with whom CUDAHY and ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
The majority offers a thoughtful and well-reasoned discussion of retroactivity cases, and if these cases could resolve the issues in Gannett’s appeal I would join today’s decision without reservation. However, the inquiry before us begins with a statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which the majority has all but ignored.1 The narrow issue presented here is whether Congress intended an enactment governing damage calculus and burdens of proof in discrimination cases to apply in future civil rights trials. The broader issue is whether Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Service Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.1992), and Luddington v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.1992), were correctly decided. I agree that “Courts should not presume retroaction” ab*565sent clear evidence of Congress’ intent — but the Act’s language and structure show that Congress intended it to apply to Mojica’s trial. Therefore I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion on the narrow issue posed above. I have never questioned Mozee and Luddington as binding authority in this circuit. Mojica v. Gannett Co., 986 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir.1993) (Cummings, J., dissenting from the rehearing en banc). Since the majority treats Mojica as a referendum on those cases, however, it is appropriate to comment on an approach to the Act that those decisions may not have considered.
The genesis of today’s dispute is easier to explain than the Supreme Court’s decisions on retroactivity law — and hopefully that Court is poised to resolve the tension between Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 and Bowen v. Georgetown Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 471-72, 102 L.Ed.2d 493. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427, and Rivers v. Roadway Express, 973 F.2d 490, certiorari granted, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1250, 122 L.Ed.2d 649 (cases consolidated). The majority reads Mozee and Luddington to establish two propositions: first, that Congress expressed no intent about how the Act should apply to pending cases; and second, that the Act makes substantive changes in federal anti-discrimination laws that would be unfair to apply retroactively to conduct that occurred before the Act became law. In my view the Act (which after all is superior authority) points to a rather different conclusion in both areas.
True, the Act does not give perfect or complete instructions on the retroactivity issue, but this does not mean that the Act is silent on how it should apply to pending cases. The Act’s language and structure suggest that while Congress could not agree whether the Act would apply to cases pending on appeal, it surely intended the Act to apply to new civil rights trials such as this. Mozee and Luddington do not bar the Act from applying here because where congressional intent is clear it controls, and there is no need to presume that the Act is prospective. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 837, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1576-77, 108 L.Ed.2d 842. My conclusion that the Act applies on its face to pending trials also draws support from the Act’s focus on trial procedures, which typically take effect upon enactment without regard to the timing of underlying conduct.
The majority initially errs by forgetting that in Mojica’s case, the Act did not create a new cause of action for intentional discrimination. Harvis v. Roadway Express, 973 F.2d 490, 495 (6th Cir.1992), certiorari granted sub nom. Rivers v. Roadway Express, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1250, 122 L.Ed.2d 649 (“the elements of a cause of action under § 1981 are identical to those under Title VII”). Mojica charged that Gannett denied her a more remunerative disk jockey shift because she was an Hispanic woman — and since a jury believed her we may assume that Gannett intentionally discriminated against Mojica. Discriminatory “shift assignments” or “failures to promote” have been illegal for decades. Gannett’s conduct was illegal under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e until the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132. Between 1989 and 1991, Gannett’s conduct was illegal only under Title VII (§ 2000e). Since the 1991 Act became law, the conduct is once again also illegal under § 1981. The obvious point here is that the Act did not identify new conduct — the majority’s emphasis — as illegal. Gannett’s treatment of Mojica was unlawful before and after the Act was passed, and therefore holding Gannett liable would not make it “accountable for acts that did not violate statutory laws when they were performed” (Maj.Op. at 558). So when the majority asserts that “the time of the alleged discriminatory conduct [and not the time of trial] is the temporal event which controls the application of the law,” (Maj.Op. at 558), it is fair to wonder just where this idea comes from — for the Act does not say this, and Congress’ intent rather than our own imagination should control this case.
Turning then to the issue of Congress’ intent, much of the Act resurrects remedies and procedures that had been undone by a well-publicized series of Supreme Court deci*566sions in the late 1980s. Bluntly put, Congress passed the Act ,to overrule certain Supreme Court interpretations of civil rights law. The Act’s first page disapproves of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733, by name and states that the Act aims “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court * * 105 Stat. at 1071. The House Report on the Act provides an even more graphic description of the statute’s purpose. Its table of contents reads (section by section): “The Need to Overturn Wards Cove * * * The Need to Overturn Price Water-house * * * The Need to Overturn Martin v. Wilks * * * The Need to Overturn Lorance * * * The Need to Address Crawford Fittings * * * The Need to Address Zipes * * * The Need to Address Marek * * * The Need to Address Jeff D. * * * The Need to Overturn Patterson * * *.”2 H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 550-551. The Act works as a repudiation of Court decisions that had narrowed the scope of civil rights laws.
To say that Congress intended to overturn a group of cases may not tell us when, precisely, the overruling takes effect. But it tells us something. The act of overruling a case is not silent indifference as to whether that case is good law, nor is it tacit approval of the case’s authority over future litigants. Butts v. City of New York, 990 F.2d 1397, 1407 (2d Cir.1993) (“restorative language and intent [are] * * * one means of discerning congressional intent as to retroactivity”); Reynolds, 985 F.2d at 474^-475. The Act accompanies its reversal of Supreme Court decisions with language that applies on its face to trials without reference to conduct. Sections 102, 104 and 105, for example, detail procedures and remedies to be used in future civil rights trials. Section 3 states that the Act aims to “provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits.” Section 105(a) restores “the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of ‘alternative employment practice.’ ” (Wards Cove was decided on June 5, 1989). If these sections are to take effect upon the Act’s enactment, as Section 402 decrees, they should apply to new trials because they concern “guidelines for adjudication” and not conduct. All of this, I submit, is enough to reject the majority’s decision that Congress was silent on how the Act should apply to new trials. Therefore Mozee’s presumption that the Act is prospective cannot apply to Mojica’s post-Act trial. Mojica, 986 F.2d at 1162-1165 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
The harder question is whether Congress’ intent to overrule a group of cases signals that the Act should be applied retroactively to all pending cases, and not just to new trials — and hence whether Mozee and Lud-dington were wrongly decided. On the one hand, just as Congress did not say anything about conduct, neither did it say anything about retrying cases that had been decided under the pre-Act regime of procedures and remedies decreed by the Supreme Court. This is the weakness of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Reynolds, 985 F.2d at 473-474; just because Congress said that two of the Act’s provisions apply prospectively does not mean that Congress meant the rest of the Act to apply retroactively. Congress could as easily have meant that it would express no opinion on the rest of the Act. And “retroactive application across the board would produce massive dislocations in ongoing litigation,” Luddington, 966 F.2d at 229, whereas applying new procedures and remedies to new trials would produce no dislocations whatsoever.
On the other hand, this Court has recognized that “we have an obligation to give statutes their proper meaning rather than to *567perpetuate the effects of our own mistakes.” Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485, 491 (1989). This adage argues that Congress’ intent to overrule cases should apply retroactively to all cases pending when the Act became law. If Kinney’s admonition is taken seriously, we should explain why the ordinary meaning of “overturn” becomes subject to complex qualifications when the Act decrees that courts mistakenly interpreted civil rights law.3
When Congress overturns a recent court interpretation of a statute, this could raise a presumption that Congress intended its action to apply retroactively' — with the same effect as a reversal by a higher court. Other circuits applied this reasoning to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100-259 § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), which overruled Grove City v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516. Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 664-665 (11th Cir.1990); Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 754-755 (5th Cir.1990), vacated on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Fordice, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2727, 120 L.Ed.2d 575 (1992) (“Retroactive application of a statute is appropriate when Congress enacts a statute to clarify the Supreme Court’s interpretation of legislation thereby returning the law to its previous posture”). Such a presumption could be rebutted if the statute stated that it applied prospectively. Because most legislation does not aim to overturn court decisions, Mozee’s presumption that statutes apply prospectively would remain the general rule for all the persuasive reasons offered in that opinion. 963 F.2d at 936.
Surprisingly, perhaps, Luddington offers a theory to support the presumption proposed above. Luddington explains our general rule that statutes apply prospectively and court decisions apply retroactively as follows:
[Without these presumptions] litigants might lack adequate incentives to seek legal change through the courts and courts might feel too free to make such changes * * *. Moreover, the power of a court to disturb settled expectations is held in check by the judicial tradition of incremental change and by the limited control that judges exercise over taxing and spending. A legislature has awesome power unea-bined by a professional tradition of modesty and this power is held a little in check by the presumption that its handiwork is to be applied only to future conduct.
966 F.2d at 228. This is perfectly correct (except perhaps the remark about modesty) — but it is irrelevant when Congress overrules a court decision because such an enactment involves the same powers as those exercised by a court. When a new statute only changes the procedures and costs of litigation — as does the Act — the effect of retroactive application on parties’ incentives and settled expectations is the same as if a higher court had made the decision. The Act is not an exercise of Congress’ awesome power to tax and spend. If we can tolerate retroactive application of court decisions, we should be able to tolerate retroactive application of statutes that overrule those decisions as well.4
*568Presuming that congressional overrides are retroactive also avoids the somewhat unfair results of Mozee and Luddington noted by Judge Cudahy’s dissent in Mozee. 963 F.2d at 940-941. Patterson changed the law to deny relief for plaintiffs such as Mozee and Mojica who complained of conduct that violated § 1981 when it occurred.5 When these claimants were before us we ignored the time of conduct and applied Patterson retroactively. McKnight v. General Motors, 908 F.2d 104, 107 (1990). After Congress restored § 1981 to its pr e-Patterson position, however, we emphasized the time of conduct, applied a prospective presumption and denied relief again. Luddington, 966 F.2d at 228. Courts should avoid decisions that appear to create “heads I win, tails you lose” rules.
There are two sides to the fairness coin, of course, and the majority properly questions whether retroactive application of the Act is fair to Gannett. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016. Two retroactive changes are at issue here. First, the Act allowed a jury to hear Mojica’s Title VII claims. The majority protests that “[t]o allow a jury trial for a case governed substantively by the former Title VII is to ignore the equitable nature of that provision.” (Maj.Op. at 559). So what? Cases following Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, teach that juries are procedural. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 83 S.Ct. 609, 9 L.Ed.2d 691; Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988. The majority admits that procedural changes in the law apply to cases pending when the new procedure is enacted — which means that Mo-jica should get a jury because her case went to trial after the Act became law.
The other retroactive change at issue is whether Gannett should face liability for compensatory and punitive damages (under § 1981 or Title VII) as an alternative to equitable relief (under Title VII alone) as a result of its discrimination against Mojica. Compensatory damages and back pay are similar awards here because they both describe the money that Gannett must pay Mojica to make whole her loss. It is perfectly fair to label Gannett’s liability “compensatory damages” retroactively so long as the damages it may face are roughly comparable to its exposure under an equity regime. The majority’s mantra that employers “are entitled to an opportunity to readjust their level of care” in response to the risk of greater liability (Maj.Op. at 559), quoting Ludding-ton, 966 F.2d at 229, does not apply to compensatory damages, for it seems unlikely that such damages expose employers to greater risks than Title VII’s equitable remedies. The Act’s offer of compensatory damages and a jury option under Title VII is thus a procedural change that must apply to new trials — if not to cases pending on appeal— under the majority’s own analysis.6
Punitive damages present a more difficult issue. These aim to punish Gannett rather than to compensate Mojicá; applying them here exposes Gannett to the risk of a significantly larger damage award, even though Section 102(b) caps liability at $300,000. But it does not take a social scientist to figure that the discounted risks of large punitive damages awards under the Act’s “new” damages regime are probably slight compared to the fixed costs of responding to anti-discrimination laws. Therefore, holding employers like Gannett liable for punitive damages would not significantly raise the costs they might reasonably expect to incur under civil rights statutes. Since the Patterson regime turned out to be a two-year sabbatical from an earlier damages regime, now restored by the Act, there is nothing fundamentally unfair about holding employers retroactively liable for pr e-Patterson punitive damages. Gersman v. Group Health Ass’n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 907-908 (D.C.Cir.1992) (Wald, J., *569dissenting) (retroactive application of the Act would not disrupt employers’ settled expectations). If the majority believes that punitive damages cannot fairly be applied retroactively, it should exempt employers from these awards rather than recasting Section 102 in its entirety as a substantive change in the law.
Only two provisions of the Act relevant to Mojica’s case are arguably “substantive” enough that they should apply only to post-Act conduct: the punitive damages provision in Section 102, and Section 101’s restoration of the traditional ban on discrimination in the performance of contracts under § 1981. The decision below could be upheld without applying either of these provisions retroactively. The Act states that compensatory damages are available under Title VII “provided that the complaining party cannot recover under [42 U.S.C. § 1981] * * Section 102(a), 105 Stat. at 1072. Even if we decided that Section 101 did not apply retroactively and that Mojica therefore cannot recover under § 1981, Section 102(a) would still allow her to seek legal remedies under Title VII, and Section 102(c) would allow her to make a jury demand. Since there is no reason to fear that a jury given a blanket instruction on national origin discrimination.would reach a different verdict without § 1981 as a redundant basis for liability, I would affirm the jury’s verdict (as modified by the district court to overturn the punitive damage award). Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504; Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1345 (7th Cir.1992).
As between the approaches outlined above — applying the Act to post-Aet trials, or applying the Act retroactively to all pending eases — I would favor the latter alternative if this were an issue of first impression. “The joint presumptions that court decisions apply retroactively while legislation operates prospectively have combined here to produce a result that is neither rational nor just.” Mozee, 963 F.2d at 940 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Because Mozee and Luddington resolved the difficult and distinct question of whether the Act should apply to cases pending on appeal, I see no reason to challenge their validity here. In the present case, however, this Court should honor Congress’ intent to apply the Act to procedures in post-Act trials.
. Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. at 1071 (hereafter referred to as "the Act,” and cited by statute and page number only).
. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835; Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261, 104 L.Ed.2d 961; Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385; Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639; Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87 L.Ed.2d 1; Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 89 L.Ed.2d 747; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132. Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 475 n. 2 (9th Cir.1993), explains how the Act overrules these decisions.
. Our account should probably go beyond a poker-faced denial that congressional overrulings exist. "When [Congress] 'overrules’ a Supreme Court decision it is not registering disagreement with the merits of what the Court did; it is laying down a new rule of conduct — ordinarily for the future.” Luddington, 966 F.2d at 228. This statement jars because the Act does not lay down new rules of employer conduct, and it registers express disagreement with what the Court did. See William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 101 Yale LJ. 331 (1991), for analysis of how often and why Congress overrules court decisions. Recent statutes that expressly disagree with “what the Court did” include the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub.L. No. 101-143 § 101, 104 Stat. 978 (1990), and the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Pub.L. No. 100-259 § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
. The concurrence's discussion of the original understanding of the 1866 Civil Rights Act fails to persuade me that congressional overrulings should be treated differently from judicial over-rulings. Since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), it has been "the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is." I completely agree that when Congress overruled Patterson, it was not debating the original meaning of § 1981 — it was decreeing that § 1981 would mean what courts had said it meant before Patterson. The probative evidence of intent here is that the Act contradicted Patterson, and the propriety of deferring to the Act’s view is neither enhanced nor diminished by the antiquity of § 1981. See Section 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (restoring "the law as it existed on June 4, 1989" — one day prior to Wards Cove).
. The majority incorrectly implies that all of Gannett's discriminatory conduct occurred between 1989 and 1990 under the Patterson regime. Mojica, however, asserts that in 1986 Gannett denied her a promotion and told her to her face that she had not been given the job because she was an Hispanic woman.
. Other sections of the Act are arguably procedural as well, and should apply to new trials. See, e.g., Section 105 (burdens of proof in disparate impact cases); Section 108 (non-party challenges to consent decrees); Section 113 (court-awarded expert fees).