OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.In this matter, a juvenile found guilty of negligent homicide following a traffic accident appeals the Territorial Court's imposition of a $500 fine on the grounds that it was not authorized by statute, and if it was, then its imposition violated the constitutional prohibition against post facto laws. Ruling the fine was a "foreseeable" construction of the Virgin Islands juvenile statute, 5 V.I.C. §§ 2501-54 (1983), the Appellate Division affirmed the Territorial Court's judgment. We will reverse.
I.
While driving his car, D.W. struck and killed a jogger running on the road. Although D.W. claims he did not see the victim until the moment of impact, the incident did not occur in an area with obstructed vision.
The government brought juvenile proceedings against D.W., charging him with negligent homicide (20 V.I.C. § 504) and negligent driving (20 V.I.C. § 503). At the adjudicatory hearing, D.W. admitted guilt on the negligent homicide and the government dropped the negligent driving charge.1 The judge held a disposition hearing, at which he announced his intent to impose a fine, among other sanctions, and requested briefs on this issue. The government declined to file a brief but stated it was aware of no other juvenile case in which a fine had been imposed. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the judge placed D.W. on probation in the custody of his mother until his 19th birthday, ordered him to perform 500 hours of community service during his probation, and fined him $500.
*299D.W. appealed the fine to the Appellate Division, contending that the Virgin Islands juvenile statute does not authorize fines and that because no prior case had imposed a fine, its imposition would violate ex post facto protections. The Appellate Division rejected this contention, and D.W. appealed.2
A.
It is widely accepted that fines are creatures of statute. Thus, "the State, by any statute fixing a penalty of a fine, has declared its penological interest . . . satisfied by a monetary payment." Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 264 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result). Not only must a fine be authorized by statute, but the amount of the fine must be statutorily capped. "The discretion of the judge in choosing among sentencing alternatives will be controlled by statute." Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 29 (1984).
B.
To determine whether the fine imposed on D.W. was authorized by the Virgin Islands juvenile statute, we look to the language and structure of that statute. Nowhere does the statute specifically authorize the imposition of a fine. Ruling the statute authorizes a fine, the Appellate Division relied on language in the statute's initial section, entitled "A Children's Policy For The Territory." 5 V.I.C. § 2501. Section 2501(c) provides:
The policy for children who commit delinquent acts is a balance between treatment and sanctions. Emphasis is placed upon public safety and deterrence. Children should become aware through the imposition of sanctions that delinquent behavior will not be excused. Sanctions will be dispensed in a manner that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense."3
*300The Appellate Division found a fine authorized and foreseeable because this section is "broadly worded," and "puts juveniles on notice that sanctions designed to demonstrate that delinquent behavior will not be tolerated are the possible penalty for their acts." The Appellate Division also noted that "although the Family Court had never before imposed a fine on a juvenile, fines are a commonplace and ordinary sanction."
Section 2501 does not provide authority for imposition of a fine. Its mere reference to sanctions "appropriate to the seriousness of the offense" only authorizes the judge to choose among sanctions set forth in the statute (5 V.I.C. §§ 2521 & 2524), which do not include fines. Although we need not decide whether Section 2501 is void for vagueness, see United States v. Batchhelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (applying'vagueness doctrine to sentencing provision), it clearly fails to give notice that a fine is a possible punishment. Furthermore, the government's argument that the fine qualifies as a "sanction designed to demonstrate that delinquent behavior will not be tolerated" could be said of any sanction, whether or not authorized by statute.
C.
In any event, § 2501 is not the critical provision in determining whether the fine was authorized by statute. That question turns on whether a fine is included among the particular sanctions set forth in the statute. Authorization for specific sanctions is contained in 5 V.I.C. §§ 2521 and 2524. Section 2521(b), entitled "Disposition of delinquent child or person in need of supervision," provides that "a court may make any of the following dispositions:... permit the child to remain with his parents,... place the child on probation... with such conditions as described in § 2524,... [or] order such care and treatment as the court may deem best." Section 2524 authorizes sixteen types of conditions of probation, including community service.
Notably absent from both §§ 2521 and 2524 is any authorization of, or even reference to, a monetary fine as a permissible sanction. This is in sharp contrast to the other sanctions imposed by the trial judge upon D.W. — commitment to his mother's custody, § 2521(b)(1), placement on probation, § 2521(b)(2), and performance of 500 hours of community service, § 2524(b)(14). Because the statute does not include a fine among the disposition alternatives, *301we hold that the statute did not authorize the Territorial Court to impose a fine on D.W.4
A fine is not, as the dissent suggests, an "other lawful condition" of probation with which the court can order D.W. to comply under § 2524(b)(16). The text of § 2524 forecloses this interpretation. Section 2524(b)(16) authorizes the court to require the juvenile to "comply with such other lawful conditions as may be ordered by the court, including refraining from the use of controlled substances and alcohol." The illustrations in the latter clause are different in kind from a fine. Like other specified conditions of probation in § 2524, for example, "work or pursue a course of study," § 2524(b)(3), or "undergo medical or psychiatric treatment," § 2524(b)(4), the illustrations in § 2524(b)(16) are direct and ongoing regulations on conduct. Accordingly, we believe the phrase "other lawful condition" refers to analogous conduct regulations, such as a curfew. A fine is neither an ongoing sanction nor a direct regulation on conduct linked to probation.5
To read the words "other lawful condition" to authorize a fine— as neither the government nor the Appellate Division, nor any other court in the Virgin Islands has done6 — would violate "two policies that have long been part of our tradition, . . . fair warning ... in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed, ... [and the principle that] because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts *302should define criminal activity." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)7
D.
Our examination of analogous statutory schemes confirms our conclusion. More than half of all state juvenile justice statutes, including all states within this Circuit, expressly authorize their juvenile courts to impose fines in juvenile dispositions. E.g., 10 Del. C. § 937 (1987), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6352 (1978), N.J. Stat. § 2A:4A-43 (1983). The penalties of nearly all crimes in the Virgin Islands Criminal Code permit a fine and cap the amount. See 14 V.I.C. §§ 156-3031.8 The Virgin Islands juvenile statute contains no such express provision for imposing a fine. That the Virgin Islands Criminal Code expressly authorizes fines demonstrates that the legislature knows how to do so.9 We see no impediment to the Virgin Islands legislature amending its juvenile justice statute to add fines as a permissible sanction.
Even if the statute could be construed to authorize a fine, we believe it would violate ex post facto principles to impose a fine *303here. The Ex Post Facto clause not only bars legislatures from retroactive creation of criminal liability but also proscribes "an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively." Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964).10 Finding a judicial construction of New Jersey's juvenile jurisdiction unforeseeable in Helton v. Fauver 930 F.2d 1040, 1045 (3d Cir. 1991), we held "that the Bouie principle applies equally to after-the-fact increases in the degree of punishment." Furthermore, "the ex post facto clause applies not only to sentence length, but to any punishment, [including] a monetary payment [or] a fine." Sheppard v. State of Louisiana Board of Parole, 873 F.2d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1989).11 Because the Virgin Islands juvenile statute nowhere mentions fines, and because no prior Virgin Islands court had imposed a fine on a juvenile, imposition of a fine here was an "unforeseeable judicial enlargement" of the statute violating post facto principles.
Nor are we persuaded by the government's argument that because juvenile proceedings serve a rehabilitative rather than a punitive function, any increase in punishment is outside the purview of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected a similar contention in Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-92130, 139 Ariz. 170, 677 P.2d 943 (Ariz. App. 1984). In Maricopa, the juvenile court retroactively applied an amendment which expanded the disposition alternatives within the statute. In reversing this judgment, the court stated "it is simply too late in the day to conclude that dispositions for delinquent children, which include incarceration, fines, and restitution, are not to be considered criminal sanctions for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause." Maricopa, 677 P. 2d at 946. We agree. Accordingly, even were we to conclude the Virgin Islands juvenile justice statute authorized a fine, application of a fine in this case would violate ex post facto principles.
*304IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand with instructions to vacate that portion of the court's judgment imposing a fine.
In the Virgin Islands, delinquent minors are "tried" in an adjudicatory hearing and "sentenced" in a disposition hearing. "An order of disposition or other adjudication in proceedings under this subchapter shall not be deemed a conviction of crime or impose any civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from conviction or operate to disqualify the child in any civil services application or appointment." 20 V.I.C. § 2520(a).
The Appellate Division had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1613(a) and 4 V.I.C. § 33. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the court's construction of the Virgin Islands juvenile statute, and its application of the ex post facto prohibition, which are questions of law. Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1992).
The statute puts these words within quotation marks, but does not indicate the source of the quotation.
That the fine imposed by the Territorial Court here was only $500 does not alter our conclusion. Under the logic of the Appellate Division's analysis, the court could have imposed a fine of any amount. By contrast, we note that must of the states providing fines for juveniles cap the amount of the fine. E.g., Wis. Stat. § 43.34 (1992).
The inclusion of restitution among the conditions does not alter our conclusion. The statute contemplates restitution can he an ongoing sanction, providing it can be made "In periodic payments." § 2524(b)(13). Additionally, restitution is reserved exclusively for "malicious or destructive acts," and, because it is compensatory and not punitive, is not analogous to a line. Inclusion of restitution also indicates that where the legislature intended monetary payments to serve as conditions, it did so expressly. We note also that the Territorial Court ruled restitution was an inappropriate remedy here.
We cannot determine the Family Division's view on the matter because it offered no reasons or statutory basis for its imposition of a fine.
The dissent's reliance on Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542 (1978), is misplaced. There, the Court upheld imposition of a fine as a condition of a juvenile's probation under the federal Youth Corrections Act. Concluding the Act authorized such a condition, the Court relied on legislative history which "clearly revealjed] Congress intended ... to preserve to sentencing judges their powers under the general probation statute when sentencing youth offenders to probation," 434 U.S. at 551, powers that expressly included imposition of a fine as a condition of probation, id. at 549. No similar evidence of statutory authority supports imposition of a fine here.
Had D.W. been charged as an adult with negligent homicide (20 V.I.C. §§ 503 & 504) and reckless driving (20 V.I.C. § 544), he would have been subject to a fine.
Because we hold the statute does not authorize a fine, this case differs from our decision in Helton v. Fauver, 930, F.2d 1040 (3d Cir. 1991), upon which both parties and the Appellate Division relied. There, we considered the distinct question of whether the New Jersey Supreme Court's concededly authoritative construction of its juvenile jurisdiction statute was unforeseeable and therefore ex post facto if retroactively applied in that case. Where, as here, we sit as the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, Polius v. Clark Equipment Co., 802 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir. 1986), we need not rely, as we did in Helton, on ex post facto principles, but rather hold that the Virgin Islands juvenile statute does not authorize imposition of a fine.
The Ex Post Facto clause, found in Article I § 10 of the United States Constitution, binds the Virgin Islands Legislature. Government of Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court has recently held the Ex Post Facto Clause is concerned with "anything to do with the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 51 (1990).