dissenting:
If the government’s evidence in this case is sufficient to carry its burden of providing a “satisfactory explanation” for failing to comply with the immediate sealing requirement of the statute, that requirement is reduced to a precatory entreaty. Because it is clear from Ojeda Bios that Congress intended something more, I respectfully dissent.
Wire surveillance of the Video Warehouse in West Long Branch, New Jersey, was authorized on March 15, 1985. After two extensions, the authority expired on June 13, 1985. The surveillance actually terminated on May 31, 1985. Wire surveillance of Video’s new location in Neptune City, New Jersey, was authorized on June 26, 1985. That authority ceased and the surveillance was terminated on July 25, 1985.
Duplicates of 185 reels of tape from the West Long Branch surveillance were sealed 45 days after that surveillance ceased and 32 days after the authorization terminated. When the government realized its mistake, the originals of these reels of tape were sealed a little over a month later, on August 19, 1985.
The federal wire surveillance statute, after providing for court authorized wire surveil-lances, stipulates the following with respect to the making and sealing of tape recordings:
The recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under this subsection shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders.... The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived therefrom under subsection (3) of section 2517.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) (emphasis supplied).
The tapes from the West Long Branch surveillance are the ones at issue here. The government has not contended that a sealing involving a 32 day or longer delay would constitute an “immediate” sealing. Rather, the government, in United States v. Vastola, 915 F.2d 865 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120, 111 S.Ct. 1073, 112 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1991) (“Vastola II ”), advanced two alternative theories under which there was said to be no violation of the statute. First, it insisted that there had been no delay because the order of June 26, 1985, authorizing surveillance of the Neptune City site, was an “extension” of the original authorization, and the duty to seal did not arise until the Neptune City surveillance terminated. We rejected this argument, concluding:
*172We eould not possibly hold that the Neptune City interception order was an extension of the West Long Branch order. Although the government rightly points out that Rios [United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 110 S.Ct. 1845, 109 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990) ] did not decide whether a change in the location of an illegal operation will prevent a subsequent order covering the new location from being an extension of a previous order, the statute unambiguously rules out this possibility.
Id. at 874 (footnote omitted).
In support of this conclusion, we referred to the above quoted portion of the statute and two other sections requiring that an application for wire surveillance authority justify the need for surveillance at a specific site:
Section 2518(l)(b)(ii) plainly states that an application for surveillance order must contain ‘a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted.’ In addition, section 2518(3)(d) requires a particularized showing of probable cause that ‘the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in the commission of [the] offense [under investigation].’ Based on these two provisions alone, we would have no difficulty concluding that Congress intended for interception orders, and their accompanying extensions, to apply only to surveillances in the particular locations specified in the applications.
Vastola II, 915 F.2d at 874.1 We held, based on the plain meaning of the text of the statute, that the duty to seal arises “upon the expiration of the order or extensions thereof’ and that an order authorizing surveillance at another site is not an extension.2
Having concluded that the duty to seal the West Long Branch tapes arose no later than June 13, 1985, the date the authorization for the surveillance of that location terminated, we turned to the government’s second argument — i.e., its “suggestion that, even if erroneous, the supervising attorneys’ reasonable belief that the order of June 26,1985, extended the original interception order satisfactorily explains the delay” in sealing the West Long Branch tapes. Id. at 875. We declined to pass upon this argument because the government up to that point had tendered no evidence to the district court concerning the circumstances of the sealing delay. We remanded to the district court so that it could exercise its discretion on wheth*173er to reopen the record and allow the government to offer such evidence.
Between Vastóla II and the time this case returned to us in Vastóla III, we had occasion to consider another case in which a sealing delay had occurred in the context of sequential surveillance of different sites. United States v. Carson, 969 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir.1992). The investigation in Carson was conducted in 1981 and 1982. An evidentiary hearing was held by the district court in that case at which Warren Robins, the attorney who had caused 33 of the tapes of the first, “Zax”, surveillance to be sealed, testified. His testimony was summarized as follows:
Robins discussed the sealing issue with Stewart, his supervisor, during the time in December 1981 when DiGilio was in the hospital. Although Stewart meant to convey that sealing was required at the end of a particular order or its extension, Robins understood him to mean that sealing was required only at the conclusion of the investigation, rather than at the end of interception at a particular location. Robins’ misunderstanding of Stewart’s advice arose, because at the time of their discussion the Zax order [authorizing the first surveillance] constituted the entire electronic surveillance operation.
* * * * * *
As a result, Robins believed that the sealing obligation for all of the tapes, including the Zax tapes, arose on May 12,1982 when the [second] surveillance was terminated.
* * * * * *
Robins therefore thought that so long as any part of the “wiretap interception process” was occurring, there was no requirement to seal — even if a particular wiretap operation which was a part of the investigation was complete.
Id. at 1493-95.
The district court in Carson concluded “that Robins’ view, though wrong, was objectively reasonable and that, therefore, the government provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay.” Id. at 1494. We rejected this conclusion based on Vastóla II, explaining:
In reaching this conclusion, the court accepted Robins’ explanation even though it was contrary to the unambiguous language of the statute. See id. at 494 (quoting Vastola II, 915 F.2d at 874).
We agree with the district court that a reasonable mistake of law can be a satisfactory explanation for delay, but we also think the district court’s findings do not support its conclusion that Robins’ explanation was satisfactory. For an explanation to be satisfactory under Ojeda Rios, it must be objectively reasonable.... The government does not, and cannot, argue that an objective reading of the extant case law might have caused an objectively reasonable attorney to take Robins’ view.
Id. at 1494 (footnote omitted).
Although the government did not maintain that the case law would have “caused an objectively reasonable attorney to take Robins’ view” on February 27, 1982 (when the final extension of the authority for the first surveillance terminated and the duty to seal was triggered), the government in Carson did insist that it had satisfactorily explained the delay by showing that “it was attributable to an innocent mistake on Robins’ part in misunderstanding what Stewart told him.” Id. at 1494. We acknowledged that it was possible for the government to have a “satisfactory explanation” even though it acted on the basis of an objectively unreasonable view of the law. We held, however, that the district court’s findings would not support the view that the delay occurred “without any fault on the government’s part.” Id. at 1494. We observed:
Robins said his conclusion that the sealing requirement was not triggered until all surveillance ended was based on a misunderstanding of Stewart’s oral advice on the sealing requirements. The district court made no finding as to whether Robins could have reasonably understood Stewart as telling him no sealing was required until all surveillance ended or whether it was reasonable to rely on what Stewart told him without any independent research. If a reasonably prudent lawyer could have interpreted Stewart’s statements as Rob*174ins did and, under all the circumstances, reasonably relied on them without any independent investigation of the law, Robins’ explanation as to the March 9, 1982 delay would be an objectively reasonable mistake of law that satisfactorily explains the government’s failure to meet the statute’s requirement of immediate sealing. Affirmative answers to those two questions of fact are necessary to a determination that Robins’ mistake of law was objectively reasonable. ...
Id. at 1494.
We ultimately remanded the Carson case to the district court to determine “whether Robins’ explanation was satisfactory and objectively reasonable.” Id. at 1501. In doing so, we made the following cautionary observations that are very pertinent here:
The circumstances of this case may show that Robins had an affirmative duty to do more than rely on the advice of his superi- or. Arguably, a reasonable attorney would not have risked the exclusion of the tapes, evidence important to his case, without personally checking the law relating to its admission. It is not always unreasonable for an attorney to rely on a reasoned oral opinion of a supervisor, or even that of a peer with more experience in the area of law in question. Moreover, an attorney working under another lawyer on a case could not be faulted for following instructions, as opposed to advice, from the person in charge of the case or investigation. On the other hand, we do not think that a reasonable attorney can rely on a casual conversation with a peer or supervisor concerning developing law on a complex, controversial subject if an incorrect answer is likely to preclude admission of evidence of vital importance to the case....
Id. at 1495 (emphasis supplied).
Carson, like Ojeda Rios, makes clear that the government bears the burden of persuading the court that its explanation is “satisfactory.”
On remand from Vastóla II, the district court allowed the government to introduce additional evidence concerning the circumstances of the surveillance and the sealings. Based on that evidence, the district court concluded that “the actual reason for the sealing delay was that the government attorneys in charge of the surveillance believed that sealing was not required until after the entire investigation.” More specifically, Assistant United States Attorney Armenakis, the decision maker in this case, had “form[ed] the same mistaken belief held by Attorney Robins in Carson.” United States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1323 (3d Cir.1993) (“Vastola III”).
In Vastóla III, we, of course, held that Armenakis’ view of the law was not “objectively reasonable.” Id. at 1327. This holding was required by Carson and, indeed, was the law of the ease in this proceeding after Vastóla II. Those cases establish that a reasonable attorney who had reviewed the text of the statute with even a minimal degree of care could not have reached the conclusion that Armenakis did.
Since the record supported the finding that Armenakis’ view of the law was the “actual reason” for the sealing delay, if that view had been objectively reasonable, that would have ended the matter in the government’s favor; there would have been no occasion to inquire into the historic facts of how Armenakis reached her conclusion. This court’s conclusion that her view was not objectively reasonable did not end the matter in the defendant’s favor, however, because the government contended that Armenakis, even though wrong, acted reasonably under all the circumstances in reaching her erroneous conclusion. Relying on Carson, we held that this was a tenable position for the government to take, but concluded that the district court had not made the findings necessary to sustain it. We remanded so that the district court could “determine whether Armenakis conducted herself reasonably under the circumstances.” Id. at 1327.
On remand from Vastóla III, the parties stipulated that the existing record was adequate to enable the district court to make the required findings. That record consisted of a hearing at which Armenakis and her immediate supervisor, Thomas Roth, testified. Roth testified that he recalled no conversa*175tion with Armenakis regarding the sealing of the tapes in this case. While not required under his understanding of the law in the spring of 1989, if he had been asked by Armenakis, he would have counseled that “the more prudent way to do it, and the way [he] always did it [was to seal] when any particular facility was terminated.” Appendix at 25.
Armenakis testified that she had had no prior experience with wire surveillance and that she received no formal training in that area with respect to this ease. Her entire testimony with respect to how she reached her view of the law on sealing was as follows:
Q. Did it occur to you to seal the interceptions that had commenced in March and had ceased at the end of May at Video Warehouse, One, I’ll call it?
Did it occur to you at any point along the way?
A Well, yes, at some point it did occur to me, yes.
Q. What was your understanding at that time as to what you were required to do in terms of sealing?
A. My understanding was that when the investigation was completed that you immediately sealed whatever tapes had been obtained.
Q. From what did you get that understanding?
A. Well, when I began working on the investigation I studied the statute and several of the annotations. I spoke with more experienced attorneys in the office on wiretaps and it was, it was my understanding, which appeared to be consistent throughout the office. A. 55-56
* Hi * * * *
Q. Did you speak to Mr. Fettweis during May or June regarding what your sealing obligations were?
A. I had a conversation with someone. Frankly I don’t recall who it was. It may have been Mr. Fettweis because I had asked him questions throughout the investigation. I did speak with someone concerning the issue of sealing when the agent raised it. I don’t recall who it was. A. 88.
* * * * * *
Q. You testified that your understanding of the sealing requirement was based on part on the statute itself; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. I would like to show you defendant’s exhibit A in evidence?
MR. WHITE: If I may approach the witness?
THE COURT: Yes.
By Mr. White:
Q. And ask you to look at — do you know what defendant’s exhibit A is?
A. It’s a portion of the statute 2518. It may be the entire statute.
Q. Yes, it is the entire statute. A 89.
******
Q. Have you looked at the statute— would you agree with me that it does not support your understanding that in 1985, that tapes didn’t have to be sealed until the end of an entire interception where there had been change of premises and the second series of interceptions was not an extension?
A. I think the answer is, no, I would not agree with you. The statute was the same then and it was my understanding and I truly felt that it was the interpretation of other assistants that this statute meant the end of the investigation and that is what I understood to be the case.
Q. Did you rely on the interpretation of other assistants for that conclusion?
A. I felt that my beliefs were consistent with those, those who I went to who had conducted wiretaps, yes.
Q. You relied on, for your conclusion, on what their perception of the statute was?
A. Not completely, but it but, in part, yes.
Q. You also relied on your own reading of the statute?
*176A. Yes and the annotations at the time. I don’t recall exactly. A. 90-91.
* # * * * *
Q. I believe your testimony was that Agent Mahoney notified you that the tape custodian at the F.B.I. had noticed the change in the numbers and brought that to his attention?
A. Yes.
Q. You consulted with some people about what you should do?
A. Yes.
Q. After the consultation, it was indicated to you you should seal those tapes?
A. That it would probably be better to seal them.
Q. Did anyone — how many people did you consult with, do you have any idea?
A. No, I don’t recall exactly.
Q. Did anybody indicate to you you better get those sealed?
A. No. A. 99.
The district court concluded that Arme-nakis “acted reasonably under the circumstances.” While “reading and outlining the statute and reviewing the relevant annotations” could not be “considered a normally competent level of research that a reasonably prudent attorney would undertake,” the district court believed the “critical aspect in this case [was] the interaction between Armenak-is’ own research and the authoritative confirming advice she received from other, more experienced United States Attorneys in her office.” Appendix pp. 10-11.
I would conclude that the record will not support the district court’s conclusions that Armenakis acted reasonably under the circumstances and, accordingly, that the government’s explanation is not “satisfactory” as that term has been interpreted by this court and the Supreme Court in Ojeda Rios. To hold that this record suffices to carry the government’s burden under Ojeda Rios would effectively eliminate that burden and would ill serve the privacy concerns underlying the sealing requirement of the statute.
The district court properly considered the extent of Armenakis’ personal investigation into the law. The degree of effort she put into that investigation is one factor to be considered in determining whether she behaved reasonably. On the other hand, her efforts have to be evaluated in light of the fact that the text of “the statute unambiguously rules out” the conclusion she reached, as we noted in Vastola II, 915 F.2d at 874. For this reason, I agree with the district court that Armenakis’ personal investigation of the legal issue involved will not support a finding of reasonableness.
This leaves Armenakis’ testimony that she consulted others in the office whose identity she cannot now recall, at times she cannot now recall, and under circumstances that she cannot now recall. While I do not fault Armenakis for being unable to recall in December of 1990 what she did in the spring of 1985, the indefiniteness of her testimony precludes anyone from determining anything about the circumstances under which she relied upon the advice of others. One can tell nothing, for example, about what she told her allegedly more experienced peers as a factual predicate for the solicited opinion, whether she inquired over lunch or in a more structured context, whether the opinions provided by the peers were tendered immediately off the top of their heads or after reasoned analysis, and whether or not Armenakis inquired concerning the basis for their proffered views. The government’s evidence simply does not permit the kind of inquiry we insisted upon in Carson. As a result, we do not know whether this is a case involving “a reasoned oral opinion of a ... peer with more experience,” or a mere “casual conversation.” Carson, 969 F.2d at 1495.
In order for the government’s explanation to be “satisfactory” in a situation like this, a determination that the advice received by the decision maker from others was reasonably relied upon requires far more specific support than the government supplied here. Accordingly, I would hold that the government did not carry its burden of demonstrating that Armenakis acted reasonably under all of the circumstances.
The government has argued throughout the extended history of this case that the admission of the 185 reels of West Long Branch surveillance, if error, was harmless error. It renews that contention before us and suggests that we should determine that *177issue without further help from the trial judge. This suggestion has some appeal because the parties would understandably like to bring this case to a close. I would decline, however, to accept this invitation. As we noted in Vastóla II, “if the tapes should have been suppressed, the extent of the damage to the government’s case could not easily be assessed.” 915 F.2d at 877. The trial judge, who heard the very extensive evidence against Mr. Vastóla, is in a far better position than we to assess that damage, and I would solicit his help in doing so.
I would remand with instructions to decide the harmless error issue and to grant a new trial if that issue is determined in Mr. Vasto-la’s favor.
. As the majority correctly points out, we also referred to a 1986 statutory amendment authorizing roving surveillance upon a showing that the suspect’s purpose is to thwart interception by changing facilities. The "unmistakable inference” to be drawn from this amendment, we held, was that the other provisions of the statute "restricted surveillance to particular locations, regardless of whether the same suspects and crimes were involved.” Id. at 875. The above quoted text leaves no doubt, however, that our conclusion would have been the same in Vastóla II if we had confined our analysis to the text of the statute as it existed prior to this amendment when the surveillances in this case were conducted.
. During our analysis of the plain meaning of the text in Vastóla II, we pointed out that the Second Circuit case law existing at the time of the surveillance in this case did not support the view that a new authorization for surveillance at a different location could constitute an extension of a prior authorization for another site. We noted and rejected the government's contention that United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979), stood "for the proposition that the term, ‘extension,’ encompasses all continuation of wiretap orders involving the same crimes and substantially the same people.” 915 F.2d at 874 n. 15. We indicated that "[w]e would be hard pressed to read Vazquez so broadly.” Id. The Vazquez court summarized the state of the law in the Second Circuit in 1979 as follows:
Therefore, we conclude that the term "extensions,” as used in the phrase “period of the order, or extensions thereof” is to be understood in a common sense fashion as encompassing all consecutive continuations of a wiretap order, however designated, where the surveillance involves the same telephone, the same premises, the same crimes, and substantially the same persons. See United States v. Scafidi, supra, 564 F.2d at 641; cf. United States v. Principie, 531 F.2d 1132, 1142 n. 14 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1173, 51 L.Ed.2d 581 (1977).
Vazquez, 605 F.2d at 1278. It is thus clear that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit does not read its case law in the same way the majority reads it in footnote 8, supra.