Diallo v. Holder

11-926 BIA Diallo v. Holder A098 361 270 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 28th day of June, two thousand thirteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 9 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 10 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 11 Circuit Judges. 12 ______________________________________ 13 14 THIERNO DIALLO, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 11-926 18 NAC 19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _______________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Theodore Vialet, New York, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney 27 General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant 28 Director; Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial 29 Attorney, Office of Immigration 30 Litigation, United States Department 31 of Justice, Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Thierno Diallo, a native and citizen of Guinea, seeks 6 review of a February 22, 2011, decision of the BIA denying 7 his motion to reopen. In re Thierno Diallo, No. A098 361 8 270 (B.I.A. Feb. 22, 2011). We assume the parties’ 9 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 10 of this case. 11 We review the BIA’s denial of Diallo’s motion to reopen 12 for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 13 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). A motion to reopen proceedings 14 “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which 15 the final administrative decision was rendered,” unless the 16 movant provides previously unavailable material evidence. 17 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (2). Where, as here, the motion to 18 reopen is untimely, failure to offer such evidence is a 19 proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, 20 as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case 21 for the underlying substantive relief sought. See INS v. 22 Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988). 2 1 We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 2 finding that Diallo failed to establish his prima facie 3 eligibility for relief based on his fear that the Guinean 4 military regime was actively pursuing him or would harm him 5 on account of his political activities in the United States. 6 See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-105. In support of his motion, 7 Diallo submitted letters from his brother and friend 8 describing the Guinean military’s suppression of peace 9 demonstrators at a 2009 peace rally, and warning Diallo that 10 his life would be in danger if he returned to Guinea. The 11 BIA, however, reasonably afforded little weight to this 12 evidence because, as the BIA found, the letters were 13 “unauthenticated” and possessed “little indicia of 14 reliability,” particularly in light of Diallo’s underlying 15 adverse credibility determination. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. 16 Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding 17 that the weight afforded to the applicant's evidence in 18 immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion 19 of the agency); see also Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 20 143, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2007) (relying on the doctrine of 21 falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus to conclude that the agency 22 may decline to credit documentary evidence submitted with a 23 motion to reopen by an alien who was found not credible in 24 the underlying proceedings). Moreover, although Diallo 3 1 submitted evidence in an attempt to demonstrate changed 2 country conditions, the BIA reasonably determined that any 3 potential future harm that Diallo may suffer in Guinea as a 4 result of civil strife and societal violence did not 5 constitute a valid basis for asylum, as the harm would not 6 be on account of a protected ground. See Melgar de Torres 7 v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that 8 “persecution must be on account of an enumerated ground set 9 forth in the Act, and general crime conditions are not a 10 stated ground”). Thus, we need not decide whether Diallo 11 established materially changed country conditions excusing 12 the time limitation applicable to his motion to reopen. 13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 14 DENIED. 15 FOR THE COURT: 16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4