concurring in part and dissenting in part,
in which KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, joins.Today’s decision counsels trial judges not to tell jurors the truth about the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict — apparently on the theory that jurors should not be concerned about the con sequences. As a matter of fact, however, jurors are concerned about the consequences. The majority opinion will simply perpetuate jurors’ uncertainty about this relatively new type of verdict in the federal system. Jurors will know that a conviction probably will send a dangerous defendant to prison. They will not know that an acquittal only by reason of insanity would lead to the defendant’s confinement and treatment in a mental institution until the defendant is no longer a danger to others. Thus, fears about the possible release of a dangerous defendant can only prompt jurors to find the defendant guilty. I respectfully dissent.1
I. BACKGROUND
A close look at the facts of the present cases shows how the rule adopted by the *1581majority can skew the chances of a defendant who relies on an insanity defense.
William James Thigpen purchased three semi-automatic pistols from various firearms dealers in January 1990. In order to buy the firearms, Thigpen had to falsify three separate Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms applications by indicating that he had never been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Soon after purchasing the guns, Thig-pen was taken from his home, an adult congregate living facility for the mentally disturbed, to a nearby medical center. Upon arriving, he told the intake nurse that he was hearing voices that were telling him that people were trying to hurt him. He also told the nurse that he had not taken his required anti-psychotic medication for the past three months. It was later discovered that Thig-pen had brought one of the three illegally obtained guns with him to the medical center.
In September 1990, Thigpen was charged in a six-count indictment with federal firearms violations. Counts I, III and V charged him with making false statements concerning his criminal background when purchasing the three pistols, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(1). Counts II, IV and VI charged Thigpen with illegally possessing the three pistols after conviction of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Thigpen stipulated that he committed the acts giving rise to the charges against him, but he asserted an insanity defense. The sole issue for the jury was whether Thigpen was insane at the time of the offenses. Thus, jurors had only two viable verdicts to choose from: They either had to find Thigpen guilty, which they knew would subject him to possible incarceration, or they could find him innocent by reason of insanity, which they may or may not have known would subject him to commitment to a mental health facility.
Two psychiatrists testified in the case. Dr. Mohamed O. Saleh was called by Thig-pen and Dr. Ernest Carl Miller was called by the Government. Each expressed the opinion that Thigpen was suffering from a schizophrenic disorder. Additionally, the testimony of each of these experts suggested that Thigpen’s mental illness presented the risk of injury to others.
The jury also heard testimony that eleven other psychiatrists had diagnosed Thigpen as suffering from schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type. Thigpen resided at an adult congregate living facility, receiving social security disability benefits due to schizophrenia and mental retardation. In addition, on cross-examination the prosecutor brought out that Thigpen was currently loose, “out in the world, amongst society.” (R.2 at 110.) The prosecutor followed this remark by commenting that when Thigpen is “released from the hospital, he’s on society.” (R.2 at 111.)
Prior to trial, Thigpen had requested a jury instruction explaining the consequences of a verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity as set out by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984. He offered to modify the instruction in any way suggested by the court. The court denied the request.
The jury found Thigpen guilty on all six counts. After the jury returned its verdict, the court determined that Thigpen was presently suffering from a mental disease or defect (specifically, chronic schizophrenia, undifferentiated type) and in need of care and treatment in a suitable facility pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244. Thigpen was then sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General to be confined' in a suitable facility for care and treatment for a period of time not to exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the offenses.
Insanity also was the only defense argued by Herman Campbell Barnett, Jr. Barnett had retired from the U.S. Army after twenty years of service that included three combat tours in Vietnam. Married and the father of two children, Barnett worked as a convenience store manager. He unsuccessfully attempted to buy his own convenience store in early 1989. The transaction fell through after a bank refused to extend credit to Barnett. Shortly thereafter Barnett embarked on a year-long series of armed bank robberies, during which he stole a total of almost $197,000. He was forty-four years old when *1582the robberies began; he had no prior criminal record.
Barnett confessed to the robberies upon his arrest. At his trial, he called as an expert witness a psychologist, Dr. Martin Youngleson, who testified that combat duty in Vietnam had left Barnett with a chronic and severe post-traumatic stress disorder. In the psychologist’s opinion, Barnett was suffering from the disorder at the time he robbed the banks. Testimony by Youngleson and other defense witnesses included graphic details of some of Barnett’s combat experiences. The Government countered Youngle-son’s diagnosis with testimony from a psychiatrist, Dr. Dave McCallister Davis. Davis testified that, in his opinion, Barnett did not suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder or any other psychiatric disorder.
Barnett asked the court to instruct jurors that if they found him not guilty by reason of insanity, he would be committed to a medical facility until he could prove that his release would not endanger others. The court refused to give the requested instruction, but told jurors that they were not to be concerned with the consequences of their verdict.
The jury found Barnett guilty on four counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and one count charging him with use of a firearm while committing a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The court sentenced Barnett to concurrent terms of ninety-eight months imprisonment on each robbery count, plus a consecutive term of sixty months imprisonment on the firearm count. Barnett was ordered to make restitution to the banks he had robbed. The court also recommended that Barnett receive a psychiatric evaluation and any appropriate psychiatric care.
In summary, the insanity defense was the only reasonable argument available to either Barnett or Thigpen at their respective trials. Each defendant presented evidence, including expert testimony, to support his defense. Jurors, however, were not told — and could not have been expected to know — that a successful insanity defense would lead to the defendant’s commitment and treatment. The jurors did know that a verdict of guilty could lead to the defendant’s imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
Confusion among jurors over the current insanity defense should be expected. The defense has evolved greatly in recent years. Prior to 1984, a defendant who was acquitted by reason of insanity in a federal court was simply released.2 This unfortunate situation was partially alleviated by the states, which would frequently institute state civil commitment proceedings against those federal defendants released pursuant to an insanity verdict. See United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 416-17 (5th Cir.1974).3
In 1984 Congress passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act (the “Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247. The Act expressly provides for a special verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity. In addition, because the claim of insanity is now considered an affirmative defense, the defendant is required to prove insanity by offering clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, and most significant, a defendant who is acquitted only by reason of insanity is now committed to a suitable facility for care and treatment unless and until the court finds that his release will not create “a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage of property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d).
Given the sweeping changes brought about by the Act in federal insanity jurisprudence, one can fairly presume that although some lawyers might be familiar with the consequences of an insanity verdict, the average juror is not so informed.
“The lack of a common understanding of the meaning of [an insanity verdict] cannot be attributed solely to limited legal education *1583of the public in general and jurors in particular, since the legal meaning of the [insanity verdict] in fact varies not only from state to state, but from state to federal practice.” McCracken, 488 F.2d at 421.
The likelihood of jury confusion led the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to mandate a jury instruction explaining the consequences of an insanity verdict pursuant to the statutory scheme governing the District of Columbia. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C.Cir.1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct. 997, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1958), and cert. denied, 362 U.S. 943, 80 S.Ct. 809, 4 L.Ed.2d 771 (1960), and cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992, 82 S.Ct. 610, 7 L.Ed.2d 529 (1962). Commenting on juror confusion, the court noted that
[j]urors, in common with people in general, are aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not guilty means that the prisoner goes free and that a verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly understood meaning.
Id. at 728. The court went on to hold that “the jury has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts.” Id.
The old Fifth Circuit first wrestled with a similar instruction issue in Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507 (5th Cir.1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 941, 85 S.Ct. 1776, 14 L.Ed.2d 704 (1965). There, the defendant requested a jury instruction explaining that he would be committed to a mental hospital should the jury find him not guilty by reason of insanity. The district court denied the request. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the instruction was an incorrect statement of law (because this was a pre-Act case and there was no other statutory procedure for committing a defendant that was found not guilty by reason of insanity). With regard to the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Lyles, the Fifth Circuit simply held that Lyles’s reasoning was inapposite inasmuch as the D.C. Circuit had a law on the books at that time which provided for mandatory commitment. Id. at 509.
The Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.1974). McCracken involved a defendant who killed a medical doctor at a hospital where the defendant was then residing. At trial, his only defense was insanity. The district court instructed the jury that if found not guilty by reason of insanity, McCracken would be turned “a loose” and “immediately released.” Id. at 415. McCracken objected, arguing that such an instruction invited the jury to find him guilty in order to ensure his post-trial confinement, even if the jury believed he was insane.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Lyles was again inapposite to criminal proceedings in the Fifth Circuit since the Fifth Circuit did not have a comparable statute authorizing commitment to a suitable mental health facility. Because the jury instruction requested in Pope was an incorrect statement of the law, and the jury instruction in McCracken was in fact a correct statement of the law, the court in McCracken went on to decide that a jury instruction’s correctness is unimportant in light of “the principle that [holds] it is error to instruct the jury on punishment.” Id. at 425.
Because charging the jury on the correct state of the law in McCracken (defendant goes free) had absolutely no chance of leveling the playing field for the defendant (and in fact had the potential only to reinforce a juror’s inclination to lock up an insane but innocent defendant), the Fifth Circuit found that the principle of shielding the jury from the issue of punishment outweighed the goal of enlightening the jury on the true state of the law. See McCracken, 488 F.2d at 424 (concluding that such an instruction could only induce a guilty verdict). Conversely, in the present cases, the absence of the instruction severely impaired the ability of Barnett and Thigpen to present their insanity defenses. The promulgation of the Act and the resulting turn in the law has shifted the balance in favor of instructing the jury that a defendant found insane is subject to involuntary confinement at a mental illness facility.
*1584It is important to keep in mind that at the time McCracken was decided, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was neither mandated nor authorized by statute. McCracken was based on the absence of a statutory scheme for committal: “Given the lack of any comparable statute applicable to other federal courts, it is obvious that the instruction on the consequences of [an insanity verdict] used in the D.C. Circuit would be inapposite outside the District of Columbia.” McCracken, 488 F.2d at 422. And although the McCracken court also supported its holding by reasoning that the jury should not be made aware of possible punishments, it noted that the “crux of the problem with instructing a jury on punishment or disposition in a ease such as the 'one sub judice [is] that it might under some circumstances induce a guilty verdict.” Id. at 424. In the present case, no such problem exists. Instructing the jury on the consequences of an insanity verdict under these circumstances can only enhance the chances that a defendant, who was in faet insane at the time of his crime, will be found not guilty by reason of insanity.
We need not consider today whether an instruction on the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict would always be appropriate if requested. The rule that the majority adopts, however, precludes the instruction even where its absence clearly cripples the defendant’s insanity defense.4 Such an instruction is not only appropriate but necessary when jurors hear evidence indicating that a defendant would pose a danger to society if released. This was the dilemma that confronted both Barnett and Thigpen.
Barnett presents a portrait of a seriously disturbed combat veteran. He brandished handguns to force bank employees to give him money. Not disputing these violent acts, he built his entire defense around evidence of a severe post-traumatic stress disorder dating to his experience in Vietnam. In Thig-pen’s appeal we see an obviously dangerous defendant. He hears voices that people are trying to kill him. He hears other voices that tell him to kill people. He has been diagnosed with the same mental illness for the past ten years, yet the jury was told that despite his condition he remains out amongst society. These circumstances could only cause jurors to be even more confused and fearful of the consequences of an acquittal.
The jurors knew that if they returned guilty verdicts, Barnett and Thigpen would be punished; if they found the defendants not guilty, Barnett and Thigpen would go free. The only option about which the jurors remained in the dark was also the only practical goal of the two men’s defenses: not guilty by reason of insanity. Honoring the defendants’ requests to instruct the jury would have ensured that jurors understood “the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common, knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts.” Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728. Furthermore, the jurors would not have been instructed on “possible punishments”; rather, they would have been told that Barnett and Thigpen were subject to long-term involuntary commitment at a suitable facility for care and treatment. This general information is comparable to what jurors knew about the other possible verdicts.
The majority opinion suggests that Barnett’s and Thigpen’s arguments undermine the principle that jurors are presumed to follow the court’s instructions, citing the following instruction given the Thigpen jury:
[T]he question of punishment should never be considered by the jury in any way in deciding the case. If the Defendant is convicted the matter of punishment is for the Judge to determine.
This reasoning rests on the erroneous assumption that jurors returning a verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity would *1585think they had “convicted” a defendant. This instruction is clearly given for the benefit of the government — not the defendant. I fail to see how it helped Thigpen in any way. It told jurors that they should not be concerned about the consequences of a verdict of guilty, and that one of the consequences of such a verdict would be that the judge would decide what punishment was appropriate.
Also, notwithstanding language to the contrary in the majority opinion and in McCracken, telling jurors about the consequences of an acquittal on insanity grounds does not conflict with the principle that the question of punishment should be left to the court rather than the jury. Defendants who are found not guilty by reason of insanity are treated, not punished. Punishment awaits only those who are convicted.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress has now provided a procedure for dealing with defendants who are found not guilty by reason of insanity. They are subject to commitment at suitable facilities where their mental illness can be properly treated. This is the way it should be. Individuals who are found to have been insane at the time they committed crimes should not be held fully responsible for their actions.
“The wisdom, the justice, and the mercy reflected in [this] basic policy decision would be largely nullified if fears about mental illness are allowed to influence the decision on guilt or innocence.” McCracken, 488 F.2d at 427.
When a court denies a defendant’s request for an instruction, we review the decision to determine whether the denial seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to present his defense. Given the facts of these cases, the courts’ failure to charge the juries on the consequences of an insanity verdict had the effect of impairing the defendants’ ability to assert their only feasible defenses.
The majority opinion forces an old rule of law onto a new type of verdict. The present eases illustrate how poor the fit is.
. I concur in the majority’s disposition of the issues on these appeals except for the jury instruction issues.
. Criminal cases arising in the District of Columbia were the exception. Federal courts there had a statutory scheme in place prior to 1984 that provided for commitment after an acquittal by reason of insanity.
. In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
. The majority opinion permits courts to discuss "the actual ramifications” of an insanity verdict only if jurors have heard inadmissible evidence or improper questions or statements by prosecutors. That is, the majority believes that jurors should be given accurate information about an insanity verdict once their "attention has been improperly drawn to the consequences” of their verdict. My difference with the majority is with its unfounded assumption that jurors do not concern themselves with the results of their verdict unless a prosecutor first mentions the consequences.