concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all parts of the majority opinion except the rulings that the district court erred (1) by instructing the jury that the city would indemnify Officer Holcomb for compensatory damages, and (2) by allowing La-rez’s counsel to tell the jury that the city was authorized to indemnify Officer Holcomb for punitive damages.
1. Jury Instruction Regarding the City’s Indemnification for Compensatory Damages
I disagree with the majority’s ruling that the jury instruction that the city would indemnify Officer Holcomb for compensatory damages was irrelevant to Larez’s damage claim, and thus, improper. The majority reasons that instructions on indemnification only distract a jury and potentially prejudice a defendant by exposing him to an inflated damage award. For authority, the majority relies on Eighth Circuit cases that exclude indemnification evidence in § 1988 eases based on concerns of undue prejudice. See Green v. Baron, 879 F.2d 305, 310 (8th Cir.1989); Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 914, 107 S.Ct. 3184, 3185, 96 L.Ed.2d 673 (1987). The majority also attributes support for its position on Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 411. I disagree.
The jury instruction in this case1 does not implicate the prejudice concerns that underlie the exclusion of insurance and indemnification evidence under common law. By in*1524structing the jury that the city, not Holcomb, would pay any compensatory damage award, the district court intended to prevent the jury from considering the defendant’s ability — or inability — to pay such damages in arriving at a fair award. The district court reasoned as follows:
It’s because the jury in these civil rights cases sometimes [is] concerned that the officer might have to pay damages that they award, and if he does, they are concerned that maybe he won’t have the ability to do so just because of the salary that they assume that officers make.... [S]o the reason that the instruction is given is because if the jury is worried about who is going to pay, this instruction tells them that the City may pay.
[R.T. VI-74: 7-20],
The district court sought to ensure that the jury would award damages that fairly compensated Larez.2 The court’s concern was legitimate, because “the ability of a defendant to pay the necessary damages injects into the damage determination a foreign, diverting, and distracting issue which may effectuate a prejudicial result [on the plaintiff].” Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.1977) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, I cannot say that the district court’s jury instruction, in response to its legitimate concern, was improper. The court was attempting to ensure that the jury arrive at a fair damage award without regard to Holcomb’s ability to pay. I submit that there is little danger of award inflation when a jury knows that a public officer is indemnified by the city for a compensatory damage award payable out of the public fisc. Any danger of award inflation by such an instruction does not, in my opinion, outweigh the danger of allowing a deflated award by omitting the instruction. I would therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by giving the indemnification instruction.
Nor do the policy concerns underlying the FRE 411 exclusion convince me to conclude otherwise. FRE 411, entitled “Liability Insurance,” applies only to evidence concerning “liability insurance.” The rule is intended to address the particular issues presented when courts admit evidence of the existence of liability insurance.
[T]he chief reason for preventing reception of the evidence [that is excluded by FRE 411] is the supposed inclination of jurors to make the insurance company bear the loss because it has been paid for taking the risk, it is well able to pay, and will spread the loss among its policy holders.
Charles A Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5362, at 429, n. 17 (1980) (citing Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, at 212 (1961)). The city’s indemnification policy is not a policy of “liability insurance.” The City of Los Angeles and other California municipalities are not insurance companies; they have not been paid to assume risks; they are unable to spread such risks among “policy holders.” Jurors would be aware of such distinctions and would realize that city funds are derived from taxes. In sum, the protection to insurance companies rationale for excluding evidence under FRE 411 does not justify restricting admission of evidence regarding the city’s obligation to indemnify its officers for compensatory damage awards.3
*1525I believe the jury is entitled to hear the truth. Courts routinely instruct the jury that the plaintiff, if successful, will not pay any income tax on an award. And, jurors very likely already know that a government employee defendant in a civil rights case personally will not pay any damage award against him or her. I see no legitimate reason why the jury should not hear the whole truth. As Mark Twain said, “when in doubt, tell the truth.”
2. Counsel’s Closing Argument Statement Regarding the City’s Indemnification for Punitive Damages
I also disagree with the majority’s ruling that the district court erred by allowing La-rez’s counsel during closing argument to tell the jury that the city was authorized to indemnify Officer Holcomb against any punitive damage award. At closing argument, Larez’s counsel told the jury that the City of Los Angeles is authorized to indemnify Holcomb for any punitive damages assessed against him. Counsel made this statement after the court had indicated before argument commenced that it would instruct the jury on the City’s indemnification of both compensatory and punitive damage awards. Even though defense counsel objected to both jury instructions, he failed to object to plaintiff counsel’s statement during closing argument. Nor did defense counsel request the court to admonish the jury either to disregard the statement or to consider it only with respect to damages. Defense counsel made no motion for mistrial under California Government Code § 825(b)(3). See Op., at 1519, n. 5. After closing argument, when the court instructed the jury, it gave the compensatory damage indemnification instruction but overlooked giving the punitive damage indemnification instruction.
The closing argument by Larez’s counsel was encouraged by the court’s initial decision, that was inexplicably not carried out, to give the punitive damages instruction. “The trial court has broad discretion in the control of closing arguments.” People v. Ignacio, 852 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir.1988) (emphasis added). Given the unusual circumstances of this case, I would find no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Diaz, 961 F.2d 1417, 1418 (9th Cir.1992) (abuse of discretion standard).
The majority reasons that counsel distracted the jury by informing it that the city is authorized to indemnify the officer against punitive damages, and that such a distraction could provide a windfall to plaintiffs at taxpayers’ expense, without appreciably deterring the wrongdoer.
To the contrary, jurors as taxpayers arguably might lower a punitive damage award where they know that the city, not the defendant, will bear the costs. In any event, in California, “taxpayers have decided through their representatives that it is to their benefit as taxpayers to help out the officers.” Cornwell v. Riverside, 896 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1026, 110 S.Ct. 3274, 111 L.Ed.2d 784 (1990). Here again, I believe that jurors are entitled to hear the whole truth.
. If an employee of a public entily requests the public entity to defend him against any claim arising out of an act made within the scope of his employment, and gives the entily sufficient notice, and reasonably cooperates in good faith in the defense of the claim, the public entity shall pay any compensatory damages awarded.
Instruction No. 45 (emphasis added).
. This attempt is further illustrated by an additional instruction, requested by the defense, that the jury received. This other instruction reads as follows:
In the event that you determine to award the plaintiff a sum of money, you are instructed that the award is not subject to any deductions for federal or state income taxes.
Instruction No. 49.
. I also note that, even if we were to apply FRE 411, the rale would not automatically bar the instruction here at issue. The record reveals that the court’s instruction concerning the City’s indemnification policy went to the issue of damages. By its terms, however, FRE 411 only prohibits the introduction of evidence of liability insurance on the issue of whether the defendant acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. FRE 411 does not prohibit the use of evidence of insurance where it is relevant to the issue of damages or punitive damages. See 23 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5364, at 449, n. 20 (1980) ("[Rule 411’s inapplicability to the issue of damages] was also the rule at common law"); see also Morton v. Zidell Explorations, Inc., 695 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir.1982) (FRE 411 allows the introduction of evidence of liability coverage if offered for “relevant purposes"), cert. denied, 460 *1525U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791 (1983).