dissenting.
I find myself in dissidence with the majority because, in my view, no defect in the design of the tire changer caused the injuries about which plaintiffs complain.
An exploding tire of unidentified origin shattered plaintiff Hector Pacheco’s left elbow as he removed the tire from a Coats Co. *42440-40 tire changer just after inflating it.1 The experts on both sides agreed that failure of the bottom bead of the tire caused the explosion.2 Plaintiffs’ experts testified that the table top was a “launching pad,” whereas the defendants’ expert described it as merely a “reaction surface.” Plaintiffs’ experts agreed that the result would have been the same with any horizontal or vertical surface.
The risk presented occurs only during the 30 seconds between detaching the hold-down cone and removing the inflated (or overinflated) tire from the tire changer. There is no risk of explosion while mounting or dismounting uninflated tires. Furthermore, the hold-down cone will restrain the tire if it explodes while being inflated.
I. Product Defect
Plaintiffs argue that the product was defective because it should have been designed to prevent injuries from the foreseeable event that a tire could explode in the time between releasing the hold-down cone and removing the tire from the tire changer.3 Defendants counter that plaintiffs’ concept for redesigning the tire changer does not eliminate explosions or serious injuries from explosions and it does eliminate the possibility of using one changer for a variety of tire sizes. Ultimately, the thrust of the argument is that the product is not defective because it cannot proximately cause this type of accident.
Defendants assert that the district court erred by refusing to find as a matter of Pennsylvania social policy that they are not required to bear the risk of loss caused by defective tires. In a Pennsylvania strict products liability case, before submitting the ease to the jury, the court is to decide “whether, under plaintiff’s averment of the facts, recovery would be justified.” Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978).4 In other words, the court decides whether the product is “unreasonably dangerous” or in a “defective condition” as the term is used in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Id. This involves consideration of whether the “product left the supplier’s control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended use.” Id. 391 A.2d at 1027. The court exercises its judgment as a social philosopher and a risk/utility economic analyst. Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 424 Pa.Super. 473, 623 A.2d 322, 324 (1993) (listing factors to be considered).
Courts in other states have described the intended use of a tire changer as excluding *425the event about which plaintiffs complain. In a ease very similar to ours, albeit with a 30-year older model, a unanimous Supreme Court of Iowa accepted the defendant’s contention that “the machine was a tire changing machine only, and not a tire holding machine, in case of a tire explosion by reason of air suddenly escaping from or adjoining the tire.” Davis v. Coats Co., 255 Iowa 13, 119 N.W.2d 198, 200 (1963). A Florida appeals court has agreed that “[t]he purpose of the machine was not to prevent a tire from exploding nor to hold it down if it did explode.” Simpson v. Coats Co., 306 So.2d 573, 574 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975). In affirming the directed verdict for the defendant, the Simpson court went on to state:
Neither was there any evidence that the use of the machine caused the explosion nor the accident. This is not a case of faulty design nor defective manufacture. The exploding tire was the proximate cause of the accident, not the tire changing machine suppled by appellee.
Id. (citing Menking v. Bishman Mfg. Co., 496 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1973, no writ)).
Although these eases differ on whether there was no negligence (Davis), no proximate cause' as a matter of law (Simpson), or no proximate cause as a matter of fact (Menking), all concur that the responsibility properly lies with the tire manufacturer, not the tire changer manufacturer.
At first blush, plaintiffs’ theory holding the tire changer manufacturer liable has some appeal because tire explosions are more likely to occur on a tire changer than anywhere else, so it would be desirable if tire changer manufacturers designed their products to accommodate these aberrations. However, there are two stronger counterarguments.
First, it is the tire manufacturer’s classical manufacturing defect that causes the accident. Products liability law developed to force the manufacturer to spread the risk of the few nonconforming items out of a large production lot. The law should not require the manufacturer of another product to insure this risk. Furthermore, liability for manufacturing defects forces the producer to adopt the appropriate level of quality control. Yet Coats cannot inspect nor improve products it does not control. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in refusing to hold a tire manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a defective rim:
This is not a case where the combination of one sound product with another sound product creates a dangerous condition about which the manufacturer of each product has a duty to warn. Nothing in the record suggests that Goodyear created the dangerous condition in this ease. Thus, we conclude that Goodyear had no duty to warn about the use of its tire with potentially dangerous multipiece rims produced by another where Goodyear did not contribute to the alleged defect in a product, had no control over it, and did not produce it.
Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 591 N.E.2d 222, 226 (1992) (citation omitted).
Second, this product in no way increases the risks attendant to tire changing as they existed prior to the invention of the machine. Without the machine, tire changing would be done on the ground, or some other horizontal surface. See Davis, 119 N.W.2d at 200. That plane would provide the same reactive surface the tire changer does. The machine does ease the task, and therefore provides utility. Among the questions to be considered is whether the product is safe for its intended use, not whether it could be made safer. See Pascale v. Hechinger Co., 426 Pa.Super. 426, 627 A.2d 750, 753 (1993).
Under our prediction of Pennsylvania law, the trial court should have concluded that the manufacturer of a tire changing machine is not liable for injuries caused by exploding tires. This would have ended the case.
II. Proximate Cause
Leaving aside whether the tire changer was “unreasonably dangerous,” the case should not have gone to the jury because Coats’ machine did not proximately cause the accident. Other jurisdictions have so held on almost identical facts. Simpson, 306 So.2d at 574; Menking, 496 S.W.2d at 765.
*426Defendants appropriately compare this case with the ramp in Habecker I. In that diversity case controlled by Pennsylvania law, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of a ramp that turned over when their decedent drove a forklift off the ramp’s edge. Even if the ramp was defective, it did not cause Mr. Habecker’s death. Driving off the ramp caused the fall and the death; the ramp’s twist did not contribute. Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir.1990). Similarly, the tire changer manufacturer should not be responsible for the (mis)appli-cation of other products to its machine.
The tire changer certainly did not cause this accident. Even plaintiffs’ experts agree that the tire caused the accident. Therefore, plaintiffs cannot recover under traditional products liability law. That leads to plaintiffs’ enhanced injury theory.
III. Enhanced Injury
Under this variation on the crashworthiness or “second collision” doctrine, plaintiffs show that the product proximately caused additional injuries, rather than causing the accident itself. In the seminal crashworthiness case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit defined collisions as an “intended use” of automobiles — indeed, a “frequent and inevitable contingency” — and therefore held the manufacturer liable for subjecting occupants to unreasonable risks of injury. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir.1968).5
Our case differs from Larsen iii several important respects. In Larsen, no product caused the collision. The driver who was responsible for the accident was liable for the initial injuries; the manufacturer of the ear that exacerbated the injuries was liable for the increment. Here, under plaintiffs’ theory of the case, another defective product is the source of the accident. The manufacturer of that product — the tire — is the appropriate defendant.
The manufacturer was held Hable in Larsen because features of the car inflicted additional injuries when the passenger had a “second collision” with the interior of the automobile. Our court has reiterated that the defect must have “increased the severity of the injury over that which would have occurred absent the defective design.” Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 213 (3d Cir.1991) (Habecker II) (quoting Barris v. Bob’s Drag Chutes & Equip., 685 F.2d 94, 99 (3d Cir.1982)). Given that both parties’ experts agree any plane — including the garage floor or the backyard — would have provided the thrust surface, the tire changer did not increase the injuries.
Even accepting the majority’s contention that prevention or reduction of injuries from exploding tires is an intended use of a tire changer as a matter of law, and substituting causation of enhanced injury for the lack of causation of the accident, plaintiffs would be required to prove (1) an alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances; (2) what injuries, if any, would have resulted had the alternative, safer design been used; and (3) as a corollary to the second element, the extent of enhanced injuries attributable *427to the defective design. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir.1976).6
Plaintiffs’ proof of each of the three required elements is lacking. They have not shown an alternative design that performs the required functions nor have they shown with sufficient specificity the injuries that would have occurred with the use of this hypothetical redesign and therefore the increment of enhanced injuries.
Plaintiffs’ expert proposes using .a disk the size of the interior diameter of the rim to support the tire instead of the tabletop. Defendants respond that this will not accommodate all sizes of tires as the changer does now, and will not prevent explosions or serious injuries from explosions. When asked for details of the redesign, such as the height of the disk, plaintiffs’ expert cavalierly responded that he would use the ergonomic data. This is not an adequate redesign.
Our prediction of Pennsylvania enhanced injury law requires proof of an alternative feasible design. Plaintiffs are not prepared to say that their proposal will work nor to show that it can perform the same tasks as the current model. Plaintiffs’ expert concedes that he has not done any engineering studies, much less built a prototype or produced a product. Defendants explained that the proposed disk cannot handle the forces required to mount a tire. The studies offered by the plaintiff showed that a smaller disk reduced the height the tire flew, but if you cannot change a tire on the alternative machine, a shorter flight path is irrelevant. I conclude that plaintiffs’ “design” is not evidence of a “feasible alternative, practicable under the circumstances” sufficient to go to the jury.
Plaintiffs’ proof of enhanced injuries is also vague. The only evidence I find of what the injuries would have been is the orthopedic surgeon’s testimony that the fractures would not have been comminuted and could have been repaired if the force had been substantially reduced. Our court’s prediction of Pennsylvania law requires proof of what impairment the simple fractures would have precipitated, but I do not find such evidence here. The plaintiffs’ failure expert 'contended that his design would have reduced the force by 98%. However, the design was not shown to perform the necessary tasks, nor were the 98% figures demonstrated to apply to the facts of this accident. Moreover, the 98% reduction in force cannot be directly applied to reduce the injuries or the medical expenses by 98%. This too is a failure of proof.
Because the tire changer did not cause the accident, enhanced injury is the only theory under which the plaintiffs could recover. Yet the jury was erroneously permitted to award damages for the entire injury.7
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the problems of proof in the crashworthiness case, crashworthiness is still a subset of design defect strict liability law. Pennsylvania courts would apply regular products law before limiting damages to the incremental injury. Therefore, a finding of nondefeetiveness as a matter of law prevents recovery under either theory.
Even without holding that the risk of loss belongs to the tire manufacturer, plaintiffs should have been limited to recovery for their enhanced injuries only. They have not *428borne their burdens on this record. I would reverse the judgment for plaintiffs.
. An anonymous customer who brought the tire to Pacheco for mounting reclaimed it after the accident but before its manufacturer was identified.
. A tire bead “is a strip of steel wire that is wrapped around and around [the inner edge of a tire] to help hold the tire on the rim of the wheel." Deanna Sclar, Auto Repair for Dummies 223 (1976). When the bead “seats” properly, the air pressure holds the edge of the tire against the rim. When the bead fails, i.e., breaks, the air escapes from the tire and, much like a balloon whose neck has been released, the tire becomes a projectile.
. An order granting partial summaiy judgment eliminated “[a]ll claims that the tire changer was defectively designed because of the absence of an interlock to prevent inflation unless the hold-down cone was attached to the center post [or] because it lacked a device which would restrain exploding tires and/or rims.” A previous order identified the genuine issue of material fact as "whether the configuration of the tire/wheel supporting structure of the Coats tire changer was responsible for the force with which the tire wheel assembly struck plaintiff.” With .the issue thus narrowed, and the plaintiffs’ experts' concessions regarding the cause of the explosion, I am not sure there was any theory for the jury under the district court’s rulings. However, the defendants do not explain the significance of these orders so I shall proceed as if they became irrelevant in later proceedings.
.Denying a defense motion for judgment as a matter of law (whether for summaiy judgment, directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict) is construed as an implied ruling that the product is unreasonably dangerous. See Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir.1982); Dambacher ex rel. Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408, 421, 423 n. 6 (1984), appeal dismissed, 508 Pa. 643, 500 A.2d 428 (1985). Although it might be preferable to resolve the matter pretrial hy summaiy judgment, the cases do not find any impediment to a later motion. Therefore, the defendants' motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. sufficiently preserved this point even though we cannot find a motion for summaiy judgment.
. Defendants contend that "crashworthiness” can apply only to vehicle design suits. True, it makes no sense to call the theory "crashworthiness” for a product that does not crash. However, the underlying logic permitting recovery for enhanced injury is easily transferrable. The original case adopting the theory described the liability as being imposed for incremental injury caused by negligent design although the accident was not produced by the defect. Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502. The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently applied the theory to allow recovery for the marginal injuries caused by the inability to shut off a motor, even though a malfunction of the cheese grater to which it was attached caused the original injuries. Calloway v. Hobart Corp., 1992 WL 309629 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 15, 1992).
The parties also seem confused by this court’s holding in Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Equip., 685 F.2d 94 (3d Cir.1982). Barns does not refuse to extend the crashworthiness theory to non-vehicles. Plaintiffs sued for the failure of a race car harness to restrain the driver during a rollover, resulting in his death. Of course, this is the intended use of such a harness. This was not a manufacturing defect. Nor was it an unintended side effect of the harness performing some other useful function. The defective design prevented the harness from fulfilling its purpose — reducing or preventing all injuries. Therefore, jury instructions for a typical § 402A strict liability case were correct. Barns did not require enhanced injury proofs because that was the doctrinally correct holding, not because the plaintiff did not introduce the theory.
. Huddell embodied the Third Circuit’s prediction of New Jersey law. 537 F.2d at 738. Its rule has since been adopted as a prediction of Pennsylvania law until its supreme court speaks. Jeng v. Witters, 452 F.Supp. 1349 (M.D.Pa.1978), aff'd without op. 591 F.2d 1334 & 1335 (3d Cir.1979); see also Roe v. Deere & Co., 855 F.2d 151, 153 & n. 2 (3d Cir.1988).
. Plaintiffs argue that defendants, requested the enhanced injury instruction and should not be allowed to object to its use. Plaintiffs also assert that "there is no evidence whatsoever” that the jury based its verdict on an enhanced injury theory. In my view, the parties have reversed their roles. It was in the plaintiffs’ interest to request the instruction and to secure a verdict based on this theory because their own experts conceded that the tire changer did not cause the accident. In the face of this concession, no rational jury could have found for the plaintiffs without an enhanced injury theory. Accepting plaintiffs’ statement in their appeal brief that the jury found the product defective in a customary § 402A defective design case, plaintiffs cannot recover.