concurring:
I agree with the majority that this court’s opinion in United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63 (4th Cir.1990), is dispositive of whether the application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 can lead to an overrepresentation of a defendant’s criminal history. I would like to emphasize, however, that Summers, like the case before us, concerned an issue of double-counting arising from the application of multiple subsections of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1.
Weddle was assessed one criminal history point for the state court’s imposition of a sentence of probation, which constitutes a prior criminal sentence other than a sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(c).* Weddle was assessed two additional criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(d) for having committed the instant offense while under the prior sentence of probation. Summers does not allow us to consider the application of these two subsections in tandem to be double-counting. *542893 F.2d at 68. Therefore, I agree that the district court’s downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 should be reversed.
Furthermore, I agree with the majority’s adherence to the D.C. Circuit decision in United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C.Cir.1993). Whether this offense is violent or non-violent is a difficult question, however. Weddle’s threat was communicated through the mails rather than in the presence of the victim, lessening the immediacy of the threatened harm. Given the surrounding factual circumstances, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s characterization of the offense as nonviolent is not clearly erroneous.
Section 4Al.l(a) mandates three criminal history points for a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month, while § 4Al.l(b) directs the assessment of two points for a sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a). U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(a), (b) (1991). Section 4Al.l(c) requires a sentencing judge to add one point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b). Id. § 4Al.l(c).