied seeing the document before, Judge Johnson could have prevented the confusion by simply instructing Mr. Holloway to cease his questioning of the witness. If there were permissible questions regarding the document at that point, Judge Johnson should have told Mr. Holloway what those questions were. Failure to undertake such prophylactic measures seriously undercuts the majority’s claim that Judge Johnson exhibited “heroic efforts to win compliance” see Maj.Op. at 1087, and lends substantial support to the view that Mr. Holloway was, at most, engaged in the “good faith pursuit of a plausible though mistaken alternative.” In Re Brown, 454 F.2d at 1007.
The majority’s efforts to infer contumacious intent from other incidents of allegedly contemptuous conduct in the record are also unpersuasive. As the majority itself concedes, a criminal contempt order “must stand or fall on the sufficiency of the specification of wrongdoing upon which it is based.” Tauber v. Gordon, 350 F.2d 843 n. 1 (3d Cir.1965) (era banc). If the conviction of contempt is to be sustained, the conduct complained of in the certificate must, in itself, constitute contempt. See Hollinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir.1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952, 71 S.Ct. 1010, 95 L.Ed. 1375 (1951). Where the actions described in the contempt certificate, taken alone, are insufficient to support a conviction for contempt, the contempt conviction may not be saved by pointing to similar incidents of borderline, or even contemptuous, conduct in the record. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 699, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 1230, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) (contempt conviction reversed where the use of an expletive by the defendant, by itself, did not constitute an imminent threat to the administration of justice, although there were similar discourteous responses made by the defendant during the trial which may have supported the contempt conviction if cited in the contempt certificate).
The district court did not refer to or even hint that the contempt conviction was related to any past instances of misconduct. Therefore, the majority’s attempt to save Mr. Holloway’s conviction by combing the record in search of any minor excess of advocacy, excesses that are inevitable in any trial as heated and drawn-out as this one was, is unacceptable. In any event, the examples used by the majority are not worthy of a summary contempt charge, however irritating they might prove to some trial judges. Judge Johnson, unlike the majority, exercised appropriate restraint in not relying on those other incidents to justify the summary contempt conviction.
*1102The majority is right about one thing, however. The contempt conviction in this case is related to a prior instance of misconduct— misconduct that occurred in a previous trial. A casual perusal of the transcript reveals that the tension generated between Judge Johnson and Mr. Holloway in the previous trial had not yet dissipated when this trial began. Mr. Holloway acknowledged this fact during the suppression hearing, and requested to withdraw as counsel for Rascoe. He explained to the court that his fear of being held in contempt arbitrarily and unpredictably would inevitably jeopardize his client’s interests. Judge Johnson denied his request to withdraw, indicating that he had nothing to fear because he could avoid a contempt citation so long as he did not behave “contemptuously.” The denial of the request undoubtedly stemmed from the desire to proceed with the trial in a timely fashion. But it made more imperative the judge’s need to manage the trial with special sensitivity to the risks involved. Unfortunately, Mr. Holloway’s instincts were correct; for doing no more than vigorously representing his client’s interests in the face of an ambiguous ruling from the court, he was summarily convicted of criminal contempt.
Notably, Mr. Holloway was also barred from appearing in Judge Johnson’s courtroom. This is no minor inconvenience. Mr. Holloway, an assistant public defender, is not some random attorney who wanders into our district court. His representations on behalf of indigent defendants take him daily into all the district courts. So for him, being held in criminal contempt and banished from Judge Johnson’s courtroom is a serious interference with his capacity to perform.
If this case was truly about the circumstances cited in the contempt conviction, rather than the resentment which had been brewing between the judge and Mr. Holloway since the previous trial, the drastic action of barring Mr. Holloway from the courtroom and holding him in contempt would be baffling. But as it stands, it is obvious from the record that Mr, Holloway was punished not for violating a court order to refrain from a certain line of questioning, but was punished instead for a dispute that occurred in a previous trial. This use of the summary contempt power is clearly abusive, and may have interfered with Mr. Rascoe’s right to receive a fundamentally fair trial from a fair and unbiased judge. See generally, Walberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1076 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013, 106 S.Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985). Certainly, Judge Johnson’s decision to proceed with Rascoe’s trial after holding Mr. Holloway in contempt is vulnerable to questions. After the contempt conviction, Judge Johnson’s impatience with all the defense attorneys, but particularly Mr. Holloway, is clear from the record. While Judge Johnson’s irritability may be understandable given this long and arduous trial, this Court should not excuse the unwarranted consequences of her indiscretion. Trial judges are human beings, and when they make mistakes their decisions should be reversed, even if we have sympathy for the strains of their occupation.
III.
Whether or not Mr. Holloway should have been held in contempt in the previous trial is an open question — and clearly not adjudica-ble in this Court on the record before us. Regardless, the circumstances in this case do not warrant a summary contempt conviction. At the very least, Judge Johnson should have utilized the “normal” procedure for adjudicating charges of criminal contempt under Rule 42(b) and afforded Mr. Holloway an opportunity to respond to the charge and explain his conduct. The fact that Mr. Holloway failed to receive even this minimal level of due process suggests that substantial resentment remained between the judge and Mr. Holloway from the previous trial, and that Mr. Holloway’s request to withdraw as counsel for Rascoe should have been granted.
With the benefit of hindsight and the luxury of cool reflection, it may be possible to divine Judge Johnson’s intent and decipher her instructions. One may even conclude that Mr. Holloway’s conduct was not exemplary. Still, Mr. Holloway was not even close to obstructing justice and his conduct was far from “exceptional.” See Harris, 382 U.S. at 164, 86 S.Ct. at 354 (summary contempt power should be reserved for “exceptional” cir*1103cumstances). Lawyers, in the heat of a criminal trial, are not always as perceptive and sensitive to the boundaries of examination set by the trial judge as we would want them to be. Hopefully, they are educable and may mature in their perceptions and judgment. The lesson that we are teaching this young lawyer, however, is to quell his zeal in favor of placating an irritated judge. That is not a good result for the criminal justice system— nor a lesson worthy of our court’s traditions.