concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except the finding that Northwest Environmental Advocates (“NWEA”) lacks standing to bring a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) § 505(a)(1) [33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) ], to enforce water quality standards contained in NPDES permits. Portland holds an NPDES permit, and the water quality standards are conditions of its permit. Both the plain language of § 1365(a)(1) and case law support a finding of citizen suit jurisdiction in this case, and I am unpersuaded by the majority opinion’s reasoning that legislative history and practical considerations preclude jurisdiction. I therefore respectfully dissent.
As the majority opinion points out, the plain language of § 1365(a) authorizes citizens to enforce all permit conditions. That section provides: “[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action ... (1) against any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under [the Clean Water Act]_” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)(A). An effluent standard or limitation includes “(2) an effluent limitation or other limitation under section 1311 ... or (6) a permit or condition thereof....” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(2), (f)(6) (emphasis added). Although this language clearly contemplates citizen suits to enforce “a permit or condition thereof,” the majority opinion concludes that the section allows citizens to enforce only those water quality standards that are translated into permit effluent limitations.
To reach what I regard as an erroneous conclusion, the majority opinion, I believe, misconstrues the effect of the legislative his*912tory of the 1972 amendments to the CWA. I agree that the 1972 CWA amendments reflect Congress’ dissatisfaction with the system of water quality standards, but nowhere does Congress evidence an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality standards that have not been translated into effluent discharge limitations. The fact that Congress created a new, simpler enforcement method based on effluent limitations does not mean that Congress intended to foreclose citizen suit enforcement of water quality standards. In fact, the legislative history convinces me of just the opposite.
By introducing effluent limitations into the CWA scheme, Congress intended to improve enforcement, not to supplant the old system. In the legislative history, the Senate Committee first outlined the dual purposes of water quality standards: “The standards are intended to function ... [a]s a measure of performance ... [and] to provide an avenue of legal action against polluters. If the wastes discharged by polluters reduce water quality below the standards, actions may be begun against the polluters.” S.Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671; 40 C.F.R. § 131.2 (1992) (dual purposes). Next, the Committee expressed dismay over the “almost total lack of enforcement” under the old system that depended exclusively upon water quality standards. 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3672 (“[0]nly one case has reached the courts in more than two decades”). Given Congress’ concern about non-enforcement, the majority opinion is incorrect when it takes a narrow view of Congress’ broad provision for “citizen participation in the enforcement of control requirements and regulations established under [the CWA],...” Id at 3745.
Moreover, citizen suit enforcement of water quality standards is necessary to complement enforcement of effluent limitations. Water quality standards “often cannot be translated into effluent limitations.... ” Id. at 3675. For example, certain water quality standards cannot be expressed quantitatively, such as those that apply in this case to bacterial pollution, aesthetic conditions, and objectionable matter (scum, oily sleek, foul odors, and floating solids). See Or.Admin.R. 34(M:N445(2)(f), (l), (k). Even after the 1972 amendments, states may adopt similar standards and express water quality criteria “as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative statements_” 40 C.F.R. 131.3(b) (1992).
Many discharges remain unregulated and primarily subject to water quality standards, despite statutory deadlines for achieving effluent limitations, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1977 deadline for first-stage effluent limitations on all point source discharges), § 1311(b)(2) (West 1993 Supp.) (1989 deadline for second-stage, more stringent controls). Furthermore, in eases where effluent limitations do apply, they serve only as national, minimum requirements; states may adopt stricter, enforceable water quality standards and limitations. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
By interpreting § 1365(a)(1) to exclude citizen suit enforcement of water quality standards that are not translated into quantitative limitations, the majority opinion immunizes the entire body of qualitative regulations from an important enforcement tool.1 The rule is especially troubling in this ease, because no effluent limitations cover the discharges from Portland’s combined sewer overflows (“CSOs”). Nor can citizens find consolation in their state court remedy of objecting to the contents of a permit within sixty days of its issuance, Or.Rev.Stat. 183.-484(2). Citizens groups such as NWEA might not wish to dispute the issuance or contents of a permit, but to enforce the permit’s terms. The majority opinion precludes them from doing so. Qualitative standards are not too difficult for courts to enforce. The majority’s decision eliminates the only practicable way for citizens to challenge CSO discharges.
*913The legislative history of the amendments neither dictates nor supports this result. In fact, parts of the legislative history reflect Congress’ intention to grant broad authority for citizen enforcement, consistent with the statutory language. In the legislative history, the Senate Committee expressly stated that “[i]n addition to violations of section 301(a) [26 U.S.C. § 1311, Effluent Limitations] citizens ace granted authority to bring enforcement actions for violations of ... any condition of any permit issued under section 402 [26 U.S.C. § 1342].” 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3747 (emphasis added). Also, the Committee explained that it modeled the citizen suit provision on the analogous Clean Air Act (“CAA”) provision that applies to air pollution permit conditions.2 Id. at 3745.
Finally, the majority opinion overlooks ample case law that supports a finding of citizen suit jurisdiction in this case. The Supreme Court has acknowledged citizen standing, under § 1365(a)(1) and (f)(6), to enforce permit conditions based on both EPA-promulgated effluent limitations and state-established standards. See E.P.A. v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 224-25, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 2033-34, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976). By applying § 1365(f)(6), several courts have held that there is jurisdiction under which citizens groups may seek to enforce many kinds of permit conditions besides effluent limitations. In fact, permit conditions that courts commonly enforce under § 1365(a) are not effluent limitations, but rather, requirements for retaining records of discharge sampling and for filing reports. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1115 (4th Cir.1988) (“Simkins’ reporting requirements are expressly made conditions of its permit, and therefore violations of these conditions, by operation of § 1365(f)(6), are violations of an effluent standard or limitation of § 1365(a).”), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 904, 109 S.Ct. 3185, 105 L.Ed.2d 694 (1989). Other examples of enforceable permit conditions include conditions relating to sewage maintenance, Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens for a Hygienic Env’t v. Eaton, 506 F.Supp. 902 (W.D.Pa.1980), aff'd 644 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir.1981), and construction schedules, Locust Lane v. Swatara Township Auth., 636 F.Supp. 534, 539 (M.D.Pa.1986) (rejecting defendant’s attempt “to impose a limitation on § 1365 where one is neither supported by the language nor the legislative history”). Finally, citizens groups may enforce even valid permit conditions that regulate discharges outside the scope of the CWA, namely discharges that may never reach navigable waters. Connecticut Fund For Env’t v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 631 F.Supp. 1283, 1285 (D.Conn.1986).3
Because the statutory language, legislative history, and case law demonstrate that citizens have authority to enforce permit conditions stated in terms of water quality standards, I would find that NWEA has standing.
. Also, the majority opinion's interpretation effectively attributes to Congress an intent to stall citizen suit enforcement of permit terms that specify water quality standards. Congress set deadlines for promulgation of effluent limitations, and therefore, must have anticipated a five-year lag, 1972-1977, before universal applicability of effluent limitations. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to stall citizen enforcement of permit terms until promulgation of effluent limitations.
. The Clean Air Act ("CAA") provision authorizes citizen suits for alleged violations of “an emission standard or limitation under [CAA] ... [, defined in relevant part as an] emission limitation, standard of performance or emission standard, ... or any condition or requirement of a permit under ... [sections of CAA] ... or pnder an applicable [state] implementation plan." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (f) (emphasis added).
. When this Court and other courts have held that citizens may not enforce water quality standards under § 1365(a)(1), they addressed standards that were not included in a NPDES permit. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.1987) (suit to enforce water quality standards allegedly breached by nonpoint sources, which are never regulated by NPDES permits); McClellan Ecological Seepage v. Weinberger, 707 F.Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D.Cal.1988) (finding no citizen suit jurisdiction existed, because "a state water quality standard can constitute an effluent standard or limitation enforceable under section 505 only if it has been incorporated into an NPDES permit”); Montgomery Envtl. Coalition Citizens Coordinating Comm. on Friendship Heights v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 607 F.2d 378, 381 (D.C.Cir.1979).