dissenting.
I.
Appellant Moore indeed has presented a version of the facts different from that of the defendant prison guards, and Moore has sworn to those facts. However, given modern summary judgment practice, parties’ inconsistent accounts of an event may not warrant a trial. While in this ease we must accord Moore, as a pro se litigant, leeway in prosecuting his case, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980), his status does not exempt him from the requirements that he properly plead his case, make out an actionable cause, and show that if he proved all he claims, he would prevail at trial. Since I think that Moore has not shown that a genuine issue of material fact remains, I believe the majority errs in permitting this matter to proceed to trial.
II.
In reviewing a summary judgment disposition, the Court of Appeals must determine whether the party opposing the motion has put forth evidence which, if produced at trial, would withstand the movant’s motion for a directed verdict. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The movant must initially show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Street, 886 F.2d at 1479 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553). A material fact is one which might affect the outcome of the suit. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. However, the court must determine whether the evidence before it on a motion for summary judgment “presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Street, 886 F.2d at 1479 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512). Bare allegations by the non-moving party will not alone suffice; they must be supported by sufficient evidence such that “reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 581-82 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512).
As the majority recognizes, this lawsuit becomes an entirely different proposition if the guards harmed Moore outside the context of a prison riot or disturbance. Hudson v. McMillian, — U.S. -, ---, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998-99, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). According to the majority,
Moore states that the prison disturbance occurred on April 26, 1990. The following day, April 27th, he was assaulted by the defendants. In contrast, defendants claim that the disturbance was in progress on April 27th and as a result, Moore was being removed from the area.... According to Moore, the disturbance had ceased the day before the assault.
Op. at 700. I do not believe that the record supports this summary of Moore’s factual contentions, particularly with regard to the last sentence, which, if true, would radically alter the applicable legal standards for Moore’s alleged mistreatment.
In filling out the form by which he filed his initial complaint, Moore simply described being taken .from his cell and beaten repeatedly on the morning of the 27th, without mentioning whether any prison disturbance had happened or was ongoing at the time. Complaint filed Jan. 23, 1991 at 2. In the affidavit1 attached to his “Motion to Stay in *703Court” filed September 26,1991, Moore stated:
On April 26, 1990, their [sic] was a major disturbance in J-3 Cell Blaosk [sic] which started about 9:00 P.M. that night which Plaintiff had nothing to do with. On April 27, 1990, about 6:30 A.M. Officer Troy Holbrook came down the Range disrespecting inmates.
According to the affidavit, Holbrook and Moore exchanged words, whereupon Hol-brook left and came back shortly thereafter with other guards, handcuffed Moore, extracted him from his cell and beat him, as alleged in the complaint. Even as I read this detailed affidavit generously, I cannot derive from it the allegation that the disturbance had ended by the time Holbrook showed up. Plaintiff merely denies being involved in the disturbance, which he says started at 9:00 p.m. the previous night.
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the disturbance was ongoing at the time of the alleged beatings, and that Moore helped instigate the disturbance. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment filed August 28, 1991 at 8. Extensive prison records of the incident which defendants appended to their motion consistently note that while trouble on the cell block started on the night of the 26th, the disturbance was ongoing, and indeed had become more serious, on the morning of January 27. Statements of prison employees present at the time consistently reported that the inmates had flooded the cell block range with water, requiring the prison staff to turn off the main water supply to the area, and that fires had been set and objects thrown.
Even if one denigrates the prison guards’ after-the-fact reports as somehow self-serving,2 the “staff visits” log, compiled contemporaneously with the events, provides a reliable source of evidence. Notations on that log indicate that by 9:17 p.m. on January 26, “all [the] ranges in [the] J3 [cellblock] were flooded” and the water was shut off. Joint Appendix at 62. Moore’s transfer is noted as occurring the following day at 8:00 a.m. Id. From 8:27 a.m. through 9:03 a.m., a series of fires were set which had to be extinguished. Id. at 63. Records also indicate that “disruptive behavior started again” at lunch that day. Report filed by Paul Blair, Unit Manager at 2, Joint Appendix at 59.
As I have noted, the question as to when the disturbance ended is a material issue, since its resolution would “affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In my estimation, however, the dispute is not “genuine”; the evidence is not “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” that is, for Moore. Id. The facts before us are “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law,” that is, Holbrook and the other defendants. Id. In reaching this conclusion, I do not advocate “trial on affidavits,” nor do I think I have usurped the factfinder’s province by engaging in “credibility determinations,” “weighing of the evidence,” or “drawing ... legitimate inferences from the facts.” Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. I have taken Moore at his word, but I do not think that he has alleged that the riot had ended by the time Holbrook came to take him out of his cell, nor do I believe that one can derive that factual allegation by drawing “justifiable inferences” in Moore’s favor from his affidavits. Id. This court has stated that “bare allegations” by the non-moving party will not suffice to avoid summary judgment, Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 581-82 (6th *704Cir.1992). Despite its being a material element to his claim, Moore has not even made the “bare allegation” that the riot had ended by the morning of the 27th.
III.
Only “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on an inmate by prison guards constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). When a prison riot breaks out which “poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff,” id. at 320, 106 S.Ct. at 1085, “the question whether the measure[s] taken inflicted unnecessary pain and suffering ultimately turns on ‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,’” id. at 320-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973)); see also Hudson v. McMillian, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 995, 998, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Prison officials’ actions in a riot situation are “accorded wide-ranging deference” in deciding how to restore and maintain order. Id. 475 U.S. at 321-22, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). In the context of summary judgment, “unless it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain under the standard we have described, the case should not go to the jury.” Id., 475 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 1085.3
Moore alleges that he had nothing to do with the riot, and that the guards grabbed and beat him for no reason. Defendants say that Moore helped instigate the riot, and that any injury he sustained occurred'when, as the guards were escorting him up a flight of stairs, he fell on top of Holbrook, who also claims to have sustained injuries as a result of the fall. First, any participation Moore may have had in the riot is irrelevant as he describes the facts of the alleged beating. As the Court noted in Whitley, the “safety of inmates and prison staff’ are of central concern during a prison riot. Prison records show that a total of ten prisoners were moved as a direct consequence of the riot, two when the range was flooded on the night of the 26th, and eight more, including Moore, at or around the time when prisoners began setting fires in the cellblock. Joint Appendix at 59-60 (Blair Report), 62-65 (Staff visit logs). Force had to be used to remove some of the prisoners from their cells, see, e.g., Report of C/O Kelly, describing removal of Inmate Allen, Joint Appendix at 52, although the parties do not dispute that Moore willingly permitted the guards to put him in handcuffs before he exited his cell. Whether or not Moore instigated or participated in the disturbance, for his own safety he, and several other inmates, had to be moved to a different area of the prison until the riot was quelled. This fact indicates that any alleged use of force required to move the prisoners occurred in good faith and for the legitimate purpose of clearing the cell block. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 1085. The circumstances of the alleged beating, then, detract from any “reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.”
The record also shows that Moore’s injuries were not serious, consisting of an edema (swelling) on the left forehead, pain in the right shoulder and beneath both arms, pain in the groin area, and slight cuts on the. wrists. Medical report, Joint Appendix at 74. As the majority correctly notes, the infliction of pain, not the infliction of injury, gives rise to a constitutional violation. However, “the absence of serious injury is ... relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry.” Hudson, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 999. While not dispositive of the issue, de minim-is injuries suggest de minimis use of force by defendants. Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1000. Looking at “the need for the application of force, the relationship between the *705need and the amount of force that was used, and the extent of injury inflicted,” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085, the facts as set out by Moore, to the extent they are backed up by any evidence, do not “support a rehable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain,” id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 1085. As with the other essential element of his case, the evidence supporting Moore’s allegation that defendants acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” Hudson, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 996, is too thin, in my opinion, to withstand summary judgment under the standards described above.
IV.
Prisoners’ pro se civil rights actions for injuries and deprivations suffered while incarcerated make up a substantial portion of already logjammed District Court dockets, and take a considerable bite out of this court’s time and energy. Time and again the inferior courts have been assured that giving every benefit of the doubt to plaintiffs and permitting cases of questionable merit to proceed to trial “does not open the floodgates for filings by prison inmates.” Hudson, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1003 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But for each case where a sadistic prison guard has maliciously battered a helpless inmate, we seem to have a dozen cases alleging bad food or complaining of restrictions on receiving subscriptions to dirty magazines. Unfortunately, the plight of truly aggrieved pro se plaintiffs is often aggravated by near illiteracy, making it hard to distinguish merit from frivolity.
Nonetheless, parties proceeding pro se are not exempted or excused from the Federal Rules governing pleading, dismissal for failure to state claims, and summary judgment. These Rules permit the District Courts to screen out cases which, if tried to a jury, would almost inevitably see one party prevail. Implicit in the Rules, and in current summary judgment standards, is the presumption that the cream generally rises to the top. Judges being human, they will sometimes err in making these assessments, which is why this court exists. But as Judge Nelson has opined in voting to dispose of a case of similar merit to Moore’s, “a full-scale trial in a ease as lopsided as this one would probably be a misallocation of judicial resources.” Canitia v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1068 (6th Cir.1990) (concurring opinion).
What the District Court had before it was Moore’s word that he was beaten for no reason after being taken out of his cell for no reason, and extensive prison records detailing a serious and dangerous ongoing disturbance, and describing Moore’s assaulting Holbrook when he and other guards attempted to move Moore and several other prisoners out of their cells. While I have noted, and cleaved to, the tradition of reviewing pro se cases leniently, I also observe that this is not a Clarence Gideon situation where a simply worded handwritten plea for judicial intervention has found its way to the bar of this court. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Moore’s pro se status did not hinder him from filing timely pleadings, affidavits, and responses to both defendants’ motions and the District Court’s and the Magistrate Judge’s orders, including two motions for summary judgment, two motions for appointment of counsel, a motion to strike defendants’ motion to extend time to answer, a motion to amend his complaint, a motion to extend time to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and numerous other motions and affidavits. What Moore did not submit, however, is even one eyewitness affidavit or other facially reliable evidence to corroborate his version of the facts. Even if we were to excuse Moore’s shortcomings in making actionable allegations as described earlier, the bottom line is that summary judgment will be granted to defendants where plaintiff has not at least indicated that he could present enough evidence at trial to allow him to prevail. Moore has not done so, in my estimation.
I have one final concern. Defendants submitted to the District Court page after page of prison records, including documents made contemporaneously to the events in question such as staff logs and the medical records of the guards, the plaintiff, and the other prisoners involved, all of which tell an entirely different story from plaintiffs. To discount *706the overwhelming evidentiary weight of these records, as I think the majority does, is to assume that at trial, Moore could prove something he has not even alleged: that the prison authorities have engaged in a comprehensive cover-up, including post facto alteration of prison documents and records, solely to support defendants’ version of the events. I decline to join in that implicit assumption; all I see before us, as I think all Judge Weber saw before him, is a fatally “lopsided” case. Mr. Moore shall have his day in court, but I have no doubt it will not be a fruitful one.
I respectfully dissent.
. In filing his "Motion to Stay in Court” and his cross-motion for summary judgment, Moore in-eluded affidavits which testified generally to the veracity of statements and memoranda he at*703tached to the motions. Joint Appendix at 128, 138. As to the first affidavit, it does not appear that the document actually was notarized, although the one attached to Moore’s cross-motion for summary judgment appears to be properly notarized. Defendants made no objection to any defect in Moore’s affidavits, so as with Moore’s belated objections to documents submitted by defendants, any such objection is waived.
. I also recognize that some of these documents, if produced at trial, might be objectionable as hearsay outside any recognized exception. Evidence inadmissible at trial may not be considered for purposes of summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press International, 412 F.2d 126, 133 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 480, 24 L.Ed.2d 453 (1969). In any case, as with Moore’s complaint on appeal that the defendants' documents were not authenticated, any such objection has been waived at this point.
. While Whitley reviewed an appeal of the District Court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of defendant prison officials, the same standard applies in the context of summary judgment. See Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989), as cited in Section II of this opinion.