concurring:
In their request for bail pending appeal, Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell have shown only ordinary reasons relating to flight risk, danger to the community and issues on appeal; they have not in addition shown, as the Mandatory Detention Act requires, “exceptional reasons” which make detention in their case inappropriate. Congress has declared that all persons who are found guilty of crimes of violence must be detained — even though they individually pose no risk of flight or danger to the community and despite the fact that they may raise substantial issues on appeal — unless they clearly show “exceptional reasons” why detention is not appropriate. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(b)(2) and 3145(c). These two officers were convicted of a violent act, and neither has shown “exceptional reasons” why he should be treated differently from everyone else who has committed a crime of violence.
Whether “exceptional reasons” exist must be determined case-by-case. Because “exceptional” means more than ordinary, and there is nothing out of the ordinary about the reasons offered by Koon and Powell, this matter does not require us to decide what will comprise “exceptional reasons” in some other case. The trial judge’s decision denying bail in this case was within his discretion, complies with the bail statutes, and is consistent with the law of other circuits1 and our own.2 Our full court therefore properly decided not to rehear the matter en banc, and I write separately to explain why I concur.
The Koon and Powell motions for bail pending appeal raise two issues. The first is whether they were convicted of a “crime of violence” for purposes of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4). Assuming they were, and that they pose no risk of flight or danger and raise a substantial question on appeal, the second issue is whether they have clearly shown “exceptional reasons” why detention is not appropriate under the Mandatory Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(b)(2) and 3145(c).
On the first issue, the bail statutes distinguish between violent and non-violent offenders. A non-violent offender may be released pending appeal if he shows that he is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of *563anyone else or the community, and that the appeal raises a substantial question. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). A violent offender, on the other hand, may only be released when he meets those same conditions and if it is clearly shown there are exceptional reasons why detention would not be appropriate. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3143(b)(2),3 3145(c).4
The district court found that beating Rodney King was a crime of violence. I agree. This finding triggers the mandatory detention provision of § 3143(b)(2).
Next, the district court found that neither Koon nor Powell was likely to flee or pose a danger to the community, and that both appeals raise substantial questions. These findings satisfy the conditions for release of an ordinary, non-violent offender. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). Because these conditions are met, the threshold requirement for the exception to mandatory detention is also met. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).
The remaining question, therefore, is whether “it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why [Koon’s and Powell’s] detention would not be appropriate.” Id. The answer is no, because no facts or reasons have been adduced in this case which amount to anything more than the normal § 3143(b)(1) threshold requirements. The record suggests nothing clearly “out of the ordinary,” “uncommon” or “rare”5 about Koon and Powell which sets them apart from any one else convicted of a crime of violence, or of violating a suspect’s constitutional rights.
Koon6 and Powell advanced numerous reasons in their request for release which they argue qualify as “exceptional”: their offense was “highly situational” and their release poses no danger .to the community; there are unusual and weighty issues on appeal; they had been acquitted in state court; the victim’s conduct contributed to the offense; a lengthy sentence and detention will adversely affect police morale; Koon is involved in civil litigation; there will be difficulty in assuring safety while incarcerated; and the sentence is relatively short in comparison to the relatively long process for appeal.
None of these reasons is exceptional; each is an ordinary corollary of being a law enforcement officer convicted of violating another’s civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242. Any police officer convicted of a § 242 offense faces civil liability, a difficult time in prison, and unemployment; may have already been prosecuted by the state; has probably been the subject of adverse publicity; and his or her family will undoubtedly suffer hardship. Congress created no law enforcement official exception to mandatory detention. Therefore, unless we are willing to say that all § 242 defendants who are police officers are “exceptional,” there is no way these defendants meet the “exceptional reasons” standard.
The most arguably “exceptional reason” proffered by Koon and Powell, is that they may have served a substantial part of their relatively short sentence before the appeal is resolved. While the length of sentence compared with the length of appeal may well be “exceptional” in a particular case, there is no basis for finding any unusual delay in processing the Koon and Powell appeals. We have already issued an expedited briefing schedule requiring all briefs to be filed by mid-February.
*564Otherwise, Powell’s (and Koon’s) arguments for why their case is “exceptional” are typical arguments relating to flight, risk of violence, and the merits of an appeal. Though it’s true that the boundaries of “exceptional reasons” are undefined, “exceptional” necessarily means more than what the typical nonviolent offender must show to merit bail pending appeal — and in turn, what the violent offender must show as a prerequisite to release under the “exceptional reasons” exception to' mandatory detention.
•To be eligible for the “exceptional reasons” exception to mandatory detention, the defendant must have shown by clear and convincing evidence that he does not pose a danger to society or a risk of flight, and that the appeal raises a substantial question. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). Showing just these things cannot be “exceptional.”7 They are foundational. Otherwise, every violent offender would have as good a chance of getting bail on appeal as every nonviolent offender. This, of course, would be inconsistent with § 3143(b)(2), which mandates detention for persons found guilty of a violent crime. “Exceptional,” therefore, necessarily means more than what the typical nonviolent offender must show; and for there to be “exceptional reasons” in addition to meeting the conditions of release set forth in § 3143(b)(1), the violent offender has to show more than the fact that he or she is neither a danger to the community nor likely to flee. Thus, no matter how broadly “exceptional” is defined, there is no way that it could be contoured in keeping with the Congressional mandate so as to make the reasons advanced by Koon or Powell out of the ordinary for a police officer convicted of violating a person’s constitutional rights by an act of violence.
Nor is it necessary or helpful to use this case to construct a framework for deciding future cases. We are-not called upon here to decide whether reasons of health, or infirmity, might qualify as exceptional.8 Rather, as both the Second Circuit and the Seventh have said, the determination of whether “exceptional reasons” have been clearly shown is quintessentially a fact-intensive inquiry requiring case by case analysis. United States v. Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d 645, 647 (7th Cir.1992) (per curiam); United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1991).
For these reasons, “exceptional reasons” is not a question of exceptional importance for purposes of en banc rehearing.9 Fed. R.App.P. 35(a). No constitutional issue is raised. In any’ event, section 3143(b)(2) on its face reveals a congressional determination that it does not matter whether certain offenders — those who commit crimes of violence — can prove they will stay put and won’t bother anyone else while pursuing their appeals. Congress has said as to them, the nature of the underlying offense justifies imprisonment immediately upon conviction. This is a rational distinction. As it is constitutional for Congress to distinguish among defendants based on their (alleged) offenses before a trial commences, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-52, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101-04, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), it is constitutional for Congress to distinguish among defendants based on their (proved) offenses after the trial concludes.
Because the Congress has spoken clearly, there is no inter-circuit conflict, there is no intra-circuit conflict, “exceptional reasons” is a fact-intensive inquiry within the discretion of the district court, and the court’s discretion was fully informed and properly exer-*565eised in this case, I concur in the court’s decision not to rehear this matter en bane.
. Two other circuits have written on the subject. The Second Circuit held in United States v. DiSomma, 951 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.1991), that it was within the district court’s discretion to find exceptional reasons for release when the element of the crime called into question on appeal is the element of the bail statute that bars release. Under those circumstances, where the challenge had to do with sufficiency of the evidence on that element, the defendant will have been confined unjustly if he prevails on appeal, as prevailing on appeal may well result in dismissal of the indictment. In so holding, the court suggested that "an unusual legal or factual question can be sufficient” to meet the “exceptional reasons” test, or "a merely substantial question may be sufficient, in the presence of one or more remarkable and uncommon factors, to support a finding of exceptional reasons for the inappropriateness of detention." Id. at 497. However, the court did not define "exceptional reasons” or designate the factors to be considered because "a case by case evaluation is essential” and the district judge's discretion "is constrained only by the language of the statute.” Id.
In United States v. Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d 645 (7th Cir.1992) (per curiam), the district court had ordered release simply because Herrera-Soto had shown a substantial issue on appeal. The Seventh Circuit disagreed that merely meeting the threshold requirement suffices; rather, it found "nothing out of the ordinary” about the circumstances of the case. Id. at 647.
. In the analogous case of bail pending appeal from revocation of probation, we have said that "exceptional circumstances” include "(1) raising substantial claims upon which the appellant has a high probability of success; (2) a serious deterioration of health while incarcerated; and (3) any unusual delay in the processing of the appeal.” United States v. Bell, 820 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir.1987).
. Section 3143(b)(2) provides:
(2) The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found guilty of a [crime of violence] and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained.
. Section 3145(c) provides:
(c) Appeal from a release or detention order.— ... A person subject to detention pursuant to section 3143(a)(2) or (b)(2), and who meets the conditions of release set forth in section 3143(a)(1) or (b)(1), may be ordered released, under appropriate conditions, by the judicial officer, if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person’s detention would not be appropriate.
. "Exceptional” as defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary 791 (1986) (unabridged), quoted in United States v. DiSomma, 769 F.Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 951 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.1991).
. Koon makes no argument in his suggestion for rehearing en banc that there are "exceptional reasons" for bail.
. See Herrera-Soto, 961 F.2d at 647 (nothing out of the ordinary about raising a substantial issue on appeal).
. In suggesting that a safety valve from the mandatory detention provisions of § 3145 be enacted, Assistant Attorney General Crawford gave ill health and infirmity from age as examples which might make detention unduly harsh. 135 Cong. Rec. § 15202 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1989). Regardless, as the Second Circuit put it, the "full exercise of discretion in these matters ... certainly is not limited by the examples contained in the Justice Department letter. It is constrained only by the language of the statute: 'exceptional reasons.’ ” DiSomma, 951 F.2d at 497.
.While many appeals are from conviction for drug or other violent crimes, not many have to do with release under § 3145(c). In most such cases, the threshold requirements are not met and so the "exceptional reasons” inquiry is not triggered.