dissenting:
However felicitous the majority’s result appears to be in the case of children, we have previously ratified the BIA’s long-standing policy that “to be eligible for [§ 212(c) ] relief, aliens must accumulate seven years of lawful unrelinquished domicile after their admission for permanent residence.” Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir.1979). It is undisputed that, at the time of the hearing before the IJ, Lepe-Guitron had accumulated less than four years of “lawful unrelinquished domicile after [his] admission for permanent residence.” Id. This should end the matter and we should deny the petition for review.
Instead, the majority accepts the reasoning of Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220 (2d Cir.1992), which took the view that “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and “lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years,” as used in § 212(c), “are separate and independent conditions, neither [of which] purports to limit or qualify the other.” Id. at 223. On this reading of the statute, the Second Circuit has long held “that Congress planned for a permanent resident alien to be eligible for § 212(c) relief, provided that person can meet the domicile condition.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.1977)).
In Castillo-Felix, however, we parted company with the Second Circuit’s statutory interpretation, expressly rejecting Lok’s conclusion that Congress did not intend the seven years of lawful domicile to follow admission for permanent residence. 601 F.2d at 467.1 Hence, even assuming Lepe-Guitron was “domiciled” where his parents lived, under Castillo-Felix, simply meeting the domicile condition is not enough; the alien must, in addition, thereafter accumulate seven years as a lawful permanent resident to be eligible for discretionary relief.
The BIA’s consistent reading of § 212(c) has tied the word “lawful,” as Congress used it to qualify “domicile,” to the requirement that the alien be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Castillo-Felix approves the BIA’s interpretation, and there is no reason to undo that rule in this case. I therefore dissent.
. Contrary to the majority's view, maj. op. at n. 9, Rosario does rely on Lok — -just as the majority implicitly relies on that case today. The Rosario court began its discussion with a restatement of the Lok rule — -that "lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and “lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years” are independent conditions and "that Congress planned for a permanent resident alien to be eligible for § 212(c) relief, provided that person can meet the domicile condition.” 962 F.2d at 223. The court then proceeded with its discussion of imputing to a minor the domicile of her or his parents. Id. at 223-25. Rosario's conclusion— that the minor might be eligible for § 212(c) relief based on his parents’ unrelinquished domicile in the United States — was dependent on Lok, since the court's exclusive focus with respect to the seven-year time frame was on the alien's "domicile” rather than his admission for permanent residence. Castillo-Felix, in contrast, accepts the BIA's interpretation that the two requirements must be considered together.