concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I am in agreement with the majority’s opinion that the trial court’s order denying the suppression motion should be affirmed. However, for reasons given below, I must respectfully dissent from their ruling that the filing in this case complied with § 851. I would affirm both the conviction and the unenhanced sentence.
By enacting 28 U.S.C. § 851, Congress prescribed the sort of notice the government must provide in order for a court to enhance a sentence based on a prior drug conviction. Although the statute fulfills the due process requirement that a defendant receive reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard regarding a recidivist charge, see United States v. Belanger, 970 F.2d 416, 418 (7th Cir.1992),. the relevant inquiry for a court reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s notice in a particular case is whether it satisfies the requirements of the statute — not solely the more general constitutional requirement of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. The latter would apply even in the absence of the statutory notice requirement. See Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 452, 82 S.Ct. 501, 503, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962). By focusing solely on “reasonable *1487notice,” the majority opinion waters down the statutory requirements and overlooks what our' task is: discerning the meaning of the statutory phrase, “stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Although § 851 does not give specific guidance as to the form the information filed by the government must take, it clearly contemplates that the information include more than merely a vague allusion to the fact that the defendant was previously convicted in some ease. The statute provides that “[u]pon a showing by the United States attorney that the facts regarding prior convictions could not with due diligence be obtained prior to trial, ... the court may postpone the trial ... for a reasonable period for the purpose of obtaining such facts.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the requirement that the government provide the defendant with the essential facts regarding the prior convictions is contained in the statute.1
Two courts have indicated that the government’s notice of intent to enhance under § 851 must clearly identify the convictions to be relied upon. See Belanger, 970 F.2d at 419; United States v. Wirsing, 662 F.Supp. 199, 200 (D.Nev.1989). In Belanger, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding that although the government’s information (titled as a “Notice of Intention to Seek Enhanced Penalty”) may have been insufficient by itself, when taken together with its “Notice of Intent to Offer Evidence,” the government had adequately notified the defendant of its intent to seek an enhanced penalty. The first filing stated that a sentencing enhancement would be sought but did not state which prior convictions would be used. The government conceded that the first filing was defective. The second filing, although submitted for different purposes, “detailed those convictions.” 970 F.2d at 419. Both the first and second instruments were filed and served on Belanger prior to trial. Id. at 417. Therefore, it was the details of the second filing that rendered the government’s instruments sufficient to satisfy § 851. Id. at 419.
In Wirsing, the court found the government’s notice and information insufficient under the plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) because the government merely notified the court and the defendant of “the existence of a prior felony conviction cognizable under Title 21, United States Code” and of the government’s intent to rely on that conviction for sentence enhancement, but did not provide any other facts about the prior conviction. 662 F.Supp. at 200.
Here, just as in Wirsing, the information filed by the government provided only the vaguest reference to a prior conviction to be relied on. It stated only that the government intended to rely on a prior conviction in California, the most populous state in the union, for possession of a controlled substance. It did not state the name or number of the case in which the defendant was convicted, the location of the court in which he was convicted, whether the conviction occurred in a federal or state court, or the correct date of his conviction.2 In short, the instrument filed by the government did not *1488identify a particular prior conviction, as required by the statute. Therefore, the notice attempted before trial was legally defective under § 851.
The majority simply asserts that “a timely filed information signalled the government’s intent to rely on a particular prior conviction.” Opinion at 1486. This assumes the very issue before us — the legal sufficiency of the notice given by the wording within the four corners of the instruments filed and served before trial. Instead of considering what the statute requires the contents of that filing to be, the majority simply argues that the notice here was “reasonable.” Id. This approach boils down to nothing more than harmless error analysis.
We should reject this approach. As this court has specifically noted: “the harmless error doctrine is not applicable” in judging compliance with § 851. United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 882 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448 (1991). Failure to comply with § 851(a) by filing the requisite notice prior to trial deprives the district court of jurisdiction to impose an enhanced sentence. Id. at 882. See also United States v. Novey, 922 F.2d-624, 627 (10th Cir.) (although the defendant did not raise the government’s lack of compliance with § 851 in the district court, the court was without authority to impose an enhanced sentence unless the statutory requirements were met; therefore, appellate court could consider the question on its merits), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991). The court cannot overlook a failure to comply with the statutory mandate by finding that, under the facts of a given case, it was harmless or, in what amounts to the same analysis in this context, by finding that the defendant had “reasonable notice ... and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Opinion at 1485. In Neary v. United States, 998 F.2d 563 (8th Cir.1993), the court rejected analysis like that of the majority opinion here:
Even when the defendant is not surprised by the enhanced sentence, was aware from the outset that his previous conviction could lead to an enhanced sentence, never challenged the validity of the prior conviction, and admitted it at the sentencing hearing, the statute prohibits an enhanced sentence unless the government first seeks it by properly filing an information prior to trial_ Significantly, “[t]he doctrine of harmless error does not apply” with respect to failures to follow the statutory scheme of § 851. United States v. Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 852 (11th Cir.1983).
Id. at 565 (quoting United States v. Weaver, 905 F.2d 1466, 1481 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied sub. nom. Sikes v. United States, 498 U.S. 1091, 111 S.Ct. 972, 112 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1991)) (emphasis added).
For this reason, the fact that “[mjore information was easily obtainable from the government,” maj. op. at 1486, is clearly irrelevant. The statute places on the government the mandatory burden of providing the information in written instruments filed and served on the defendant prior to trial. The government is given the right to have the trial postponed if it is unable to comply with § 851 at that time. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). The defendant, who may be served with the information the moment before the trial begins, must be able then to “determine whether he should enter a plea or go to trial ... with full knowledge of the consequences of a potential jury verdict,” United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 407 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 646, 116 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991). He is not able to do this unless the instruments filed and served on him before trial give clear details on the particular conviction to be relied upon.
The majority’s reliance on the fact that after the defendant was convicted, the government invited defense counsel to explore the contents of the judgment and commitment order concerning the prior conviction is also irrelevant; the statute requires that the information be provided “before trial.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (emphasis added). The majority’s suggestion that the government’s post-conviction actions can make up for the deficiencies in the written instruments served before trial is, again, nothing more than harmless error analysis. It focuses on what the defendant could have done, instead of on what the government did or did inadequately. This focus is misdirected because *1489[ujnless and until prosecutorial discretion is invoked and the government files and serves an information as required by See. 851, the district court has no power to act with respect to an enhanced sentence; it can no more enhance the sentence than it could impose imprisonment under a statute that only prescribes a fine. Harmless error cannot give the district court authority that it does not possess.
United States v. Olson, 716 F.2d 850, 858 (11th Cir.1983) (emphasis added).
Because I am convinced that the government failed here to comply with the notice requirement of § 851 prior to trial, I would affirm both the conviction and the unen-hanced sentence of the defendant. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent as to the enhancement holding of the majority opinion.
. I do not say that this means that the evidentia-ry background underlying the prior conviction must be shown, but merely that the conviction itself be adequately identified. As the majority points out, subsection (c) of the statute provides that ‘‘[t]he failure of the United States attorney to include in the information the complete criminal record or any facts in addition to the convictions to be relied upon shall not constitute grounds for invalidating the notice given in the information. ...” 21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(1) (emphasis added). However, this is not responsive to the issue of what facts constitute notice of the prior convictions under that statute.
. I recognize, as does the majority, that § 851(a)(1) provides that clerical mistakes in the information may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence. Therefore, an incorrect date, standing alone, would not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to enhance the sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1); United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245, 252 (4th Cir.1992) (allowing United States Attorney to amend information to correct clerical error where original information "clearly identified” prior conviction), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2446, 124 L.Ed.2d 663 (1993). Here, however, because the original information filed did not clearly identify the prior conviction to be relied on, the inaccurate date further undermined the adequacy of notice.