concurring:
The majority has concluded that it should affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Government. I totally agree with that result. However, I would reach that conclusion without ever addressing or relying upon the disclosure exceptions of 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4). Rather, I am persuaded that, as a threshold matter and pursuant to summary judgment principles, the record cannot support Ms. Tavery’s allegation that Mr. Steffan, the Government attorney, disclosed “return information” within the in-tendment of 26 U.S.C. § 6103. This being so, Ms. Tavery cannot prevail.
I.
Ms. Tavery alleged in her complaint that Mr. Steffan, the United States attorney identified in her submissions, disclosed “return information regarding [Ms. Tavery’s] Tax Returns without [her] permission,” and that such disclosure was made in violation of § 6103. I R Doc. 1 at ¶¶4, 6. The plain language of § 6103(b)(2) indicates that the statutory provision, which accords confidentiality to “return information,” is intended to act as a general prohibition only against public disclosure of tax information filed by the taxpayer with the IRS and disclosed by the IRS. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (defining “return information” to include element that it be “received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return * * *.”); see Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir.) (holding that “section 6103 applies only to information filed with and disclosed by the IRS”), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1033, 108 S.Ct. 1592, 99 L.Ed.2d 907 (1988); see also First Western Gov’t Secs. v. United States, 796 F.2d 356, 358 (10th Cir.1986) (“Return information requires some nexus between the *1431data or information obtained and the further-anee of obligations controlled by Title 26.”)-
A.
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); accord Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1525 (10th Cir.1992) (en banc). Statements of fact in support of, or in opposition, to a motion for summary judgment must be made under oath, and must be admissible in evidence. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e).1 The failure of a party resisting a summary judgment motion to contradict, specifically and affirmatively, the sworn fact statements of the moving party will result in judgment for the moving party. Id.
B.
In support of her motion for summary judgment, Ms. Tavery made only the following declaration:
1. I am Mary Ann Tavery, the plaintiff in the above-entitled action.
2. I did not give the United States Attorney the permission to disclose my return information in [Mr. Steffan’s brief] which is attached to the complaint.
3. It is my opinion that my income is not related to the resolution of any issue in the case 88-X-259.
4. I was not a party to the litigation in case 88-X-259.
5. I filed married-filing separately for the years 1986 to present.
I R. Doc. 6.
in opposition to Ms. Tavery’s motion for summary judgment and in support of its cross motion, the Government submitted the affidavit of Mr. Steffan. In that affidavit, Mr. Steffan, under oath, averred that he “was not given access by the Internal Revenue Service to any tax ‘return information’ of Ms. Tavery.” I R. Doc. 8 at ¶ 3. The affidavit submitted by the Government denying that Mr. Steffan obtained the disclosed information from the IRS created a genuine issue of material fact, thereby precluding summary judgment in favor of Ms. Tavery. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990) (“where the facts specifically averred by the [party opposing summary judgment] contradict facts specifically averred by the movant, the motion must be denied.”).
In order to resist the Government’s cross motion for summary judgment, Ms. Tavery then had to “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there [was] a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Rule 56(e)); accord Clemmons, 956 F.2d at 1525. Her sworn averment in response to the Government’s properly-supported cross motion had to contain more than “mere allegations or denials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). That is because the object of Rule 56(e) “is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint with conclusory allegations of an affidavit.” Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888, 110 S.Ct. at 3188. “Rather, the purpose of Rule 56 is to enable a party who believes there is no genuine dispute as to a specific fact essential
*1432to the other side’s ease to demand at least one sworn averment of that fact before the lengthy process of litigation continues.” Id. at 888-89, 110 S.Ct. at 3188-89.
C.
Ms. Tavery failed to present any countervailing evidence that would have created a dispute of material fact over the source of the information disclosed by Mr. Steffan. Her only offering on this point was a facetious, “Maybe a little bird told him.” 2 Ms. Tavery could not survive summary judgment in favor of the Government because she did nothing more than raise “ ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ ” Clemmons, 956 F.2d at 1525 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).
Although Mr. Steffan’s affidavit shed no light on the actual source of the disclosed information, the Government, in order to succeed on its cross motion for summary judgment, did not have to disprove Ms. Tavery’s allegations; it was sufficient that Mr. Steffan in his sworn affidavit affirmatively and specifically denied that he had been given access by the IRS to Ms. Tavery’s “return information.” See Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.1986) (“The moving party’s burden cannot be enhanced to require his proof of a negative; that is, not only is there no evidence in the record, but plaintiff’s evidence need not be disproved.”), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).
Summary judgment for the Government was appropriate because Ms. Tavery did not establish by affidavit or any other affirmative sworn evidence that the source of the information disclosed by Mr. Steffan was the IRS. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514 (“plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. This is true even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to conduct discovery.”); see also Thornton v. United States, 493 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.1974) (holding that unsworn statements in a brief do not constitute evidence).
Because the information disclosed by Mr. Steffan was never shown to be “return information,” (a burden which Ms. Tavery failed to carry) the district court never had to reach the question of whether the exceptions of § 6103(h)(4) shielded the Government from liability for disclosure of that information. See Stokwitz, 831 F.2d at 896 (“Nothing in [§ 6103] or its legislative history suggests an intention to protect a taxpayer’s financial data from any potential risk of disclosure *1433except that arising from the filing of the taxpayer’s return with the IRS.”); see also United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir.1979) (discussing legislative history). The district court nevertheless did reach that issue; but, as I have pointed out, did so unnecessarily and gratuitously.
II.
In its October 15, 1991 order denying Ms. Tavery’s motion for summary judgment and granting the cross motion of the Government, the district court never found that the information disclosed by Mr. Steffan had emanated from the IRS. The district court merely assumed that the allegation raised in Ms. Tavery’s complaint was correct, and that the information disclosed by Mr. Steffan was, in fact, “return information.” Those assumptions fueled the need for the district court to discuss the exceptions to disclosure found in 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4). However, in making those assumptions, the district court completely disregarded the Supreme Court’s instructions that:
It will not do to “presume” the missing facts because without them the affidavits would not establish the injury that they generally allege. That converts the operation of Rule 56 to a circular promenade: plaintiffs complaint makes general allegation of injury; defendant contests through Rule 56 existence of specific facts to support injury; plaintiff responds with affidavit containing general allegation of injury, which must be deemed to constitute averment of requisite specific facts since otherwise allegation of injury would be unsupported (which is precisely what defendant claims it is).
Lujan, 497 U.S. at 889, 110 S.Ct. at 3189.
In reviewing the district court’s order of summary judgment, we, of course, view the case in the same manner as the district court. Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 792 (10th Cir.1988). Hence, we examine the affidavits and all other materials which were before the district court so as “to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact pertinent to the ruling remains, and if not, whether the substantive law was correctly applied.” Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56).
In responding to the Government’s cross motion for summary judgment, Ms. Tavery relied solely on the unsupported and conclu-sory allegations contained in her pleadings. She offered no documentary or testimonial evidence based on personal knowledge, containing facts which would be admissible at trial, to substantiate her claim that the information disclosed was “return information” within the meaning of § 6103. Ms. Tavery could not defeat the Government’s properly supported summary judgment cross motion because she presented no evidence, let alone significant probative evidence, contradicting Mr. Steffan’s affidavit or tending to support her own motion for summary judgment. See Conaway, 853 F.2d at 792-93 (indicating that a party’s sole reliance on verified complaint would be insufficient to satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, “especially when the allegations contained in the pleading are merely conclusory.”).
The district court therefore was correct in granting summary judgment for the Government, but wrong in assuming as a matter of law that the information disclosed by the Government was “return information,” thereby requiring application of the exceptions of § 6103(h)(4).
The majority takes an opposing view. It believes that “it would be unfair to affirm the summary judgment against Ms. Tavery,” as I suggest, “on the different theory that she did not produce evidence that the IRS was the source of her return information.” Ante at 1427 n. 5. The majority’s stated reason for not affirming summary judgment in favor of the Government on this basis' is that the Government did not raise this argument before the district court, and therefore “Ms. Tavery was not alerted by the government below that such evidence had to be shown in order for her to avoid summary judgment.” Ante at 1427 n. 5.
Contrary to the majority’s position, Ms. Tavery cléarly was on notice that, in order to survive the Government’s cross motion for summary judgment, she had to come forward with sufficient countervailing evidence that *1434the IRS was the source of the disclosed information. Ms. Tavery was provided with such notice by the Government’s submissions to the district court both in opposition to her motion for summary judgment and in support of its own cross motion for summary judgment.
The Government argued before the district court that Ms. Tavery had not shown that the disclosed information was “[t]ax ‘return information,’ i.e., that the source of the information was the IRS; as a result, she is not entitled to summary judgment.” In its brief to the district court, the Government also noted that the affidavit of Mr. Steffan, “attached to the United States’ Response and Cross-Motion, establishes that the information concerning Ms. Tavery did not flow through the IRS, but rather was obtained by Mr. Steffan in some other, independent, way.” I.R. Doc. 9 at 6 (emphasis added). Not only was Ms. Tavery well aware of the Government’s position that the disclosed information was not “return information” because it had not come from the IRS, her unsworn reply to the Government’s cross motion for summary judgment focused on this precise point. Indeed, she identified as the “only issue for the Court to decide” the issue of whether Mr. Steffan could “escape from a charge of simple negligence by claiming he didn’t get the information from the IRS when he clearly can state no other source for his information?”3
Once the Government properly supported its cross motion for summary judgment with the affidavit of Mr. Steffan, Ms. Tavery could “not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but [had to] set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, relying upon the types of evidentiary materials contemplated by Rule 56.” John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 27 F.3d 500, 503 (10th Cir.1994) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Specifically, Ms. Tavery was required to satisfy the standards for affidavits set forth in Rule 56(e) in order to survive the Government’s properly supported cross motion for summary judgment. See Conaway, 853 F.2d at 792 (“Rule 56(e) requires that the affidavit be based on personal knowledge, contain facts which would be admissible at trial, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated therein.”).
Irrespective of the fact that a pro se litigant is held to less stringent standards than lawyers with respect to procedural infractions, see Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir.1988), Ms. Tavery failed to offer any evidence whatsoever that the IRS was the source of the information, or to refute the unequivocal assertion of Mr. Stef-fan that he had not been given access by the IRS to Ms. Tavery’s “return information.” Under such circumstances, the district court should have entered summary judgment in favor of the Government on the basis that there was no evidence that the information disclosed was “return information” within the intendment of § 6103.
The cases cited by the majority for a contrary result are inapposite to its position. See Ante at 1427 n. 5. In contrast to the instant case, those cases—Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.1993), and Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir.1989) — did not involve cross motions for summary judgment.
In Buckingham, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court which, after hearing the government’s motion for summary judgment and without notice to the government, had sua sponte granted summary judgment for Buckingham, the non-moving party, despite the existence of genuine issues of material fact. 998 F.2d at 742. Unlike the situation in Buckingham, here Ms. Tavery had notice and actually responded to the Government’s cross motion for summary judgment, but did so without furnishing any affirmative evidence that would have created a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment for the Government. Compare id.
The majority’s reliance on the Seventh Circuit case of Malhotra also is misplaced. If anything, Malhotra supports the proposition I have espoused here — that Ms. Tavery’s failure to offer evidentiary materials to rebut Mr. Steffan’s affidavit was fatal to her claim *1435that the Government had disclosed “return information.” In Malhotra, the defendant employer in an employment discrimination case had urged summary judgment on procedural grounds, but had supported its summary judgment motion with a substantive affidavit that set forth facially nondiscriminatory reasons for its denial of two of numerous promotions sought by the plaintiff employee. Because the employee failed to offer any evidentiary materials to rebut the employer’s affidavit, the Seventh Circuit held that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the employer on the two failure-to-promote claims refuted in the affidavit. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1311.
The majority cites Malhotra for the proposition that ‘“when a party moves for summary judgment on ground A, his opponent is not required to respond to ground B — a ground the movant might have presented but did not.’ ” Ante at 1427 n. 5 (citing Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1310). That language was used by the Malhotra court in explaining why the employer in that case should not have been granted summary judgment on the employee’s six remaining claims of discrimination in promotion, which the employer had failed to refute in its affidavit. Because the employer had not furnished an affidavit on these remaining six claims, the Seventh Circuit held that the employee was not required to produce evidence rebutting “a ground the movant might have presented but did not.” Id. at 1310.
Finally, the majority quotes language from the Supreme Court case of Celotex to bolster its position that Ms. Tavery was not required to furnish evidence on the issue of whether the IRS was the source of the disclosed information because the Government had not explicitly made that argument in its cross motion for summary judgment. See ante at 1427 n. 5. The majority apparently reads in isolation the Celotex Court’s observation that summary judgment sua sponte is appropriate “ ‘so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326, 106 S.Ct. at 2554) (emphasis added by majority).
In Celotex, the Court was not dealing with the issue we face here. The issue in Celotex was whether a district court properly could grant summary judgment on the motion of a defendant when that motion was not supported by affirmative evidence negating the plaintiffs wrongful-death claims. The Celotex Court held that
the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Because the parties in Celotex had already conducted discovery, the Court determined that the plaintiff could not seriously claim that she was not on notice that summary judgment could be entered against her. Noting that “district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence,” the Court reasoned that “[i]t would surely defy common sense to hold that the District Court could have entered summary judgment sua sponte in favor of [the defendant], but that [the defendant’s] filing of a motion requesting such a disposition precluded the District Court from ordering it.” Id. at 326, 106 S.Ct. at 2554.
In the instant case, the Government unquestionably was entitled to summary judgment on its cross motion. The majority and I are in full agreement on that point. Unlike the majority, however, I am convinced that the district court relied on the wrong grounds in entering summary judgment in favor of the Government. “In the review of judicial proceedings the rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.” Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 158, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937), reh’g denied, 302 U.S. 781, 58 S.Ct. 478, 82 L.Ed. 603 (1938); accord Robert-Gay Enters., Inc. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansas, 753 F.2d 857, 862 n. 5 (10th Cir.1985). Ac*1436cordingly, I would affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the Government’s cross motion, even though the district court relied on the wrong grounds.
I, therefore, respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority, but I do so without reaching any issue of disclosure as provided by 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4).
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) requires that:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to Ínter-rogatories, or farther affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided by this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
. Ms. Tavery replied to the Government's motion for summary judgment in an unsworn reply as follows:
The government argues that the unlawful disclosure is not an unlawful disclosure under 26 USC 7431 and 26 USC 6103 because the United States Attorney claims that he did not get the $40,000 amount of income from the IRS but from somewhere else. Maybe a little bird told him. The fact is, the United States Attorney at the very least doesn't know where he gleaned the information which shows he acted in a negligent fashion and his negligence would lead to an assessment against the government for damages under 26 USC 7431. In the Tenth Circuit the only thing the plaintiff has to show is simple negligence. See Chandler v. [United States, 687 F.Supp. 1515 (D.Utah 1988)]. The United States Attorney claims he knew how much money Mary Ann Tavery made in a year but didn’t know she filed married filing separately. The fact that he knew the amount of money Mary Ann Tav-ery made from some undetermined source but didn't know that Mary Ann Tavery filed separate returns clearly shows simply negligence under Chandler, supra.
There is only issue for the Court to decide. Can the United States Attorney make a specific unlawful disclosure and escape from a charge of simple negligence by claiming he didn’t get the information from the IRS when he clearly can state no other source for his information?
Assuming arguendo that the United States attorney did not get this information from the IRS; then where did he get it? If he got it from some individual who he was not able to identify in his affidavit; he still made an unlawful disclosure because that individual whether or not he worked for the IRS would not have legal authority to publish Taveiy's return information. Two wrongs do not make a right?
I R. Doc. 10 at 1-2.
. See supra note 2.